Thewesternbalkans.
If some miracle happens and the dispute between North Macedonia and Bulgaria is resolved today, will North Macedonia still be ready for EU membership?
The short answer is: not yet, according to current assessments in the European union. However, this does not mean that membership is out of the question – the country has made progress in some areas, but there are still significant unresolved issues.
North Macedonia has been a candidate for membership since 2005. It has been a member of NATO since 2020. Legislation is gradually being harmonized with that of the EU in a number of areas. In the political area, the most of the European Commission’s assessments are that further substantial reforms are needed. The EU continues to insist on a more independent judiciary, a more effective fight against corruption and organized crime. There is a significant amount of European legislation that still needs to be introduced and effectively implemented. Further reforms are needed to increase administrative capacity so that the state administration can implement and enforce EU legislation. The government is aware of the need to bring the Electoral Code into line with several OSCE recommendations and to accept the diaspora vote.
The economy of North Macedonia functions as a market economy, but it needs to become more competitive.
In addition to the readiness of North Macedonia itself, EU accession also requires the unanimous approval of all member states. This means that progress depends both on Skopje fulfilling the criteria and on political agreement within the EU. The rulers of North Macedonia are disappointed that European integration is burdened with bilateral issues and insist that it remains a process based on clear criteria, values and the implementation of reform obligations. Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski has repeatedly stated his expectation that even if the Bulgarians are included in the Constitution and all reforms are implemented, new demands will follow for Skopje.
Brussels, on its side, shows satisfaction that North Macedonia is one of the countries with the best achievements in the Reform Agenda, having fulfilled the 10 reform requirements, with the exception of the Electoral Code. The government in Skopje is very active in implementing the Growth Plan, which is not dependent on the stagnation in the negotiation process due to the bilateral dispute with Bulgaria.
Therefore, at present, the prevailing assessment is that North Macedonia is not yet ready for membership, but remains a candidate country and can join if it meets the necessary conditions and receives unanimous support from the member states.
Paradoxically, Brussels is striving to accelerate enlargement with the Western Balkans with the main motive that otherwise the vacuum will be filled by external non-European powers. But the exact opposite is happening with North Macedonia – it is the strongest of all other six Western Balkan countries in striving to become a major partner of the United States. North Macedonia is a strategic partner of the United States and is striving to sign various agreements and attract investments from the United States. Skopje is also turning to other non-European partners from which it can receive investments, including from China. These investors are not necessarily a bad thing, but they limit the remained tools of Brussels for influence.
No change in the negotiating framework
The EU negotiating framework for North Macedonia is based on the so-called French proposal, which envisages North Macedonia including Bulgarians in its Constitution as one of the many minorities in the country. Western diplomats remind that the 2022 compromise was concluded between Skopje and Brussels and are categorical that the document will not be reopened, despite various political manifestations from Skopje. Bulgaria’s position is clear and easily defensible: Skopje’s problem is now with Brussels, not Sofia.
The EU position remains unchanged: the July 2022 negotiating framework is not subject to renegotiation; constitutional amendments are a precondition for opening the first negotiating cluster; Skopje must fulfill the commitments already made.
European Council President António Costa reiterated publicly in June 2026 that “implementation of the agreed constitutional changes is the only way to open negotiations”.
However, the EU does not have the leverage to exert serious pressure on North Macedonia or Bulgaria and calls only for a compromise, which requires an open, honest and calm dialogue between Skopje and Sofia. And this is tantamount to achieving a miracle.
Is Euroscepticism increasing in North Macedonia?
The political leadership in Skopje claims that the EU’s condition for including Bulgarians in the country’s Constitution is leading to an increase in Euroscepticism in North Macedonia. Skopje directly blames Bulgaria for the decline in the Macedonian population’s positive attitude towards the EU.
The real picture is more complex than is often presented in the media. Data from the latest long-term survey by the Skopje think tank Institute for Democracy Societas Civilis (IDSCS), conducted in the fall of 2025, show:
– 71% of citizens support North Macedonia’s EU membership;
– 14% are against;
the rest are undecided or have no opinion.
This is one of the highest levels of support in recent years.
There is currently no decline in support for the EU. Rather, three periods are observed: in 2018-2020, support for the EU was around 75-80%. In 2021-2024, there is a decline to around 60-62%. In 2025, there is a new increase to 71%.
The main reasons for the decline between 2020 and 2024 are:
– Disappointment with the accession process: Many citizens believe that the country has made heavy compromises: the name change after the Prespa Agreement; the subsequent Bulgarian-Macedonian disputes; the delay in real negotiations. According to surveys, over 40% of citizens see precisely the disputes with neighbors as the main obstacle to membership.
– Growing Euroscepticism among ethnic Macedonians: In 2024, support among ethnic Macedonians fell to around 56%, while among Albanians it remained above 80%.
– VMRO-DPMNE rhetoric: After the coming to power of the government of Hristiyan Mickoski, the message that the EU is setting “unfair conditions” has intensified, especially with regard to the constitutional changes to include Bulgarians in the Constitution.
There are several factors for the growth of support in 2025:
– Economic expectations – higher living standards; more investments; better jobs; free movement.
– Reduction of apathy – a significant part of the undecided citizens have switched to the camp of EU supporters.
– Geopolitical factor – the war in Ukraine and the general uncertainty in Europe increase the perception of the EU as a guarantor of security and stability.
There is an interesting paradox in North Macedonia: On the one hand, 71% of citizens support EU membership; On the other hand, the majority of citizens do not support changes to the Constitution related to the Bulgarian community. A large part believes that the EU should provide additional guarantees against future bilateral blockades.
Thus, the position is formed: “Yes to EU membership, but not at any cost”. This is the political formula on which Prime Minister Mickoski built a large part of his public support.
By 2025–2026, there is no trend of decreasing support for the EU in North Macedonia. On the contrary, after several years of decline and disappointment, support has recovered to around 71%. At the same time, there is a growing discrepancy between the high support for membership as a strategic goal and the low readiness for new political and constitutional compromises to achieve it. For Bulgarian diplomacy, this discrepancy is one of the most important factors in assessing the domestic political situation in North Macedonia and the prospects for implementing the so-called “French proposal”. Prime Minister Mickoski’s idea of “membership not at any cost” is undermined by the high public support for membership.
Negotiations between Bulgaria and the RNM
At the moment, there is limited readiness for dialogue, but no real political readiness for compromise is visible on the key issue blocking the European integration of the Republic of North Macedonia – the inclusion of Bulgarians in the Constitution according to the 2022 agreement. Since the VMRO-DPMNE government came to power in 2024, Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski has consistently stated that he is ready for talks with Bulgaria; he does not reject the European perspective, but will not accept constitutional changes under the current conditions. This means that Skopje is ready to negotiate a change in the framework, but not to implement the already agreed commitments in their current form.
In 2025–2026, Mickoski formulated two main demands:
– guarantees from the EU that after the inclusion of Bulgarians there will be no new bilateral conditions and blockades;
– progress on Skopje’s demands regarding the rights of the Macedonian community in Bulgaria.
According to Mickoski, constitutional changes will not be made “unconditionally” and without clear guarantees about the final outcome of the accession process.
Formally, there is room for new negotiations, but in practice it is very limited. In 2025, Mickoski proposed talks with the participation of the EU and NATO as mediators, which indicates a desire for political dialogue. But Bulgaria and the European institutions have consistently signaled that the framework agreed in 2022 will not be reopened. Therefore, dialogue may exist, but the possibilities for changing the already agreed conditions seem minimal.
The domestic political factor is the most important element. After the convincing victory of VMRO-DPMNE in the parliamentary and local elections, Mickoski has a strong political mandate, based largely on the promise not to accept constitutional changes under the current conditions. This significantly limits his space for compromise. From a political point of view, any retreat could be presented by his voters as a refusal of the so-called “red lines”.
The government of North Macedonia has demonstrated readiness for political dialogue with Bulgaria, but at present does not show readiness to take the specific steps set out in the 2022 European negotiating framework. Therefore, the negotiation process is blocked not by the lack of communication between the parties, but by the different understanding of the content and implementation of the commitments already made.
By mid-2026, the more realistic assessment is that Skopje is seeking to renegotiate the parameters of the 2022 compromise, while Sofia and Brussels insist on implementing what has already been agreed. It is this divergence that continues to block the actual start of accession negotiations.
