Thewesternbalkans
The election campaign in the Republic of North Macedonia did not give an answer to the question of where the country will go after May 8 (the election of a new parliament and a new president). The campaign was dominated by anti-Bulgarian rhetoric, and the two presidential candidates did not present a realistic vision for the country’s development.
The ruling SDSM explained that there was no other way to the EU than accepting the Bulgarians as a state-creating element in the constitution, but it kept quiet that this is only the first step of the European integration and from now on there is a long way to join the EU, including the implementation of the Treaty for Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia from 2017, which is part of the adopted negotiation framework with the EU.
The opposition VMRO-DPMNE said it would continue negotiations with the EU, without explaining how this would happen. Hristijan Mickoski called the so-called French proposal for the negotiation framework with EU a treason under “Bulgarian dictate” and claimed that his party would never agree to it.
The VMRO-DPMNE won the parliamentary elections and is able to form a coalition – for example with the Albanian opposition coalition VLEN (“Worth”), led by Dr. Taravari and the association Znam, with leader Maksim Dimitrievski, mayor of Kumanovo. Such a coalition may take the power, but the question is what will it do with it?
The big news after the elections is that the largest Albanian party in the country, DUI, will be in opposition for the first time in history. This does not portend calm days for the future administration of VMRO-DPMNE.
In an attempt to postpone the resolution of the important state issues, the new rulers will most likely attempt to revise the negotiating framework for the launch of the EU membership negotiations and, more precisely, to soften the conditions. Some politicians in the RNM create dangerous illusions among the Macedonian society that it is possible to renegotiate something with the EU, which was voted by 27 countries and the candidate country itself, which agreed to these conditions.
The French proposal of June 2022 led to the lifting of the veto that Bulgaria imposed on the Republic of North Macedonia for EU membership. It envisages that the Bulgarian conditions in front of Skopje will become part of the commitments of RNM to the EU, and that the European Commission will be the guarantor of their implementation. This option became known as the “French proposal” because it came during the French presidency of the Council of the EU.
The French proposal to resolve the dispute between Bulgaria and the Republic of North Macedonia consists of three interrelated documents.
The first document, the conclusions of the Council of the EU, states that the topic of “bilateral relations Skopje-Sofia” will be part of the negotiation process. This document, as well as the second document, the negotiation framework, refer to a third, key document – a bilateral protocol from the meeting of the Joint Intergovernmental Commission (Bulgaria – RNM) under Article 12 of the 2017 Treaty for Friendship. This is actually the road map with specific commitments and milestones that Skopje must fulfill in exchange for Bulgaria lifting the veto.
The French proposal containing the negotiating framework is inherently a compromise. It does not reflect all the demands of the Bulgarian side. But the 2017 Treaty for Friendship of the Republic of North Macedonia with Bulgaria, together with the two bilateral Bulgarian-North Macedonian protocols, is part of the negotiation framework. It is precisely in the protocols that the four key points that Bulgaria particularly cares about are laid down: changes in the history schoolbooks in RNM in accordance with the objective historical truth; opening the archives of the Directorate for State Security of communist Yugoslavia (UDB), to see who’s who in the young Macedonian state; stopping the language of hatred towards Macedonian Bulgarians; respect for the Bulgarian historical monuments in RNM.
There are indications that the new rulers in Skopje will attempt to pressure Bulgaria into softening its demands regarding the RNM.
Only days before the May 8 elections, VMRO-DPMNE made a slight change in its position and indicated that Bulgarians could be included in the preamble of the constitution under two conditions: first, Bulgaria to agree with the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, where Bulgaria has been convicted several times for refusing to register the organization of Macedonians in Bulgaria OMO “Ilinden” (defined by the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria as “directed against the territorial integrity of the country”), and secondly, Bulgarians can enter the constitution of the RNM only on the condition that this happens after the actual start of membership negotiations, i.e. post factum.
However, it is extremely unlikely that the EU will set a precedent by agreeing to a candidate country imposing conditions on the Union or its members.
Meanwhile, attempts of Skopje to pressure neighboring Bulgaria will continue, maintaining the thesis of not changing the constitution. On election day, May 8, Gordana Siljanovska Davkova, the new president from VMRO-DPMNE, stated that a change to the constitution was not necessary, as Bulgarians were included in the constitution under the column “and others”. Also, the representatives of VMRO-DPMNE talk about denunciation of the Treaty for Friendship with Bulgaria, which is not respected by the North Macedonian side: there are no joint celebrations, revision of history textbooks has not started, there is no stop to the language of hatred.
However, an EU spokespersons indicated also recently that without constitutional changes there is no start of EU negotiations. The RNM must fulfill its commitments to the EU and, as a first step, make changes to the constitution and enroll the Bulgarians.
The pressure against Bulgaria is pointless, since the requirements for the RNM in the negotiation framework are not purely Bulgarian, they are already European. They are enshrined in the French proposal of the negotiating framework and should be implemented.
In addition to the pressure against Bulgaria, Skopje will also rely on a pro-Macedonian lobby in Brussels, similar to last year’s attempts to influence the RNM progress report in the European Parliament.
VMRO-DPMNE has stated that it will not use the word “North” in the name of the country, which will open also a conflict with Greece. The Prespa Agreement with that country opened the way for the Republic of North Macedonia to NATO. At that time a constitutional majority was found for a change in the constitution. Will there be a constitutional majority of two-thirds in the North Macedonian parliament for the Bulgarians as well?
The big question for the future of RNM is whether VMRO-DPMNE will be able to make a U-turn? Party leaders have gone too far to back down on their rhetoric, in which they opposed the Treaty for Friendship with Bulgaria, the Prespa Agreement with Greece, the change of the country’s name, the French proposal for the negotiation framework, the changes in the constitution to include the Bulgarians. Continuing on this path leads to something other than the EU, or at least to a delay in European integration plans. The disposition of forces in the RNM is currently such that the country moves closer to the Serbian world than to the European world.
Meanwhile, the ordinary citizens of the Republic of North Macedonia are little excited by the European integration drama of the ruling elite, which does not deal with the epidemic corruption in the country. They want to live in peace with their neighbors and are tired of the European path that the country has been treading for 19 years. In 2018, the citizens of the Republic of North Macedonia voted in a referendum to change the name of the country in order to gain European integration. People are now disappointed that their expectations have been left in vain.
