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Vučić Reshapes the Political Landscape
Aleksandar Vučić officially resigned as President of Serbia on September 27 and is running in the snap parliamentary elections on October 25 as the prime ministerial candidate for the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).
Under Serbian law, presidential elections must be held within three months of the head of state’s resignation. Consequently, citizens will have to vote twice before the year ends: first in the snap parliamentary elections on October 25, and then in snap presidential elections, likely in December.
A Wide Range of Possible Outcomes
The landscape ahead of Serbia’s October 25 parliamentary elections is highly fluid due to significant discrepancies between various opinion polls, which greatly widens the range of potential outcomes. Student activists, who have spearheaded protests lasting nearly two years, have formed a political movement called “Student List – Students Win” to contest the election. The Student List lacks a traditional party structure, making it difficult to predict how the support indicated in polls will translate into actual votes and parliamentary seats.
The latest survey by Faktor Plus, conducted in late September, puts “Aleksandar Vučić – United Serbia” (SNS) at 48.6%, ahead of the Student List at 37.1%. This marks a significant shift compared to the July NSPM survey, in which the student-led list stood at 39.6% and the SNS at 37.5%. Other political groups trail significantly behind, hovering around or below the parliamentary threshold. This implies that the October 25th election will largely be a contest between the current ruling establishment and the student movement, effectively taking on the character of a referendum, while traditional opposition parties fight primarily for parliamentary representation. The election campaign in Serbia is already shaping up to be a “for or against” referendum.
Serbia Awaits a “Hot” Autumn
The majority of voters support Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling Serbian Progressive Party, and it is highly likely the party will succeed in forming a new parliament. Vučić’s transition from the presidency to the premiership would signal a shift of power from the presidential hierarchy to the government. The Prime Minister would become the central figure in the political system, while the presidency would become a largely ceremonial role.
However, this redistribution of power within the ruling structure will not lead to a departure from current policies or a change in Serbia’s political course. Overall, there will be no radical changes, as the same person will remain in charge of everything.
Yet, a potential victory for Vučić would not automatically guarantee a smooth term in office or legitimacy for the new cabinet—even without term limits. Neither side is prepared to lose the election. The election results will almost certainly be challenged by the losing side.
Vučić will not allow himself to be forced out of politics. During his 12-year rule, he has laid foundations solid enough to withstand the current upheavals. The Serbian Progressive Party retains control over key state institutions, and the entire system Vučić has built continues to work in his favor.
For their part, the hundreds of thousands of protesters who have been active for a year and a half will find it difficult to accept a situation where their energy spent fighting for justice has gone to waste.
Consequently, it is evident that Serbia faces a period of political turbulence.
