Thewesternbalkans.
Is Israel rediscovering the Balkans?
In recent years, there has been a clear intensification of Israel’s relations with part of the Western Balkans. This is especially true for Serbia, which is the most important regional partner of the Jewish state. A series of visits at the highest level can be mentioned – a visit by President Isaac Herzog to Belgrade (2024), a visit by the Serbian Foreign Minister to Israel (2025 and 2026), as well as other ministerial contacts.
Economic relations are being intensified, a free trade agreement is being prepared. Technological cooperation is expanding, and especially military cooperation is significantly growing. Belgrade is showing interest in Israeli technologies in the field of UAVs, air defense, electronics and cybersecurity. Serbia receives drones, missile systems, modern communication systems, systems for electronic warfare and troop control from Israel. Israel buys artillery shells from Serbia, as well as products of the Serbian military enterprises Krušik, Sloboda and Prvi Partizan.
It is particularly significant that in 2025 Serbia agreed to jointly produce combat drones with the Israeli company Elbit Systems through the Serbian state-owned company Yugoimport SDPR. This is one of the most serious Israeli defense investments in the region. There are several reasons for this acceleration of cooperation:
Israel views Serbia as a stable partner outside NATO and in April 2026 established a strategic dialogue with Serbia. Belgrade maintains a relatively pragmatic policy towards the Middle East. Serbia is probably the only European country that immediately and unconditionally sided with Israel and the United States at the start of the war against Iran. President Vučić constantly speaks of the “wonderful” cooperation between Belgrade and Tel Aviv. The paradox is that despite the centuries-old opposition of Serbs to Muslims, the population of Serbia is on the side of the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. Here, empathy with the victims comes to the fore, while official Belgrade supports Israel.
While some of the major European countries (such as Italy, France) have frozen their agreements with Israel in the field of defense, Serbia has dramatically increased military-technical cooperation with Israel against the backdrop of escalating tensions in the Middle East.
Of particular interest are Israel’s relations with the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The President of the Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, visited Israel in the spring of 2025, where he participated in an international conference in Jerusalem and held meetings with Israeli representatives. At the time of the visit, a serious legal procedure was already underway against him in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in August he was deprived of his presidential post. A significant political moment is that in October 2025, the Trump administration lifted sanctions against Dodik and his close associates. While there is no public evidence that the Israeli government lobbied for the lifting of sanctions against Dodik, some observers see such a connection, believing that Dodik, like Vučić, sees cooperation with Israel as the shortest path to the White House. In any case, Dodik’s visit to Israel had a diplomatic effect and helped his international legitimacy. The visit to Israel was important for Dodik to show that he is not completely isolated and that he can visit countries outside the traditional circle of allies such as Serbia and Russia.
After Israel and Kosovo recognized each other in 2021, they have developed diplomatic relations, but economic exchange remains limited and symbolism has so far been stronger than economic results.
Albania is perhaps Israel’s most consistent political partner in the Balkans. The main areas are intelligence exchange, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, tourism, agricultural technologies, water resources. After the massive cyberattacks against Albania in 2022 (presumably by Iranian perpetrators), cooperation with Israel in the field of cybersecurity has gained even greater importance.
With North Macedonia, the dynamics of relations are more moderate and there is not as intense military interaction as with Serbia. There are good diplomatic relations and interest in Israeli investments, cooperation in agriculture and exchange in healthcare are developing.
With Montenegro, relations are relatively calm. The main areas of cooperation are in the field of tourism, real estate; military cooperation is limited.
Strategic Dimensions and Implications
Israel is not yet among the leading investors in the Western Balkans. The main economic partners of the countries in the region remain the EU and European companies.
The most visible activation of Israel is observed in the military dimension. Israel offers drones, surveillance systems, cyber defense and electronic warfare, training of special forces and intelligence technologies. The most serious development in this area is with Serbia. In the other countries, cooperation is significantly more limited.
In a political context, there are several strategic reasons for Israel to pay greater attention to the Balkans.
The historical meaning of the definition “powder keg” in Europe, used for the Balkans, has lost its original meaning. But it is easiest to ignite a new conflict in Europe in the Balkans. There are enough conflicts that can be ignited with just a single match: the Serbia-Kosovo crisis, the Bosnian-Serbian crisis, the Albanian-Serbian confrontation.
Israel has its interests in the Balkans and seeks to take a more stable position in the region, given the number of Islamists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Turkey’s interests in the region. Tel Aviv seeks to limit the influence of Iran and its associated networks. An important aspect of the motivation is also the development of new defense markets and technological cooperation. Israel has so far shown some financial efforts in the region and also seeks to build diplomatic support in international organizations and use the Balkans as a logistical and economic bridge to Europe.
Considering the large number of Jews who lived in the Balkans region until World War II, when a large part of them were exterminated, in a sense, Israel’s current activation can be defined as a return to the region.
Is there really a “return” of Israel to the Balkans?
So far, there is no large-scale geopolitical “return” of Israel as a dominant external factor in the Balkans in the sense of a comprehensive geopolitical strategy comparable to that of China, Russia, the European Union or Turkey in the region. Israel’s “return” to the Balkans, however, is a targeted policy, a gradual building of a network of bilateral partnerships in which defense technologies, cybersecurity, and political contacts play a greater role than classical trade or large-scale investments. This policy is not comprehensive, but selective, and is most strongly expressed in Serbia.
