Thewesternbalkans
Two of the five major players with real influence on the Western Balkans are the EU and Türkiye. Everyone is betting on their trump cards, but both sides are looking for maximum strengthening of their positions in the region. The actions of both the EU and Türkiye, as well as the interaction between them, are important for the future development of the Western Balkans. This makes the analysis of the relations between Türkiye and the EU particularly relevant.
The European Council of 29-30 June 2023 invited the High Representative and the Commission to submit a report on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations, building on the instruments and options identified by the European Council, and with a view to proceeding in a strategic and forward-looking manner.
It was submitted by the Commission and the High Representative joint report in December 20, 2023. Report outlines the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations in key areas and sets out elements to develop this relationship, in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and a broader, fast-changing geopolitical and security environment.
The main findings in this report are following:
POLITICAL RELATIONS
Beyond the bilateral and economic ties set out below, there are other factors that profoundly shape the complex and challenging context of EU-Türkiye relations: the need for a sustainable de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean; the Cyprus issue; Türkiye’s position on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; NATO enlargement; Türkiye’s position on foreign and regional policy issues, including the Middle East and particularly since the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October; and the domestic human rights and rule of law situation.
Since 2021, the focus in EU-Türkiye relations has shifted to concrete steps towards re-engagement, including strong EU support in the aftermath of the devastating earthquakes in 2023.
However, the full positive potential of the EU-Türkiye relationship has not yet materialised.
Eastern Mediterranean
Relations between Greece and Türkiye deteriorated until early 2023 with hostile rhetoric, violations of Greek national airspace including overflights of Greek inhabited areas and threatening statements regarding the sovereignty of Greek islands. Following the devastating earthquakes in Türkiye on 6 February 2023, there was a marked improvement in the relations. Greece rapidly provided humanitarian aid and support to Türkiye, followed by several high-level phone calls and meetings.
Cyprus issue
The Cyprus settlement issue is a core element of Türkiye’s strong disagreements with the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The situation in Cyprus continued to deteriorate due to the consistent efforts of Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to undermine the basis of the settlement of the Cyprus issue enshrined in the UN framework.
However, some progress was made in agreements on implementation of confidence building measures (CBMs), key in creating an environment conducive to building trust.
Eastern Mediterranean Conference
A standing Eastern Mediterranean Conference (EMC) as an inclusive yet flexible and demand-driven platform, could serve as a framework to discuss and develop cooperation opportunities, including in the context of new EU legislative acts and instruments in specific areas such as energy and economic security, connectivity, digital and green transition and industrial policy.
The broader region
Yet Türkiye is currently clearly at odds with EU priorities under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), maintaining a very low alignment rate of on average 10%. Stepping up its alignment would be a significant signal of Türkiye’s commitment to the EU in the new geopolitical context.
Türkiye continues to oppose Russia’s military aggression, and engages diplomatically, including in the initially successful facilitation of the export of Ukrainian grain via the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). The Turkish leadership invested in facilitating prisoners’ exchanges and worked on de-escalation and a cease-fire. At the same time, Türkiye’s non-implementation of the EU restrictive measures against Russia, while intensifying trade and economic ties with Moscow, poses serious risks of circumvention of EU restrictive measures which must be addressed. The Turkish stance on Sweden’s accession to NATO was also seen negatively.
Cooperation on Common Security and Defence Policy and Counter Terrorism
Türkiye is a longstanding partner of the EU in crisis management, an important contributor to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations and the biggest non-EU troops contributor in Operation European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina Operation ALTHEA. Most recently, Türkiye took over the command of NATO KFOR in Kosovo. Türkiye seeks further involvement in CSDP and EU defence initiatives, whilst at the same time continuing to exclude a Republic of Cyprus from all possible cooperation with NATO. Türkiye continue to create practical and serious operational difficulties for further developing a genuine EU-NATO organisation-to-organisation relationship.
BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TÜRKIYE.
The Report sad that:
Association Agreement. The Association Agreement of 1995 has succeeded in laying a firm basis for bilateral relations. However, its implementation keeps encountering serious impediments. The unresolved Cyprus issue has had an impact ever since the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU in 2004. Türkiye decided in July 2005 not to implement the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement extending its Customs Union with the EU towards the Republic of Cyprus. In light of the unauthorised drilling activities of Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Council decided in July 2019 not to hold for the time being the EU-Türkiye Association Council. Preparatory Association Committees, chaired at senior officials’ level, have not taken place either.
Accession negotiations, accession criteria and pre-accession aid. Türkiye was granted the status of candidate country in December 1999. In light of the continued, serious backsliding on core EU principles and values, the Council noted in June 2018 that Türkiye had been moving away from the European Union and therefore its accession negotiations had “effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing”.
Under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for 2021-2027 (IPA III), the EU provides support to Türkiye in areas of key EU interest, in line with the evolving relationship with the country. In 2022, the EU allocated EUR 221 million for actions in Türkiye, reflecting the level of ambition of Türkiye in its reforms. In 2022, the Commission established a Turkey Investment Platform (TIP) under the European Fund for Sustainable Development plus (EFSD+), which will provide EU guarantees in support of private and public investments in key sectors. In early 2023, the TIP Operational Board endorsed 14 guarantee programmes for a value of EUR 317 million guarantee coverage and an expected volume of up to EUR 2 billion in investments.
Since the 2019 Council conclusions, which called on the European Investment Bank (EIB) to review its operations in Türkiye, the EIB stopped all new operations in the country, with the exception of one framework loan of EUR 400 million, decided in the wake of the 2023 earthquakes.
Migration and the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. The March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement provides the overall framework for the cooperation on migration. Since the start of its implementation, there has been a substantial decrease in the number of irregular crossings from Türkiye to Greece. Even though tragic incidents continued, the number of lives lost in the Aegean Sea has significantly decreased since the record numbers in 2015-2016.
The slow pace of returns to Türkiye has been an issue ever since the adoption of the Statement. The Turkish authorities unilaterally suspended readmissions under the Statement in March 2020, citing COVID-19 restrictions. Despite repeated requests by the Greek authorities and the Commission, the issue has not been resolved yet.
Since 2011, the EU has mobilised around EUR 10 billion to assist refugees and host communities in Türkiye. The EUR 6 billion budget of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey has been fully committed and contracted, with more than EUR 5.1 billion disbursed so far.
On 18 October 2023, the Commission presented an Action Plan for the Eastern Mediterranean migration route to address the challenges more effectively. The plan outlines concrete measures to prevent irregular departures, combat smuggling and provide legal pathways. The Turkish authorities and airline companies also work to improve the effectiveness of passenger screening and border controls at Istanbul airport.
Summits and high-level dialogues.
Regular high-level dialogues constitute an important platform to discuss joint opportunities and challenges and contribute to improving overall EU-Türkiye relations.
EU response following the 2023 earthquakes in southern Türkiye.
Following the devastating earthquakes in February 2023, the EU immediately mobilised search and rescue teams, and deployed field hospitals to provide relief. The Commission and the Swedish Presidency of the Council organised an international donors conference on 20 March 2023, “Together for the people in Türkiye and Syria”, at which EUR 6 billion were pledged for earthquake-affected people in Türkiye, including EUR 3.6 billion in a Team Europe approach including EUR 1 billion from the EU budget.
6. People-to-people contacts and Türkiye’s participation in EU programmes
For the 2021-2027 period, Türkiye has joined Erasmus+, Horizon Europe, the European Solidarity Corps programme, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, the Customs programme, the Single Market and Digital Europe programmes, the European Environmental Agency and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. Despite initial interest, Türkiye has not pursued participation in the Creative Europe, LIFE, Fiscalis, InvestEU and EU4Health programmes.
Visa liberalisation. On 16 December 2013, the EU and Türkiye launched a Visa Liberalisation Dialogue, parallel to the signature of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement9. This Dialogue is based on the roadmap towards a visa free regime, which sets out 72 benchmarks that Türkiye needs to meet.
However, six benchmarks remain outstanding, while those considered provisionally fulfilled also require continuous monitoring.
EU restrictive measures. The framework of restrictive measures established in 2019 in light of Türkiye’s illegal drilling activities in the waters surrounding Cyprus, remains in place along with the listings that were adopted on 27 February 2020. In November 2023, following the fourth annual review, the Council extended the framework until end of November 2024.
ECONOMY AND TRADE.
The Report findings are as follow:
EU-Türkiye trade framework. In 2022, Türkiye removed additional duties on 500 product groups coming from third countries, which had been imposed in violation of the Common Customs Tariff. In 2023, it also advanced considerably on the removal of another barrier – the localisation requirement and domestic prioritisation of pharmaceuticals.
The Customs Union Joint Committee on 27-28 November 2023 was another occasion to check progress in resolving these EU priority issues.
Modernisation of the Customs Union. The Commission submitted to the Council in December 2016 draft negotiating directives on ‘a new agreement to modernise the Customs Union (CU) and extend the scope of the bilateral preferential trade relationship’ with Türkiye. The draft directives seek the modernisation of the 1995 Customs Union, notably by including an effective dispute settlement mechanism, increased mutual liberalisation on trade in agricultural and fisheries and an extension to new areas such as services, public procurement, investment and sustainable development.
The impact assessment prepared by the Commission at the time noted that the modernisation would have a substantial positive impact and bring economic benefits both to Türkiye and the EU. The fact that Türkiye does not ensure the effective application of the current Customs Union to all Member States remains a serious issue.
EU restrictive measures against Russia. Despite being a candidate country sharing a Customs Union with the EU, Türkiye has chosen not to align with the EU sanctions regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Overall, the alignment of Türkiye with CFSP measures is very low. There are growing commercial and financial flows with Russia and several Turkish banks continue to facilitate trade payments.
The Commission actively monitors the considerable evidence of Türkiye’s territory being used to divert sanctioned goods to Russia, notably as regards Common High Priority Items.
Economic cooperation. Since 2015, all candidate countries and potential candidates, including Türkiye, have submitted annual Economic Reform Programmes (ERP), as part of efforts to strengthen their economic governance. The ERP contains medium-term macroeconomic projections, budgetary plans for the next three years and structural reform plans. Based on the ERP and the Commission’s assessment, the annual Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye at ministerial level provides targeted economic policy guidance. A High-level Economic Dialogue was set up in 2015 but suspended for the time being in 2019. The European Investment Bank Group and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development19 focus current operations in Türkiye on the private sector.
Other priority sectors. Türkiye is one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the region. Its emissions have risen sharply over the last decades. Türkiye ratified the Paris Agreement in 2021, announcing its plan to reach net-zero-emissions by 2053.
The energy sector is of strategic importance in EU-Türkiye relations. Technical exchanges focus on security of supply in the EU and in Türkiye and clean energy transition.
Transport relations between Türkiye and the EU remain challenging despite shared interests. Türkiye has shown strong interest in encouraging sustainable maritime and aviation fuels production and uptake.
On public health, Türkiye was recovering from the impact of COVID-19, when two earthquakes hit the country in February 2023. The disaster had a direct impact on 15 million people and the capacity of the healthcare system was seriously affected. The EU will continue supporting access to public health for migrants and refugees, benefitting also host communities.
Türkiye is a participating state in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). In the wake of the February 2023 earthquakes, Türkiye activated the Mechanism. Subsequently, all member and participating states offered major collaborative support via the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) of the European Commission.
The main conclusion of the Report is that the EU clearly has a strategic interest to develop such a relationship with Türkiye in all possible areas, based on trust and a culture of consensus, not least against the background of broader geopolitical shifts. The current state of play allows for some further steps towards constructive engagement, building on the positive elements suggested in 2021. The Commission and the High Representative propose different actions to energise key areas of our cooperation as reinstate the EU-Türkiye High-level Dialogues on Economy, Energy and Transport; resume meetings of the Association Council and the High-level Political Dialogue at ministerial level; Organise further rounds of sectoral High-level Dialogues on climate, health, migration and security, agriculture as well as research and innovation; Set up a new High-level Dialogue on Trade; Conduct the EU-Türkiye dialogues on foreign policy and regional issues regularly in a more structured way, with a view to be more effective and operational, in parallel with decisive steps by Türkiye to increase alignment with the EU CFSP; Invite the Foreign Minister of Türkiye to informal meeting(s) of EU Foreign Ministers (“Gymnich” meetings), when relevant; Encourage Türkiye to increase its contributions to CSDP missions and operations; Resume discussions on the draft negotiating framework for the modernisation of the EU-Türkiye Customs Union, as proposed by the Commission, on the understanding that Türkiye keeps addressing the circumvention of EU restrictive measures against Russia via its territory rapidly and efficiently and continues to resolve trade irritants; In particular, Türkiye should implement effective measures to stop the re-export of Common High Priority (“battlefield”) items; the Council should adopt the negotiating directives and authorise the Commission to open negotiations for the modernisation of the Customs Union; Adopt new negotiating directives for a Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement; A more effective and mutually beneficial implementation of key areas of the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, notably on migration management is necessary; As a matter of priority, explore possibilities with Member States to facilitate access to visa applications, in particular for certain specific categories of Turkish citizens when applying for visa to the EU (business people, students, Turkish citizens with family members in the EU etc.).
Comments: The European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have produced a very detailed document on the relations between the EU and the Republic of Türkiye, which shows that the attitude and approach towards the country is similar to that towards the countries of the Western Balkans .
At the same time, the EU’s attempts in recent years to sanction and “punish” Türkiye have led to a practical freezing of political and maybe some of the economic relations, as well as Türkiye‘s withdrawal from European integration priorities, despite the current Customs Union Agreements. In the context of the Western Balkans and the possibilities of the Republic of Türkiye to influence the processes in some of the Balkan countries (Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina), it should be noted that the mentoring approach of the leaders from Brussels can hardly be defined as constructive. As I have noted before, Türkiye has its own agenda, subordinated to the country’s interests, and sets its own priorities according to these interests.
The document in question was presented to the European Council on 14 and 15 of this year, but it has been taken just for information.
