Thewesternbalkans.
Viktor Orbán’s loss in Hungary is a significant event not only domestically, but also with potential implications for the entire Western Balkans region. The effect will not be direct and immediate, but there are several key areas in which it can be felt:
- Stronger and more unified EU policy towards the Balkans
Orbán often blocked EU decisions (including on Ukraine and enlargement) through veto. The new government in Budapest is expected to be more pro-European and more aligned with Brussels. For the Western Balkans, this means fewer blockages within the EU, a greater chance of accelerating enlargement (Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania, etc.), and a more coordinated push for reforms in the region.
- Weakening of the “illiberal model”
Orbán was a symbol and political ally of leaders with a similar style of governance. His rule was characterized by strong centralization of power, control over media and institutions, and a balance between the EU, Russia, and China. After his defeat, this model loses an important political “patron” in the EU. The loss of Viktor Orbán means that there will be no “Trojan Horse” in the EU, Aleksandar Vučić will have one less ally, and Republika Srpska will have less protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Leaders in the region (e.g. in Serbia or Republika Srpska) may remain more isolated.
As a medium-term effect, Western Balkan capitals may feel stronger pressure for democratic standards and less legitimization for authoritarian practices.
- Decreasing Russian influence in the EU – indirect effect on the Balkans
Orbán was a key ally of Vladimir Putin in the EU. The new government is likely to orient itself more firmly towards the EU and NATO. For the Western Balkans, this means less space for Russian geopolitical play and stronger pressure on countries like Serbia to adopt a clearer orientation.
- Financial and economic effects
An unfreezing of European funds to Hungary is expected, which will strengthen the overall budget and capacity of the EU. A potential result of this could be more resources for investments and funds for the Western Balkans and more active economic integration of the region.
- Limitations – the effect will not be automatic
It is important to clarify that Hungary remains only one country in the EU. The internal problems of the Balkans (corruption, political conflicts) remain crucial. Part of Orbán’s influence is institutionally entrenched and will not disappear immediately.
- Serbia: stronger pressure and less “room for maneuver”
Viktor Orbán was one of the few leaders in the EU who advocated a softer line towards Aleksandar Vučić and blocked or softened criticism of Belgrade. After Orbán’s withdrawal, Serbia loses a key ally in the EU and an important “voice from within” in the union. Belgrade will find it harder to avoid pressure on issues such as sanctions against Russia, the rule of law, and normalization with Kosovo.
The new Hungarian government is likely to adhere to the EU’s common policy, which means that Serbia may feel a tougher line from Brussels. The “EU or balance with Russia” condition will be more clearly stated, and Brussels will be less tolerant of Belgrade’s “multi-vector” policy. Serbian President Vučić has also learned an important lesson from Orbán’s failure: you shouldn’t argue too much with the EU, from which you expect to receive a lot of money.
Hungarian energy company MOL is a potential buyer for the Russian shares of Serbia’s mostly state-owned oil refinery NIS, which has faced US sanctions. The change in Hungary could force Belgrade to reconsider its energy strategy, as the fate of NIS, the Druzhba pipeline, and other projects now remains unknown.
Vučić’s governance model is often compared to Orbán’s: strong concentration of power, influence over the media, nationalist rhetoric. Without Orbán, this model loses legitimacy in the EU. Belgrade may experience stronger external and internal pressure for reforms, which could pose a risk to Vučić’s political model.
On the main issue of Kosovo, the EU could act in a more coordinated manner. Serbia would be under pressure for real compromises and as a possible result the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue could be accelerated, but tensions could also increase if Belgrade resists.
