Thewesternbalkans.
Serbia’s foreign policy stances took a back seat during the election campaign for the snap parliamentary elections held on October 25, 2026. The primary slogan of the opposition student movement, „Students List“ (SL), was “Change”—a change now set to take place following their victory, though primarily within the domestic sphere. The outgoing regime traditionally relied on “strategic ambiguity” in its foreign relations, balancing between Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing. The student movement did not criticize Vučić for “sitting on several chairs”. A government led by “Students’ List“ will inherit this foreign policy balancing act, having already signaled that certain foreign policy positions will remain unchanged.
Regarding issues such as relations with Russia and the European Union, or the status of Kosovo, the student movement’s stance does not differ significantly from that of Vučić’s party. The overall direction of foreign policy will not change. However, „Student List’s” commitment to advancing democratic reforms will lead to certain adjustments in the foreign policy course, as well as significant changes within the foreign policy apparatus and the manner in which the country manages its external relations.
The Foreign Policy Platform of the Student Movement
The foreign policy section of the “Student List” platform, published in late September and titled “Foreign Affairs and National Interests,” is relatively brief; however, it offers significant insights into areas of continuity as well as intended adjustments to Serbia’s foreign policy course.
While the core objectives of foreign policy will remain unchanged, the methods employed will shift. The personalized “summit diplomacy” is set to be replaced by an institutional, legally regulated, and more transparent approach. Key constants include the maintenance of “military neutrality” and the preservation of “Kosovo and Metohija as part of Serbia”—a commitment explicitly stated and linked to the country’s constitution. EU membership is not mentioned at all; instead, the focus is placed primarily on economic and financial relations with the Union and individual member states. This implies a continuation of the current, slow-paced integration process. Furthermore, the platform upholds the traditional partnership with the Russian Federation—including the refusal to impose sanctions—as well as the strategic dialogue with the United States and the strategic partnership with the People’s Republic of China.
The most profound reforms are expected within the foreign ministry and other state bodies with jurisdiction over foreign affairs. Efforts will be directed toward combating political patronage and nepotism, with a complete shift toward relying on professional expertise.
Kosovo
The newly formed ruling coalition in Serbia is not expected to support the recognition of Kosovo. In 2026, the “Student List” even published a special memorandum on Kosovo, in which the territory is viewed as part of Serbia rather than as an independent state. At least on paper, the “Student List” takes a harder line on Kosovo than Vučić does. The students have vowed to prosecute representatives of the regime for potential crimes related to the conclusion and implementation of unconstitutional agreements.
Even the most liberal members of the “Student List” continue to use nationalist terminology from the eras of Milošević and Vučić, referring to “Kosovo and Metohija” or speaking of negotiations with “Kosovo Albanians.”
If reliance is placed solely on pressure from the EU, the process of normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo will remain at a standstill.
European Union
The priorities championed by the student movement during the protests—combating corruption, ensuring transparency in public procurement, and upholding the independence of the judiciary—align directly with the “fundamentals” clusters of the EU accession negotiation chapters. However, the protesters refrained from displaying EU flags or symbols, and the “Student List” has not articulated a clear vision regarding accession to the Union.
Although the „Student List“ is primarily oriented toward European values, this stance cannot be taken for granted, given the heterogeneous composition of the group. A change of power in Serbia will not automatically open a “fast track” to the EU. The „Student List“ favors an integration process rooted in reforms rather than one driven by geopolitical commitments. Student leaders are open to resolving the question of membership via a referendum, which could potentially be organized after six months or a year of discussions.
Nevertheless, during the delicate process of transforming its political institutions, Serbia will require the support of partners. Many Serbs will likely view the EU as a suitable ally. This offers the new government a genuine opportunity to make progress in areas where previous Serbian administrations encountered difficulties or stagnation. Rapid progress can be expected regarding Chapters 23 and 24 of the negotiation process—which concern the rule of law—but not regarding Chapter 35, which pertains to international policy. Overall, Belgrade is set to play a long game of negotiations without actual accession, as the EU will continue to push for changes in Serbian foreign policy. The Union’s demands—specifically for greater alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (including sanctions against Russia) and the normalization of relations with Kosovo (entailing recognition by Belgrade)—remain on the table. However, these issues are absent from the governing program of the election-winning force; given the high domestic political cost involved, the latter refuses to address them. Consequently, Western pressure may shift its focus toward Belgrade’s relations with China.
The Russian Federation
For Russia, the change in power in Serbia is not particularly welcome, as Russian institutions are ill-prepared for a post-Vučić landscape in Serbia. Belgrade’s stance toward Russia will remain unchanged, driven by the need for coordination within the UN Security Council regarding Kosovo, as well as by significant interests in the energy sector. Both in the foreign policy platform of the winning movement and in the post-election statements and interviews of its key figures, the refusal to impose sanctions on Russia is firmly maintained. This position is framed within a broader perspective: the argument that sanctions fail to resolve political or security challenges—a conclusion drawn from Serbia’s own historical experience. The issue of Kosovo, however, requires the “Student List” to acknowledge that, at the same time, they will “adhere to the principled position under international law of respecting the territorial integrity of all sovereign states worldwide—including the integrity and inviolability of the territory of the Republic of Ukraine”—a stance also inherited from the previous administration. Moscow is currently too toxic for any rapprochement, and, furthermore, the production of Serbian ammunition for Ukraine will continue.
Even if a government led by the “Student List” were to see its hopes for improvements in media freedom, the rule of law, and civil society realized in the foreseeable future, this would be unlikely to spark a new public debate regarding relations with Moscow.
USA
The government’s program envisages a strategic dialogue with Washington in the fields of telecommunications, energy, artificial intelligence, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and defense. The economic interests of the executive branch in Washington regarding Serbia—and the partnerships linked to them—will continue to develop. The U.S. is focused on energy diversification and limiting the presence of Chinese technologies. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress will likely maintain its interest in democratic accountability and the rule of law in Serbia.
While U.S. pressure to eliminate Russian influence in the country’s energy sector might temporarily ease, the issue remains tied to broader regional and geopolitical dynamics.
China
Over the years, China and Serbia have forged deeply intertwined economic ties that have benefited Belgrade. Serbia serves as China’s primary gateway into the region: between 2009 and 2021, the country received €10.3 billion out of a total of €32 billion in Chinese investments across the Western Balkans. The new Serbian government has no real incentive to alter its existing policy toward China.
A political shift could potentially cool diplomatic ties between Beijing and Belgrade and lead to greater scrutiny of Chinese investments in Serbia; however, it is unlikely to overturn a relationship built upon years of cooperation. Grandiloquent labels—such as referring to China as an “ironclad friend”—and emotive phrases like “community with a shared future” will quietly fall by the wayside. In future projects, the new Serbian authorities are likely to take an increasingly pragmatic stance, insisting on strict adherence to domestic regulations, environmental standards, labor rights, and workplace safety.
Regarding China, the “Student List” platform envisions deepening cooperation in high-tech investments, while simultaneously demanding full compliance with national legislation across all project implementations.
The “Student List” agenda—focused on domestic reforms and enhanced transparency—could fundamentally alter the nature of infrastructure deals involving Chinese and other foreign partners by subjecting them to more rigorous oversight.
Beijing’s reaction to the “Student List” victory has been cautious and carefully measured. The challenge for Beijing lies in the fact that its own approach relies on “leader-to-leader” diplomacy, conducted away from the public eye, whereas the students’ domestic political mandate is rooted in the principle of transparency in interstate relations. This does not imply a severance of bilateral ties; however, Beijing will be compelled to adapt to the shifting landscape of Serbian political norms.
Furthermore, solutions will need to be found for certain sensitive issues, such as the potential liability of Chinese contractors regarding the collapse of the canopy in Novi Sad in 2024, the confidentiality of contracts for Chinese projects in Serbia, and the environmental and social concerns surrounding Chinese enterprises in Zrenjanin, Bor, and Smederevo.
However, regardless of any changes the contracts may undergo, the strongest factors ensuring continuity in the relationship remain: China’s support regarding the Kosovo issue at the UN Security Council, and the free trade agreement that entered into force in 2024. SL does not, in any form, affect the core interests of the PRC regarding Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and the Uyghurs.
The strategic framework of the relationship will be preserved, but the relationship itself will lose its special and privileged character, featuring less political symbolism and greater transparency and accountability.
Israel
Belgrade’s most significant shift in foreign policy could impact Israel. “We will not be complicit in Israel’s systematic attempt to destroy the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip,” the authors of the SL’s foreign policy platform state unequivocally. Consequently, Serbia—which possesses a substantial defense industry comprising nearly 200 state-owned and private companies—could lose its role as a potential military-industrial hub, one capable of providing Israel with an expanded production base in the event of a prolonged conflict.
Meanwhile, Israel has established itself as a key supplier of advanced defense technologies to Serbia. In April 2026, the “Serbian-Israeli Strategic Dialogue” was launched, and President Aleksandar Vučić unveiled plans for a joint Serbian-Israeli program to manufacture combat drones. This trend toward a deeper, long-term partnership culminated in September 2026 with the opening of a joint venture in Serbia for the assembly of Israeli-designed combat drones.
Belgrade has a traditional aptitude for balancing its relations with various—and often mutually hostile—partners; thus, a change in government would not automatically lead to hostility toward Israel or the termination of existing military contracts. However, in this sensitive area, even a mere delay in an export license or the review of a contract could disrupt supply chains—which, in times of crisis, could have far-reaching consequences.
The student movement has not yet demonstrated an intention to fundamentally alter Serbia’s foreign policy. The review of specific contracts should not lead to a strategic break with Israel.
