Thewesternbalkans.
Part 1 – Russia
In this era of rapid globalization, it is very normal for capital to move in the form of investments or trade. However, concern increases when this economic activity is of a strategic nature – enabling the growth of influence and the shaping of dynamics or agendas of another country. It is precisely here, at the level of strategy, that the difference is made between benevolent (constructive) influence and malevolent (malicious or destructive) influence.
According to many political scientists, the main element of foreign influence analyses is the fact that propaganda cannot function without receptive ground. No external power can impose its influence without segments of society and part of local elites being willing to accept it.
Influence is a voluntary relationship between those who offer a narrative and those who embrace it.
In the Western Balkans, accumulated frustration with long, conditional integration processes have created space for alternative discourses. This is where the Russian and Serbia narratives find their entry point.
Moscow has systematically used information manipulation as a tool of foreign policy. Known as “information warfare” or “foreign information manipulation and interference,” this approach goes beyond traditional diplomacy, targeting emotions, identity, and societal insecurities. Some experts view this as a form of hybrid warfare, where information is used as an instrument of political and social influence.
In North Macedonia, Russian influence is built around several repeated narratives:
- Russia is presented as a defender of traditional values, Orthodox identity, and pan-Slavism;
- the West is portrayed as a “liberal” force that imposes conditions and undermines national identity;
- The change of the country’s name, demands for constitutional amendments, and the protection of minority rights are often framed as “humiliations” imposed by the EU.
- Religious and traditional sentiments are a crucial instrument in this influence strategy. Church structures and so-called civic initiatives are used as intermediary channels to nurture narratives against the ‘degenerate’ West.
For the traditional relations there is a very good example: – on 12 of August 2026, Russian diplomats in North Macedonia paid tribute to the memory of the Russian Empire’s consul Alexander Rostkovsky in the city of Bitola, where he was killed in 1903.
As part of the annual event organized by the Regional Society of Russian-Macedonian Friendship in Bitola, Alexander Rostkovsky Days, Russian Ambassador Dmitry Zykov laid wreaths at the graves of Russian compatriots in the city and its surroundings. Representatives of the Russian embassy also visited the Bukovski Monastery, which served as the summer residence of the Russian imperial consul Alexander Rostkovsky.
Within the executive branch in Skopje, there are figures known for close links with Moscow. Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Stoilković, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbs, has participated in Russian security forums where he promoted bilateral cooperation.
Parties such as Levitsa have openly expressed anti-NATO and anti-EU positions, while groups like “United Macedonia,” led by Janko Baçev, promote closer ties with Russia and reject Euro-Atlantic integration.
These concerns were also reflected in the European Parliament report of June 26, 2025. Rapporteur Thomas Waitz warned about the influence of the so-called “Serbian World” concept, supported by government representatives and closely linked to Russian interests in the region.
Research shows that Russian influence spreads mainly through media outlets that rebroadcast content from Sputnik Serbia, RT Serbia, and Serbian tabloids, which are then adapted for the Macedonian audience. Social media platforms act as amplifiers of these narratives.
Facebook, X, and Telegram are particularly used by the Russian embassy in Skopje and reinforced by bot farms to spread disinformation, especially regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and so-called “traditional values”.
According to some political scientists, the goal is not the complete domination of public discourse, but the fragmentation of informational reality, the creation of confusion, and the weakening of trust in Western democracy.
Although Russian influence in North Macedonia is not currently dominant, it represents a real risk. Propaganda creates illusions, fuels ethnic and religious polarization, undermines trust in institutions, and slows Euro-integration processes.
Addressing this phenomenon requires first of all political will, professional approach of the media, institutional transparency, media literacy, and legal regulation of media ownership and financing. Combating disinformation is not censorship, but the protection of the public sphere from the abuse of freedom of expression.
Ultimately, the choice remains political and societal: Europe as a project of reforms and standards, or the believes on alternative that offers another development, or security.
