Thewesternbalkans.
In recent months, Xi Jinping has welcomed a large number of heads of state and government from around the world to Beijing. The culmination was last week, when Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin paid visits to Beijing. China has slowly and methodically become the center of world diplomacy. At the same time, the signs of the new world order are clearly visible: the American leader did not allow himself any of his usual improvisations in Beijing; parity has been established between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, despite the great advantage of American nuclear power; at the same time, despite the nuclear power of the Russian Federation, the Russian leader went to Beijing to seek economic assistance; and most importantly, China, which once balanced between Russian and American hegemony, has now imperceptibly become the axis between them.
What is remarkable is that the two largest nuclear powers in the world, currently in complex military situations, are seeking political and economic support from the much more modest nuclear power, China. This puts Xi Jinping in a stronger position in relation to Trump and Putin, and China once again presents itself as a stable and self-confident country, responsible for the fate of the world.
British conservative analyst Adriel Kasonta defines China as the “gravitational center of world diplomacy”. This opinion of his was published on May 19 in the Hong Kong newspaper South China Morning Post, considered a media outlet that in many cases publishes opinions of official Beijing that cannot be published by state-run Chinese media. That is, the above definition is indicative of how the Chinese leadership views itself or at least agrees with this opinion.
The word of the Chinese leader is increasingly heard in the world: the West does not want Russia to sit at the table of the great powers, but Xi Jinping will not allow Russia to lose in the war, which is not with Ukraine, but with NATO. And what is more important – the world is increasingly taking into account Chinese formulations. China’s “discursive power” in international relations is already yielding serious results. The United States has adopted a mutually beneficial formula for relations described as “constructive strategic stability.” Trump has hardly had the patience to delve into the full depth with which Chinese scholarship builds this framework. But he certainly understands that there are more similarities than differences between Trump’s MAGA and Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Chinese diplomacy has traditionally described Beijing’s relations with individual countries in different ways. For example, with the Russian Federation, “relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction in the new era” are developing. Regarding Serbia, Xi Jinping says that “we will build a community between China and Serbia with a shared future in a new era.” China’s relations with Great Britain are “global” and “oriented to the 21st century.” And with Pakistan – “all-weather strategic partnership and cooperation.” There is no official hierarchy in China’s relations with different countries, and the definitions themselves are difficult to decipher in detail. But while the formulation for relations with the United States – “constructive strategic stability” – recognizing the impossibility of resolving all disputes at once, calls for dialogue to avoid serious crises in relations, which is beneficial for both sides, the focus with regard to Russia is on cooperation.
There should be no special connection between Trump’s and Putin’s visits to Beijing – the circumstances and preparations are different. The facades are also different – pompousness during Trump’s only second visit to Beijing, on the one hand, and a businesslike atmosphere during Putin’s routine visits (over 20) to Beijing. Trump’s visit to Beijing will in no way affect Russian-Chinese relations, which have their own agenda. Putin is currently in a weakened position and Moscow is not on an equal footing with Beijing.
The two visits were completely different in tone and agenda. For example, while the Taiwan issue was the focus of attention during Trump’s stay in Beijing, it was absent during Putin’s meeting with Xi.
But the Chinese side did not allow Trump and Putin to leave Beijing having fulfilled their main goals 100 percent. The world media analyze that Trump has not achieved a breakthrough in the field of trade with China, and Putin has not achieved a breakthrough in the construction of the key gas pipeline “Power of Siberia 2”. Xi Jinping is holding his ground and is in no hurry to satisfy all the wishes of his partners, who are looking to him for support in two crises – Ukraine and Iran. China is increasingly becoming the center of both crises, and the Chinese leader is buying time and focusing on strengthening China internally.
According to a number of observers, relations with the United States are much more important for Beijing, but it should be noted that China and Russia have jointly adopted a 47-page statement on deepening bilateral relations, which shows their desire to build a long-term Eurasian framework and shows their common views on world politics and the multipolar order.
The Russian delegation included five deputy prime ministers, eight ministers and representatives of big business, which turned the visit into a presentation of almost the entire Russian economic and administrative apparatus. Moscow offered Beijing a wide range of long-term projects in energy, transport, industry, nuclear energy, education, culture and payments in national currencies. In this way, an infrastructure and economic system is being built that is less and less dependent on the West.
At the same time, China is restoring a pragmatic trade dialogue with the United States. While Moscow talks about “historical friendship” and a multipolar world, Washington insists on specific economic deals – exports of American LNG, oil, agricultural products and technologies. The fact that American tankers with liquefied natural gas are already heading to China is indicative.
Thus, two different models of relations are taking shape. Russia offers China strategic depth, resources and geopolitical support against the United States. The United States offers access to the largest consumer market, technology and trade benefits. For Beijing, these two lines are not mutually exclusive. China has no interest in severing its strategic ties with Russia, but it also has no intention of sacrificing its economic interests in relations with the United States.
The leaders of China and Russia also signed a Declaration on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations. Despite all the conventionality and vagueness of the concept of a multipolar world, the declaration is striking in its focus on the term “civilization,” stating that “civilizations are not divided into highly developed and underdeveloped, strong and weak.” “The spiritual and moral system of no civilization (meaning the “collective West” – editor’s note) can be considered exclusive or superior to others.” The principles set out in the declaration are dominated by anti-Western narratives: inadmissibility of hegemony, of control of international affairs by one state or group of states, resistance to the expansion of military alliances and to the use of human rights as a pretext for interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
Ultimately, China positions itself as a central power through which both the Russian strategy for a multipolar world and the US-China economic exchange simultaneously pass. This is precisely what gives Beijing the greatest advantage in the current global configuration.
