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The growing protests in Serbia increasingly evoke memories of those that led to the downfall of Slobodan Milošević nearly 25 years ago. While the comparisons are understandable, these are vastly different political and historical contexts, with few real parallels.
Key Differences
Slobodan Milošević managed to remain in power even after the NATO bombings of 1999, but his political position was irreversibly weakened. In the presidential elections held on September 26, 2000, he attempted to rig the results against opposition candidate Vojislav Koštunica. However, the electoral fraud was exposed, triggering massive public outrage that ultimately led to his downfall. When protesters stormed the Serbian parliament on October 5, 2000, stacks of forged ballots bearing Milošević’s name were discovered inside the building.
The scale of the demonstrations played a crucial role. On October 5, 2000, an estimated 500,000 people gathered in front of the Serbian parliament and throughout Belgrade—a critical mass sufficient to topple any government. To replicate October 5, today’s protests have yet to mobilize at minimum 150,000 participants, some observers estimate. It is currently difficult to achieve that level of pressure.
Another stark contrast is the composition and direction of the protests. In 2000, demonstrators from rural areas arrived in Belgrade, bringing sticks and stones to confront the regime. In the current movement, however, protesters from Belgrade have been traveling to Novi Sad—moving away from the seat of power rather than toward it.
Serbia’s long tradition of protests reflects a strong sense of community and solidarity, yet few movements have fully achieved their objectives. In the 1990s, public anger was directly focused on Milošević himself. Today, student-led demonstrations have not called for President Aleksandar Vučić’s resignation.
Unlike in 2000, the opposition is not leading the protests. In fact, none of the many opposition figures have assumed responsibility for guiding the movement. The students do not identify with opposition parties, nor do they express interest in parliamentary politics.
Another crucial factor is the state of the economy. In 2000, Serbia was crippled by international sanctions and economic collapse, which fueled public discontent. Today, despite ongoing grievances, the economic situation is considerably more stable, and social demands have taken a backseat.
Furthermore, in October 2000, Serbia’s security forces ultimately abandoned Milošević and sided with the people. The current situation is quite different—Vučić retains firm control over law enforcement and has openly threatened to deploy the elite “Cobra” police unit if necessary.
Vučić’s Strategy for Retaining Power
Unless an extraordinary event triggers a mass uprising, Vučić is likely to manage the crisis through a familiar strategy: calling for early elections. This scenario mirrors the snap parliamentary elections of December 17, 2023. Even if the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) fails to secure an absolute majority, Vučić is adept at forging coalitions to maintain his grip on power. His advantage lies in his control over the media, judiciary, state institutions, and the presidency itself.
In the end, both the students and the opposition may claim victory for pushing Serbia toward early elections. However, Vučić would also secure what he desires—a de facto referendum on his leadership. Such an outcome would grant him the political stability needed to navigate difficult decisions ahead, particularly concerning Kosovo.
