Thewesternbalkans.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is slowly but methodically removing pro-Russian elements from Serbian state structures. In the government of Đuro Matsut in April 2025, pro-Russian ministers from the previous government were not given positions. Russia’s best friend in Serbia – Aleksandar Vulin was removed from his post as deputy prime minister.
In the past few months, a number of senior officials in the Serbian armed forces and special services with pro-Russian sympathies have also been removed as a result of reshuffles or retirements. In January, the pro-Russian director of the Serbian military intelligence service, Major General Zoran Stojkovič, was retired without much fanfare. The replacement in December of Marko Parezanović as head of the operational department of the Security and Information Service (BIA) received greater media attention. Parezanović, who has passed through all operational levels, was considered a “Russian lobbyist.” The appointment of Nikola Vasiljevic, who is connected to the political vertical loyalist, in his place is an example of how the architecture of the Serbian security system is gradually changing.
Over the past three years, Serbia has suspended military cooperation agreements with Russia and Russian military supplies have been stopped. Over the past year, the US has been relentlessly pushing Russian ownership out of Russia’s main economic asset in Serbia – the NIS oil refinery. Russian gas supplies to Serbia are increasingly uncertain, as they depend on transit through EU member states.
Moscow’s main friend in the Balkans and Belgrade ally Milorad Dodik was forced to step down as president (not without Vučić’s consent and cooperation).
Not only Russian media, but also Russian foreign intelligence has been sharply raising the issue of Serbian ammunition supplies to Ukraine in recent years. The “suspicious death” in November in Moscow of the representative of the Serbian state arms company Yugoimport SDPR, Radomir Kurtić, also raises questions. Although the details of the case have not yet been made public, this is already negatively affecting Serbian-Russian relations.
The Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Niš has not become a full-fledged international structure providing assistance and support for an emergency humanitarian response. After the start of the war in Ukraine, there was even talk that the center was planned to be closed.
The main positive side in Russian-Serbian relations remains Belgrade’s refusal to join the EU sanctions against Russia. It is not only a fig leaf for the friendship between the two countries, but also payback for the Russian veto on Kosovo in the UN Security Council. However, according to Russian experts, since the end of 2024, Serbia has frozen all bilateral projects with Russia and de facto joined the sanctions against Russia.
All this raises a reasonable question about the viability of the instruments of Russian influence in Serbia: without Russian military equipment, without Russian economic presence, without pro-Russian politicians and civil servants, bilateral Russian-Serbian relations focus mainly on the cultural sphere. The Russian Center for Science and Culture (Russian House) in Belgrade continues its activities (within its financial capabilities) to maintain cultural ties between the two countries, the postponed visit of the Hermitage to Belgrade nevertheless took place at the end of this year.
Is this enough to maintain the Russian vector as a full-fledged and equal component in the notorious multi-vector Serbian foreign policy? The Kremlin is aware that the answer is “no” and therefore is implementing a strategy of transition to priority development of the subnational level of cooperation in all areas with Serbia and, if possible, with other Balkan countries. In this way, a foundation is being built for the development of local ties between Russian regions and Balkan countries in the event of a critical situation – without Dodik, Vucic and Putin.
Dodik’s room for maneuver is already narrowed, Vucic’s horizon as president is limited to April 2027. Putin’s horizon seems the furthest, but hardly anyone believes in the sincerity of his friendship with the multifaceted Vucic.
However, a rift between Russia and Serbia will not occur, at least for now, since the ostensible friendship between them is beneficial to the leaderships of both countries.
