Thewesternbalkans
In April 2023 the European Parliament has formulated its position on the activities and interests of the Russian Federation on The Western Balkans. The main conclusion of the study is that “the countries in the region have emerged as a frontline in Russia’s geopolitical confrontation with the West. The Kremlin has demonstrated repeatedly that the Balkans are a conducive environment for punching back against the United States and the European Union (EU). The region’s ample ethnic, political, and social fractures, along with widespread disenchantment with the slow pace of Euro-Atlantic integration, create easy opportunities for Moscow to disrupt the post–Cold War European order”.
While the Russian Federation has strong historical ties with the Western Balkans, and holds a certain soft-power attraction for the region, its influence and economic impact there are declining. Meanwhile, the EU and NATO presence in the region is advancing, and investment and aid from the EU-27 and other players, such as China, have been dwarfing Russian investment.
The report of the EP said that “Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has put the Western Balkans on the spot again, pushing their governments to take a clear stance towards their historical ally, while the EU has tried to give new impetus to the enlargement process and has reinforced its presence in the region. While polls show considerable support for EU membership across the Western Balkans, a large majority of Serbian citizens in particular continue to consider Russia to be their true ally, despite the EU being Serbia’s major financial partner. The legacy of the Yugoslav Wars − a complex political architecture with precarious balances between fractious ethnic and religious communities − has proved fertile ground for the Kremlin’s influence and interference, especially since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia has used the media and information sphere, stepped up its political and economic influence and mobilised proxy organisations to project its narratives, protect its interests and slow the region’s integration into Western institutions”.
The influence of Russia as traditional partner for the Western Balkan countries has grown, reflecting a certain “enlargement fatigue”, as a realistic path towards EU membership has proved rather slow. No new members have joined the EU since Croatia in 2013. Disillusionment with slow progress towards EU accession and economic stagnation have created an opening for other geopolitical players. At present, all six Western Balkan countries are still on track to join the EU, and four of them– Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia – are actually in accession negotiations, which have, however, been stalled for years.
For Serbia, in particular, the conflict in Ukraine has not changed the country’s pro-Russian stance. Analysts have stressed that, according to recent polls, ‘Putin is the world leader that Serbs admire the most and 95% of Serbs see Russia as a true ally, compared to only 11% who see the EU that way, despite the EU being Serbia’s major financial partner’. Furthermore, 68% of Serbs statedt hat they believed ‘NATO, not Vladimir Putin, was responsible for the war in Ukraine’, with 82% opposed to Serbia imposing EU sanctions on Russia. Historic grievances, simmering ethnic tensions, high Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans unemployment, a youth exodus, and shaky constitutional arrangementsin countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), are creating an opportunity for Russia to leverage its already substantial influence in the region.
Cultural and historical ties give Russia considerable soft power, particularly among the Serb population, concentrated mainly in Serbia,the Republika Srpska (one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Kosovo.Historical ties go as far back as the pan-Slav movementof the 19th century and Russia’s support for Serbian independence from the Ottoman Empire. Russia entered World War I on Serbia’s side. In the Kosovo conflict, Russia condemned the NATO bombing of Serbia and firmly opposed Kosovo’sindependence. Russia uses its status as a permanent UN Security Council member in Serbia’s favour. In 1994 and 2015, Moscow vetoed two UN Security Council resolutions condemning violence by Bosnian Serbs, the latter resolution qualifying the 1995 Srebrenica massacre as genocide.
During the pandemic, this soft power manifested as ‘vaccine diplomacy’, supplying both medical material and vaccines.
Although Russian investment in the region has increased in absolute terms, Russia’s economic footprint as a share of the total economy in the Western Balkans has shrunk or stagnated in the wake of international sanctions over Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Even though Russian economic influence is heavily concentrated in the energy sector, its share as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) is declining across the region.
Moscow still has a series of local allies, including politicians such as Milorad Dodik, President of Republika Srpska and member of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s tri-partite presidency, and Aleksandar Vučić, President of Serbia. In April 2022, Serb ministers in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Council of Ministers blocked a decision to apply sanctions and deny Russia and Belarus access to funds from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
Milorad Dodik meanwhile announced the stepping up of energy cooperation with Russia. On 13 January 2023, Dodik awarded Vladimir Putin the highest award of Republika Srpska, the order of Republika Srpska, for his support for the Dayton Agreement, thanks to which the creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was made possible.
On 29 May 2022, while the EU has pressed for sweeping bans on Russian energy, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced that his country had signed an agreementon a new 3-year gas contract with Russia. Data from the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators show that Russia’s energy influence is greatest in Serbia, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it supplies close to 100 % of gas needs and owns several assets, such as the Lukoil petrolstations network.
On the other hand, Kosovo, Montenegro and Albania currently consume little no Russian gas, and future supplies are likely to come from Azerbaijan rather than Russian fields, via the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).
Outside the energy sector, where Russia’s presence is gradually declining, Russia’s economic presence through trade is dwarfed by that of the EU-27. However, experts caution that Russia’s major presence in strategic sectors is making the region’s governments vulnerable to its pressure and accentuating the risk of state capture.
The Kremlin has found it easy and useful to use the tools of foreign influence and interference in the region, especially following its invasion of Crimea in 2014, in order to protect its interests and project its narratives. Targeted and low-cost (asymmetric) operations in the information space, including (dis)information campaigns, cyber-attacks and clandestine operations, combined with the support of proxy organisations and the use of political and economic influence, have been effective in exploiting structural vulnerabilities and societal and political divisionsin all six Western Balkan countries. Russia has used these hybrid strategies to pursue three objectives in the region, with varying degrees of intensity and success over time: i) preserve the status quo, where convenientf or Russian interests(i.e. in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina); ii) undermine the EU and NATO, slowing down full integration into Western institutions; and, iii) protect Russia’s economic interests(and those of its elites).
Sputnik Srbija, the online news website in Serbian established under the umbrella of the Russian state news agency Sputnik, has been recognised as one of the main channels of Russian influence in the Western Balkans media space over the years. It has the potential to reach audiences that speak Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian, and its content is very often republished by local media.
Along the same lines, in November 2022 the media group Russia Today (RT), also state-controlled and under EU sanctions, launched a multimedia website in the Serbian language, dubbed RT Balkan;television broadcasting is expected to begin in 2024.
Beyond the media, the Russian Orthodox Church has also been identified as a powerful vehicle of influence for Russia in the region. Slavic brotherhood and shared Orthodox Christianity values are used to fortify the Kremlin’s ties with political leaders, churches and independent groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska), North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and among Orthodox minority groups in non-Christian countries, such as Albania and Kosovo. Oligarchs with ties to the Russian Orthodox Church and far-right elements of Russian society, such as Konstantin Malofeev, actively contribute to Russian soft power efforts in the Balkans.
The Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Centre in Nis, registered as a non-profit organisation, is also seen as a powerful tool for influence in the region, and has been seen by Western officials as a potential base for covert operationsfor Russia. Among other activities, it organises youth educational camps in Russia and Serbia, denounced by some researchers as indoctrination and radicalisation centres. Its connections with radical nationalist groupings, such as Serbian Honour and St George of Loncari have also been exposed as part of the Russian destabilisation toolkit. Over the years, the Kremlin has been accused of being behind a number of clandestine operations in Western Balkans countries aimed at undermining their integration into NATO (i.e. Montenegro and North Macedonia), or influencing election results(Bosnia and Herzegovina). It should be noted EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service that the connection to Russian security services has not been proved, and the nature of events remains contested.
The degree of permeability to foreign influence and interference across the region varies, reflecting the different internal vulnerabilities of the six Western Balkan countries in several domains (societal, economic, and political). According to a permeability index developed for a study by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, North Macedonia and Albania were identified as least vulnerable countries, while Bosnia and Herzegovina appeared to be the most vulnerable country, followed by Serbia.
Russia remains Serbia’s biggest arms supplier, but is in increasing competition with China. When it comes to military influence, Russia seeks to maintain its military cooperation with its main partner, Serbia, while also supporting the militarisation of Republika Srpska in B&H. Belgrade is satisfied with its current degree of cooperation with Moscow but seeks to avoid becoming Russia’s foothold in the Balkans. Factually, Russia is only one of multiple security actors in the Balkans, overshadowed by NATO and challenged by China.
The Kremlin’s track record includes its longtime refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence, a brazen coup attempt in Montenegro, support for separatist-minded leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and covert efforts to target arms supplies destined for Ukraine and to sow domestic or interstate political tensions. Despite intense international criticism over its war against Ukraine, the Russian government shows no sign of giving up on such heavy-handed behavior or tried-and-true tactics like the cooptation of corrupt local elites. But as the Ukraine war drags on, Balkan leaders may find it more difficult to sit on the fence or to play Moscow and Brussels off of each other.
From the point of view of some Russian analysts, Russian foreign policy in the Balkans, is based on the principle of “using the minimum necessary resources to maintain a working atmosphere at the interstate level and prevent the loss of existing material assets”.
Positive factors for Russian policy are: Objective difficulties of the EU in the Balkans Settlement of territorial and political disputes, modernization of the political systems of the countries of the region, creation of conditions for economic development, social stability and prosperity; actions in the initial stages of the Ukrainian crisis, the military operation in Syria; the creation of the Eurasian Union and special mechanisms for interaction with Turkey, Iran, China and the BRICS countries create the image of Russia in the Balkans as a “great power” and a “global alternative” that defends the principles of multipolarity in international relations . The other side of this issue is the exaggeration of the place and role of modern Russia in the Balkans by both supporters and opponents. As a result, without making material efforts, Russia tactically gains a certain image presence.
Negative factors for Russia are: inability to resist NATO expansion Russia was unable to answer its most fundamental and sensitive question. Montenegro, Albania and Northern Republic of Macedonia has already become a member of NATO. Serbia’s accession to NATO has not yet been announced, but over the past four years it has made significant progress towards rapprochement with the Alliance; clientelism in economic policy, combined with a low level of trust in political elites on the part of the population; the historical tendency of Balkan leaders to balance between “global players”; coherence of the Euro-Atlantic position Although the tactical interests of the EU, USA, Great Britain, and the Visegrad Group may diverge, they have a consistent position on the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans.
The integrity of the “European choice” of Serbia and other countries is not questioned. Although the formats and deadlines for achieving membership are not specified, since 2014 this has not left any space for serious discussion with Russia of “alternative formats of cooperation” and especially “alternative integration.”
As a consequence, although in economic and cultural terms the region is becoming increasingly exposed to the cross-influence of a number of global players (not only Russia), in political terms it is assessed as an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic space.
From the Moscow’s point of view, Russia’s abandonment of interests in the Balkans will significantly worsen Russia’s position in Europe. The final withdrawal of the Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic orbit: will complete the division of Europe into the “EU zone” and the “border exclusion zone”; will give Brussels a free hand and open up new opportunities for the EU’s expansion to the East; will change the balance of Russia-Türkiye and Russia-China relations; is fraught with the exclusion of Russia from the emerging structure of transcontinental transit; will discredit the positive developments in relations between Russia and some Balkan states; will significantly complicate the restoration of relations between Russia and Greece, Russia and Montenegro, and will complicate the position of Serbia as a key partner of Russia.
In general, Russia’s departure from the Balkans means the loss of positions in southeastern Europe, which will limit the possibilities of action in the Mediterranean. This will lead to increased pressure from the EU and NATO on the Transcaucasian republics and Belarus. The loss of the Balkans will narrow Russia’s room for maneuver in relations with Turkey, which is strengthening its position in South-Eastern Europe. Negotiating positions with China will weaken, for which the Balkans are the final and practically unknown point of the New Silk Road route from the point of view of culture and perception.
Russia will lose one of the key fields on its “playing field”, which will lead to a compression of the space around its “penalty area”.
Russia is interested in maintaining stability in the Balkans. But it is also interested in preserving the various forms of its presence that are historically inherent to it. Linguistic and religious proximity, combined with the accumulated base of fundamental knowledge, allows us to assert that Russia has a deep and accurate understanding of the processes in the Balkans. The Russian presence has become a natural part of the region’s architecture. Its removal from the overall picture is fraught with the disappearance of an important structure of regional stability.
At the same time, due to geographical remoteness, as well as limited opportunities for economic interaction and the peculiarities of the diplomatic position, Russia’s influence today cannot be key.
Due to established historical traditions and diplomatic practices, Russia’s interaction with the EU in the Balkans looks most likely and justified. However, the lack of desire for dialogue in the presence of “cross” influence from other players can also lead to “non-standard” options for interaction, such as Russia-China or Russia-Turkey.
Comments: Russia’s position in the Balkans is not guaranteed, but considering what the losses will be geopolitically and economically, it can be expected that Moscow will strive with all possible means and levers to maintain its influence in at least three out of six countries of the Western Balkans – Serbia, BiH and the Republic of North Macedonia. Russian aggression in Ukraine has certainly reduced Russia’s influence in some of the Western Balkan countries, but it has certainly radicalized the population in others. Slavic and Eastern Orthodox solidarity cannot and should not be underestimated. Especially in the constantly worsening international security situation and the open tolerance of the Albanian factor in the Western Balkans region.
On the other hand, if we go back to the events of March 1999, we see that with decisive action on the part of NATO, Moscow promises but does not fulfill its commitments to protect those who expect it from it.
