Thewesternbalkans.
Early results for the 2026 elections in Hungary have been published by the National Election Office.
After 90% of the votes counted Parliamentary mandates go to:
Respect and Freedom (Tisza) mandates: 138
Fidesz mandates: 54
Our Homeland: 7
Early results indicate that Tisza will have a 2/3 majority in the Parliament, which means they will be able to amend the constitution, reversing Fidesz’s earlier changes to the fundamental law.
At the close of the polls the turnout was nearing the 78% mark. Four years ago, in 2022, the number of citizens taking part in the elections was 67.8%.
The President of the republic, Tamás Sulyok, must call the new parliament and appoint the new prime minister within 30 days after the elections.
Hungary’s Tisza Party presented its 240-page government programme on February 7 – 2026.
The programme titled Foundations of a Functional and Humane Hungary was developed over nearly two years by around 1,000 experts working in 65 policy groups.
According to the Programme, main priorities for Tisza are as follow:
ECONOMIC POLICY
* Seek the release of billions of euros worth of EU funding currently suspended over Orban’s rule-of-law reforms to help kick-start Hungary’s stagnating economy.
* Use those released funds to invest in healthcare, transport, education and support for businesses.
* Clamp down on corruption and cut back on what it calls unjustified public investments, saying this could save trillions of forints.
* It expects stronger growth and investor confidence to curb the financing costs of the EU’s largest debt pile outside the euro zone by up to 1 trillion forints ($3.15 billion – $1 = 317.23 forints) over the longer term.
* It aims to cut the budget deficit from 5% or more of gross domestic product this year to below 3% and to meet euro entry criteria by 2030.
* Raise healthcare spending by at least 500 billion forints each year until it reaches 7% of GDP by 2030.
* Impose a 1% tax on wealth exceeding 1 billion forints that it says will raise hundreds of billions of forints.
* Limit state intervention in the economy and markets and create a predictable and transparent business environment.
* Support small businesses with EU-funded grants and tax benefits while cutting bureaucracy and energy costs.
* Suspend new permits for workers from outside the EU from June.
* Cut subsidies for manufacturing and polluting technologies and review the operation of large battery manufacturers in Hungary to ensure they comply with environmental standards.
FOREIGN POLICY
* Lift defence spending to NATO’s target of 5% of GDP by 2035.
* Tisza would not send troops to Ukraine and does not plan to revive conscription.
* It does not support the fast-track entry of Ukraine into the EU and would put the issue of Ukraine’s EU membership to a binding referendum.
* Halt Hungary’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court.
* Seek a bilateral strategic partnership with the U.S. focusing on energy diversification, security and transparent economic cooperation.
* Strengthen Hungary’s European and Western orientation.
* It would not accept the relocation of migrants from western Europe and opposes EU migration quotas and its migration pact.
Peter Magyar, leader of the opposition Tisza party declared that Hungary’s foreign policy will come back to its origins to the early 2010s when Fidesz’s first foreign minister, Janos Martonyi, stuck to a triad of foreign policy priorities: EU and NATO alignment, good neighbourly relations, and responsibility for Hungarians abroad.
Tisza’s primary foreign policy goal is to restore Hungary’s position as a reliable member of the EU. But Tisza will likely be forced to negotiate a compromise to access the funds before their expiration, while the EU will need to focus on safeguards to avoid another disappointment similar to that in Poland.
National sovereignty remains central to Tisza’s rhetoric, too. The party will not shy away from asserting itself in its alliances, should it consider Hungarian interests at stake.
Migration, one of the most sensitive topics in Hungarian politics, will likely remain an area where Tisza opposes Brussels the hardest. But here tone and practice matter. Tisza is more likely to return to the table and negotiate derogations it believes to serve the national interest.
What Tisza rejects is the notion that sovereignty must be wielded against Brussels. Rather, they argue, the EU is the vehicle through which Hungary can protect its interests and exercise its sovereignty. Tisza’s supporters seem to concur in regarding the EU as a useful platform: most of them perceive the EU to have the global standing to deal with global powers on an equal footing.
One of the clearest contrasts to Orban’s foreign policy is Tisza’s ambition to reset relations with key regional partners—especially Poland. The Warsaw-Budapest axis collapsed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the two capitals diverged sharply on Moscow.
This extends to other neighbours, too. Tisza has plans to pursue constructive relations, but also to settle disputes concerning ethnic Hungarians.
Settling the decade-long dispute about the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia in Ukraine is another matter high on Tisza’s agenda and it will likely seek a negotiated solution. Tisza is also likely to end the current government’s veto policy blocking support for Ukraine. But it has ruled out sending weapons or troops—reflecting both domestic political caution and a desire to distance itself from hawkish European leaders.
The party does not outright oppose Ukraine joining the EU. But it expects a merit-based process with conditionality, and it promises to put the country’s EU membership to a national referendum.
Tisza believes that Strengthening Hungarian sovereignty with energy independence is a goal both American and European partners could get behind. At the same time, Tisza’s goal to do away with dependence on Russian energy—whatever that means exactly—by 2035 could conflict with the EU’s intention to ban Russian gas imports by 2027 and will certainly come under question in Brussels.
But one think is clear: In place of confrontation, Tisza’s offer to the West is cooperation.
RULE OF LAW
* Join the European Public Prosecutors’ Office.
* Strengthen the independence of public media and the judiciary.
* Greater transparency in public procurement, tougher conflict-of-interest rules.
* Two-term limit for prime ministers.
ENERGY
* Eliminate dependence on Russian energy by 2035.
* Full-scale review of a Russian-built nuclear power plant.
* Double the share of renewables in Hungary’s energy mix by 2040.
* Launch a 1 trillion forints energy efficiency programme for households and companies.
* Maintain and extend Orban’s policy of household energy price subsidies.
SOCIAL POLICY
* Employment taxes will not increase.
* Cut income tax for 2.2 million workers earning below the median wage. The current 15% rate would stay in place for higher earners.
* Cut the tax on the minimum wage to 9% from 15%.
* Maintain and extend the current system of family benefits.
* A so-called 13th and 14th month of pension payment launched by Orban would remain in place.
Comments: Many analysts insist that with the coming to power of the Tisza party in Hungary, there will be a fundamental change. Whether this is true may perhaps be answered after the first hundred days of Tisza’s governance. Yet the analysis of the Party’s program shows that their aim will be to preserve the achievements of Orban’s administration regarding national sovereignty, social programs, and even energy policy (despite declarations of a 180-degree geopolitical turn). As for the goal of complete independence from Russian energy sources by 2035, this only shows that at the moment Hungary has no other serious alternative.
Regarding national sovereignty—how feasible this will be will become clear after the first contacts with the European Commission.
On the other hand, the fates of the Western Balkan countries are not among the priorities of the Tisza party, and they will only be center of interest when necessary. Most likely, during the processes of EU enlargement. Important news for the Western Balkans is that Tisza is against the rapid accession of Ukraine to the EU and supports a classical enlargement process, based on the merits of each country.
