Thewesternbalkans.
The composition of the new Serbian government, which is being discussed these days, will be indicative of the next step in Belgrade’s geopolitical orientation – towards the West or the East. The current government, appointed in May 2024, has surprisingly upset the previous balance, embodied by the cabinet of Ana Brnabić.
President Aleksandar Vučić has promised to replace half of the 32 ministers. But who will they be? There are 6 prominent Russophiles in the current government. Undoubtedly, if they (or some of them) are dismissed, this will be a clear reverence to the West. These ministers are:
Aleksandar Vulin, Deputy Prime Minister;
Ivica Dačić, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs;
Nemanja Starović, Minister of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Policy;
Milica Đurđević Stamenkovski, Minister of Family Welfare and Demography;
Nikola Selaković, Minister of Culture;
Nenad Popović, Minister without portfolio.
All these ministers worked actively to develop relations with Moscow and advocated the non-implementation of sanctions against Russia. Deputy Prime Minister A. Vulin was particularly diligent, having visited Moscow several times in the past year and meeting with his friend Nikolai Patrushev, Putin’s advisor.
The creation of such a cabinet had its explanation both in the multi-vector foreign policy adopted by Serbia and in Belgrade’s frustration with Brussels’ pressure on the Kosovo issue. Vučić saw no benefits from the EU on this issue and risked being viewed by his people as a weakling. Given Serbian tradition, this is a very dangerous situation for a leader.
Vučić gained the courage to challenge the Eurobureaucrats also because of Xi Jinping’s visit to Serbia in early May last year, when the Chinese leader called Serbia a friend and strategic partner, which is unprecedented for a country so far from China.
Vučić’s policy resembles Buridan’s donkey, which hesitated between two haystacks until it finally died of hunger. But since we do not live in an ideal world, the two options before the Serbian president are not absolutely equivalent – the Western manger has more straw. Vučić takes a step in one direction, but then takes a step in the other, which in the eyes of the Serbs should be presented as a multi-vector policy.
Seriously pressed by sanctions against Russia and indirectly against Serbia itself (American sanctions against Naftna Industrija Srbije), now it is time for Belgrade to take steps towards the West (the lithium deal with Germany, the purchase of Raffals fighter jets from France). The long-lasting protests in Serbia are clearly in this direction. Vučić will be forced to deprive himself of part of his close circle, but in order to preserve his main economic and political base, he will resort to new elections.
Through Gert Jan Koopman, Director-General at the European Commission’s Directorate-General Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, the message from Brussels was conveyed in Belgrade that “the EU will not recognize and support a violent change of power in Serbia”.
