Thewesternbalkans.
On September 16, 2026, Ursula von der Leyen announced the concept of a European Security Council—a leadership-level forum for European security that envisions the participation of partners such as the UK, Norway, Ukraine, and Canada, alongside EU member states. The following day, it was revealed that von der Leyen had appointed Daniel Markić, the incumbent Director of INTCEN, to coordinate the intelligence unit attached to the new Security Council. He will also serve as the primary point of contact for the liaison officers whom national intelligence services dispatch to the European Commission President’s team. Thus, Markić finds himself at the intersection of two intelligence architectures: national intelligence services and the Ursula von der Leyen/European Security Council framework.
Who is Daniel Markić, the man the media calls a “top European intelligence official”?
Interestingly, this “European intelligence tsar” is not a representative from one of the major European powers that have historically held the most sway within the European intelligence community. Markić is Croatian; an individual from a smaller member state now finds himself at the heart of the emerging European intelligence architecture.
Markić is the former Director of Croatia’s Security and Intelligence Agency (SOA)—a role he held for two terms from 2016 to 2024—and has served since 2024 as the Director of EU INTCEN (Intelligence and Situation Centre), the EU’s civilian intelligence and analysis center. INTCEN is part of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and works in close cooperation with the intelligence services of the Member States. INTCEN serves as the EU’s intelligence fusion center—a hub where information from national agencies is gathered and analyzed. Under his leadership, the institution—which had operated almost unnoticed within the European bureaucratic apparatus for years—began to significantly expand its reach to decision-makers.
Unlike some of his predecessors at INTCEN who came from diplomatic backgrounds, Markić possesses operational intelligence experience, having spent nearly his entire career within the security sector. His background is particularly notable for its international dimension. Born in Paris, he holds French citizenship. In his youth, he was a member of the French national swimming team. He enrolled at the Sorbonne to study English and technical sciences but returned to Croatia in 1991 at the age of 19 to volunteer for the Croatian Army, eventually rising to the rank of major in the “Green Berets.” During this period, he forged strong ties with French special services and the French Foreign Legion (in 2024, France awarded him the Legion of Honour, one of the country’s most prestigious distinctions). In 1994, he transferred from the army to the Croatian intelligence service, and from 2001 to 2005, he served at the Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union in Brussels. Meanwhile, he completed a degree in international law in Grenoble. At the Security and Intelligence Agency (SOA), his portfolio covered the military sector and international cooperation prior to his appointment as deputy director and subsequently director.
As the long-standing head of the SOA, he advocated for more intensive intelligence sharing with partner agencies. His strategy was to position Croatia closer to the core of European and American intelligence cooperation, with cybersecurity serving as a key tool. In 2019–2020, Markić played an active role in establishing the Intelligence College in Europe (ICE). On February 26, 2020, twenty-three European nations signed a letter of intent in Zagreb to create the college. The initiative aimed to foster a shared European strategic intelligence culture and facilitate knowledge exchange among agencies, without involving the operational exchange of intelligence data. Croatia held the college’s first presidency in 2020, and Markić played a leading role in its establishment. Today, the ICE comprises 25 member states.
He also participated in the work of the Club de Berne—one of the most important informal networks for European intelligence cooperation—as well as the Counter Terrorism Group, which links European domestic intelligence agencies.
A “French” or “American” man?
During Markić’s two terms, the SOA developed close ties with US agencies and cybersecurity structures. For instance, in 2023, a joint operation took place between the SOA and US Cyber Command, in which an American team conducted a so-called “hunt forward” operation in Croatia to detect malicious cyber activity. Such a partnership enhances the capabilities of both sides and enables the exchange of knowledge regarding cyber resilience.
Transatlantic intelligence cooperation is clearly a key part of Markić’s professional credentials; he describes the 30-year Croatian-American intelligence partnership as reliable and valuable.
There is also a direct link to NATO. On April 24, 2023, SOA Director Markić met with David Cattler, then NATO Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security. They discussed the SOA’s contribution to the Alliance’s activities and the situation in Southeast Europe following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
There are no strong grounds for labeling Markić an “American man.” However, the appointment of a French citizen—and recipient of the Legion of Honour—to head the intelligence support unit for the European Commission’s new Security Council will certainly strengthen French influence. Markić’s Croatian background serves as a convenient official cover for this influence.
Duplicating INTCEN?
In recent months, Daniel Markić has emerged as one of the most influential figures in the European security architecture. Although he remains largely unknown to the general public, his influence in Brussels is becoming increasingly visible. At the same time, a quiet institutional battle played out in Brussels when Ursula von der Leyen proposed creating a new intelligence unit within her own administration. Officially, the talk was of a small analytical “intelligence cell” within the Commission’s Secretariat-General, designed to consolidate security information according to the Commission’s needs. Some viewed the idea as a first step toward a more centralized European intelligence system under the Commission’s political control. The EEAS and Kaja Kallas saw the project as an attempt by the Commission to encroach upon the security domain that formally belongs to the EU’s diplomatic service. Member states were also concerned about the possibility of the Commission gaining excessive access to intelligence information.
Daniel Markić was among the opponents of the EC project, fearing that the new structure would weaken the existing INTCEN and create a parallel system. His discreet lobbying aligned with the opposition coming from member states and the EEAS.
Ultimately, due to resistance from member states and other institutions, Ursula von der Leyen abandoned the initial idea of a separate European Commission intelligence unit in March of this year. Subsequently, in July, a different arrangement emerged: liaison officers from national intelligence services would work with the Commission. Markić now appears to be the person tasked with linking this network to the new European Security Council. This makes his appointment potentially far more significant than merely a new administrative post.
The EU’s Dilemma
There is currently strong political pressure within the EU for deeper integration in the realm of security. On the other hand, member states continue to jealously guard their own secrets. In this landscape, Daniel Markić is emerging as a key figure. He is seeking to transform INTCEN from a passive analytical hub into a more substantial European center for cooperation among intelligence agencies and is striving to foster a stronger “European intelligence culture.” Markić appears to be someone who has consistently built bridges between national intelligence services, NATO, the US, and European institutions. His new appointment under Ursula von der Leyen is a logical continuation of this very trajectory.
The most significant aspect of Markić’s professional profile is his effort to shape a European intelligence community. However, he does not envision European intelligence as the creation of a centralized agency that would replace national services. Markić is not the “European spymaster,” nor will he command national intelligence agencies. Rather, his model relies on increased information exchange among the 27 national services and greater trust, leading to superior joint analysis. Markić’s task will be to connect, coordinate, analyze, and disseminate intelligence, while national services retain their respective powers. He himself emphasizes the limitations imposed by Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union, under which national security remains the responsibility of the member states.
Information Must Reach the Leaders
The idea of establishing an intelligence unit within the emerging European Security Council appears to be a way to enhance the Commission’s direct access to national intelligence data without formally creating a European CIA. Liaison officers from national agencies will provide a direct channel to Ursula von der Leyen’s security structures, while Markić will contribute his experience in coordinating the intelligence community.
While there is currently no complete clarity or officially stated plan regarding the new Security Council structure and Daniel Markić’s role within it, his concept that “intelligence must reach the political leader” is clearly a key element of the ongoing, high-intensity debate on European security. Information holds little value if it merely sits in a database; it must reach the decision-maker at the right moment. Few would dispute his idea that the three central figures of European foreign policy and strategic leadership—Kaja Kallas, Ursula von der Leyen, and António Costa—should have timely access to the necessary information.
If von der Leyen has indeed appointed INTCEN chief Daniel Markić to coordinate the new intelligence unit attached to her European Security Council, this means he will also serve as the primary point of contact for the liaison officers sent by national intelligence agencies to the Commission President’s team. This significant and unprecedented institutional move by the Commission demonstrates its drive to secure better access to intelligence. If Markić retains his post at INTCEN as well, it would be a very elegant solution; there are precedents for this: Kallas heads the foreign service but is also a Vice-President of the Commission!
For now, the question remains open as to whether the current liaison officers to INTCEN will be accredited to the new unit. However, it is also possible that the EC might send its own liaison officers to national intelligence services.
Institutional conflict
A discussion regarding the potential for institutional conflict is unavoidable—the EU already has EU INTCEN within the EEAS structure, and if the Commission creates a parallel intelligence structure, the question arises: Who actually coordinates European intelligence? Kaja Kallas and the EEAS? Or von der Leyen and the Commission? Markić finds himself right between these two institutional realities. Thus, it can be argued that Markić is not building European intelligence through centralization, but rather by connecting national services.
A high-ranking European security official gave the correct answer to the question “Who actually coordinates European intelligence?”: “No one; there is no European intelligence: there is INTCEN as an EU analytical center supported by member state services; there are many European forums for cooperation between intelligence services, but there is no European intelligence! Member state services retain their independence from European bureaucrats!”
What Markić’s appointment means for the Western Balkans
Markić comes from Croatia and has extensive experience with the Balkan environment. This could have implications for how the future European system assesses Russia, China, the Western Balkans, migration, hybrid threats, and EU security. Croatia is deeply integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures, possesses experience in dealing with Russian and other external influences in Southeast Europe, and is historically and geographically close to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. While the Western Balkan countries are merely candidates for EU membership, they are closely tied to the EU’s security system—and this is not just a matter of theory.
Markić’s appointment is potentially significant for how Brussels will view the Western Balkans region. It is unlikely he harbors a specific, hidden “Balkan doctrine,” yet his public statements indicate that the Western Balkans form part of his strategic framework rather than being a peripheral issue.
The appointment of Croatian military veteran Markić—who was wounded in combat against the Serbian army in Krajina in 1992—to a high-level post in a sensitive sector of the European Commission will certainly not be well-received in Belgrade, Banja Luka, or Sarajevo, and could influence political sentiment in Brussels regarding enlargement.
The new European intelligence architecture is not focused solely on Russia. Markić himself speaks of a global spectrum of threats, including cybersecurity, terrorism, and strategic competitors. The Commission is stepping up security measures amidst the rising activity of foreign intelligence services, including China’s. In this context, what will be potentially significant for the Western Balkans is not only Russian political influence or disinformation, but increasingly the influx of Chinese technologies, infrastructure development, and issues of economic security and strategic dependence.
From Croatia to the Heart of European Intelligence
Ursula von der Leyen’s selection of Daniel Markić likely signals a significant shift: for the EU and NATO, the Western Balkans are gradually evolving from primarily an enlargement issue into a security issue. While this may not be an explicitly stated goal of Brussels, intelligence assessments regarding Russian influence—as well as Chinese investments, technology, infrastructure, and economic security—necessitate an overall strengthening of European intelligence capabilities.
