Biser Banchev
Ever since its inception in 2009, the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Centre, located at the Constantine the Great Airport in Nis, has caused tensions between Serbia and its Western partners. On 20 October 2009, an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Emergency Humanitarian Response, Prevention of Natural Disasters and Technogenic Accidents and Elimination of Their Consequences was signed during the visit of then Russian President, Dmitrii Medvedev, to Belgrade. The Agreement created a ‘humanitarian centre’ in Nis, to coordinate disaster response regionally. The details were to be settled in a special subsequent agreement. From Nis, Serbian and Russian teams would provide assistance to all countries in the Balkan region. Neighbouring countries would be invited to become members of the Centre.
The private US intelligence agency STRATFOR claimed that the Russian military had effectively opened its first military base abroad since the end of the Soviet Union. Western and Balkan media supported STRATFOR’s line that Russia was setting up a military base in Serbia. The city of Nis is strategically located at the intersection of roads leading to Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece and what is now the Republic of North Macedonia, and close to Kosovo, the location of Camp Bondsteel, the main base of the United States Army in the Balkans. Russia’s disaster diplomacy in the Balkans is implemented through the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM). EMERCOM is organised as a military structure. Some scholars have hypothesised that Belgrade set up the Centre in Nis near the Albanian-populated area of Presevo to deter any moves towards autonomy. This ignores the fact that the largest outpost of the Serbian gendarmerie is also located near Presevo to deal with any Albanian actions. However, the intention to intimidate local Albanians with a Russian presence cannot be ruled out.
The proposed joint rescue centre would be open to all countries in the region. On 17 February 2010, the interior ministers of 19 countries – the former Yugoslav republics, all other countries of Southeast Europe, several other EU member states (Spain as rotating EU president, Denmark, Italy and Hungary) and Switzerland – were invited to Belgrade to discuss a coordinated response to fires, floods and earthquakes. The countries from the region rejected the idea of a regional organisation.
After the failure of this conference, Serbia and Russia focused on building the Nis Centre as a bilateral initiative. Yet, even before the initiative became a fact, starting in the summer of 2010, Russian aircraft were used to put out fires in Serbia, with the costs being borne by the Serbian government. The agreement on cooperation in the field of humanitarian emergency response was ratified by the Serbian Parliament in November 2010.
On 17 October 2011 at Constantine the Great Airport, the Russian Minister of Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu provided a significant amount of equipment for the operation of the Centre. The event was presented as ‘the opening of the administrative department of the Serbian-Russian Humanitarian Centre for Crisis Situations’.
The actual opening took place on 25 April 2012. Two documents were signed. The first was an agreement on the establishment of the Centre, which was created as an intergovernmental humanitarian NGO, for an initial period of five years, with the option of automatic extension for an additional five. The second document was an agreement approving the status of the Centre. The institution was to be governed by a board of directors with an equal number of representatives from both sides and two co-directors. The National Assembly of Serbia ratified the agreement establishing the Centre in late 2012.
On 25 April 2013 were settled the last legal details on the functioning of the Centre. Two co-directors were also appointed. This was the third year in a row that documents for the start of the Centre’s work were being signed. It could be suggested that signing an initiating document for the same Centre on three separate occasions was merely a publicity stunt, meant to play to the public diplomacy needs of both governments.
Indeed, it was only in 2013 that the modalities on the functioning of the Centre were finally taking shape. It was mainly used as a warehouse for disaster-relief materials provided free of charge by Russia, while in the event of fires, Russian helicopters and planes would land there, pending approval and paid by the Serbian government on case-by-case basis for a limited period.
In October 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Serbia as a guest of honour at a parade marking the 70th anniversary of Belgrade’s liberation from German occupation. The visit was considered particularly successful, but at the last minute, the Serbian government refused to sign an agreement on the diplomatic privileges and immunity of the Humanitarian Centre at Nis.
The document equated Russian staff at the Centre to the administrative and technical staff of an embassy. In other words, in accordance with the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, they had diplomatic status. In fact, they already had this status under Article 7 of the 2012 agreement establishing the Centre. Perhaps the problem for Western diplomats was the requested immunity for the premises, documentation and means of communication. They had to be treated ‘in no less favourable regime than the one enjoyed by the diplomatic missions of the foreign countries in Serbia’. It could be reckoned that the Serbian government refused to sign at the last minute because of Western media and diplomatic pressure.
A few years later Pro-Russian opposition lawmakers in the Serbian National Assembly claimed that the Centre did not have its own building until 2017 and that the Russians were accommodated in city hotels. Indeed, it was not until the end of 2016 that the Serbian government spent roughly €1.8 million to begin construction of housing for Russian and Serbian staff in the Nis Centre. It was alleged that in recent years there had been no separate building which could enjoy any immunity (and to store military or spy equipment)
The five-year term of the original agreement on the Nis Centre was due to expire in 2017. A decision had to be made on whether to let the agreement automatically be renewed or to terminate it. The Serbian government oriented itself toward a ‘Solomonic’ solution. No action was taken to give the Centre diplomatic status (as the Russians wanted), but neither was any action taken to terminate the agreement (as the Americans wanted). At the end of the year, the government’s inaction automatically ensured that the Centre would continue to operate for another five years.
It should further be noted that the Nis Centre was not used in firefighting in Montenegro in 2017, nor in Greece in 2018 and 2021. According to official data published on the Centre’s website, it has not even taken part in firefighting missions in Serbia itself since 2019.
In 2019, the centre became a full member of International Civil Defence Organization (ICDO). The international organisation was based in Geneva, but its members were mostly countries outside Europe and the organisation’s main funder was the Russian state. The Centre acquired the status of an ICDO education and logistics centre, which marked yet another change in its function. Since then, its activities have been adjusted to provide mainly for the training of firefighters and rescuers.
At the end of 2022, the situation of 2017 was repeated – the inaction of the Serbian government ensured the automatic continuation of the Nis Centre’s existence for another five years. This act can be seen as part of the ‘hedging’ and ‘deliberate ambivalence’ of the Serbian establishment, which, on the one hand, maintained good relations with Russia and did not impose sanctions against it, while also condemning the attacks on Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
The Centre is slowly passing into history as an example of a failed project of Disaster Diplomacy, even while Moscow and Belgrade still resist closing it down. For Russia, the very existence of the Centre on the territory of an EU candidate state, situated in a geopolitically contented region, will continue to be a reason for its existence, while for the West it will continue to be a suspicious initiative. Serbia, on the other hand, has tried to exploit the differences in the approaches to natural disaster diplomacy applied by Russia and by the EU in order to make the most of both.
See the full analysis of the functioning and international context of the centre at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09668136.2025.2549811
Author’s bio: Dr. Biser Banchev is currently employed at the Contemporary Balkans Department of the Institute of Balkan Studies and the Center for Thracology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. His academic interests are focused on issues of national security and foreign policy in the Western Balkans, as well as contemporary political developments in Serbia and Montenegro. Dr. Banchev is a member of the editorial board of the journals Geopolitics (Sofia) and International Politics (Belgrade).
