Thewesternbalkans.
To be or not to be?
Will there be an EU-China summit or not? This is now a €1 million question among European China experts. Not only did Xi Jinping refuse to go to Brussels this year, as diplomatic reciprocity dictates, but two weeks before the forum there is no confirmation of his presidency, which gave rise to speculation that he could be replaced by Premier Li Qiang.
According to the traditions of Chinese diplomacy, everything related to the leader’s appearance is announced at the last possible moment. This will be the case now, but the situation is causing nervousness in Brussels, ahead of the departure of the two European presidents – Ursula von der Leyen and Antonio Costa to Beijing.
Tensions in relations between Europe and China are escalating with each passing day and look set to escalate even further in the coming days, in anticipation of the EU-China summit scheduled for July 24-25 in Beijing. According to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the summit will be shortened to just one day. During his visit to Brussels, Mr. Yi gave a geopolitical lecture to Kaja Kallas, explaining why Russia cannot lose the war in Ukraine. This revelation, unusual for Chinese diplomacy, put an end to the main issue that EU leaders want to raise at the summit – China’s support for Russia.
Deteriorating tone
The two sides are currently competing to show a lack of willingness to make concessions in the dialogue, which is currently being conducted mainly in absentia:
– European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined (16 June) the main directions and set the tone for relations with China during her participation in the G7 summit in Kananaskis, Canada. She used very strong language, warning of a “new China shock” and condemning Beijing for its “pattern of dominance, dependence and blackmail” towards its trading partners. She clearly wanted to please Donald Trump, but this language signals a significant hardening in the EU’s stance toward Chinese industrial policies.
– The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission Kaja Kallas went even further than her boss and used NATO language to describe China’s actions.
– The EU canceled the EU-China High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue, a key format preparing the summits, in June, due to the lack of preliminary progress on contentious trade issues.
– Von der Leyen gave a speech on China in the European Parliament on July 8, devoid of any condescension that was showed at the beginning of the year. In addition to dissatisfaction with the way Beijing is supporting Russia’s war, the Commission President identified three focus areas: rebalancing economic relations, reducing risk, and global issues such as climate. The first two areas are initially negative for Beijing, and on climate, Brussels is not willing to adopt a joint communiqué on the subject until Beijing promises greater efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
– Berlin summoned the Chinese ambassador to complain that a Chinese warship targeted a German aircraft with a laser over the Red Sea on July 2. The German reconnaissance plane was part of the EU’s ASPIDES mission, which ensures maritime trade between Asia and Europe – also very important for the Chinese economy. This has already happened before in this region, where China has a base in Djibouti, with the participation of American aircrafts. However, the attack on a German plane far from Chinese territorial claims is unique, especially in the current context. Therefore, the EU also found it necessary to summon the Chinese ambassador to Brussels on the same occasion.
– Italy arrested a Chinese citizen at the request of the United States on suspicion of espionage.
– French intelligence has accused China of using its embassies to discredit the Rafale fighter jet after clashes between India and Pakistan in May.
– Greece detained four Chinese nationals for taking photos of the Tanagra air base, a strategic site where the 24 Rafale jets received from France are located.
– The EU has imposed restrictions on public procurement for imports of Chinese medical equipment. Beijing has immediately imposed restrictive measures in response.
All these irritants worsen the tone and cast doubt on what kind of summit will be held in Beijing?
It takes two to make a deal
Amid the recent extraordinary activation of the Chinese in doing business with Eoropean countries, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce has invited the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China (European Chamber) to co-organize a roundtable with the participation of global European companies on the afternoon of July 24, i.e. immediately after the planned separate meetings of European leaders with Xi Jinping and Chinese Premier Li Qiang.
The humiliating slapping of the summit and the business forum in just one day shows a clear intention to formally mark yet another international event by the Chinese leader, with no particular intention of resolving the extremely large volume of accumulated trade and economic problems. Beijing demonstrates a lack of time to deal with Europe. For Beijing, the first priority is the United States and now is clearly not the time to make compromises.
In addition, Beijing traditionally resolves issues of its relations with Europe not at the EU level, but on a bilateral basis and uses its opportunities to influence Brussels through individual member states. Two months after the summit in Beijing, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz will arrive in the Chinese capital, at the head of a large German business delegation. It is then that important economic issues will be resolved and there will be an opportunity to limit possible damage from the summit.
“Procrastination” between Brussels and Beijing until the last day before the summit
The EU’s preparations for the forum are focused on Europe’s access to Chinese rare earth metals. During the summit, European leaders will seek to resolve, if possible, the most important conflict with China – the almost halted licensing of exports of certain critical raw materials, rare earth alloys, compounds and magnets by China. China has no interest in a quick resolution of this issue, as it provides it with a convenient tool for future influence. Beijing even denies that it has a problem with the EU over rare metals at all.
While China harbors some hopes of reviving the frozen Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), the EU rejects it because it would create a complex web of interdependencies with an asymmetrically stronger partner. The influential European Chamber, however, has launched a campaign to revive the CAI. If the EU-China Summit produces any results in this direction, it would be tantamount to a sensation. After landing in Beijing, the European leaders will be briefed by the European Chamber and this will have a concrete effect on the talks with the Chinese side.
The lack of progress in trade talks between the European Union and the United States, which also involve a Chinese component, and the postponement of the deadline until the end of July, are making it harder for the EU to reach a deal with Beijing and increasing China’s room for maneuver.
The European divide
Amid growing political fragmentation in Brussels, the EU institutions are currently engaged in an internal debate between a hard and a soft approach to China. The Baltic states and Eastern Europe are pushing for tougher trade barriers and sanctions against Chinese companies. Southern countries and key countries such as Spain and France, as well as some commissioners from more trade-dependent member states, are more open to a package deal.
Although diplomatic coordination between Germany and France on positions and messages on China is increasing, the bulk of the work is being done by the European Commission, with its influence increasing and that of the “Franco-German axis” decreasing. Germany and France preach a unified policy on China in words, but in practice Germany follows the interests of its large companies, and France cannot become the leader of EU policy on China.
The internal debates between the two European camps make it difficult to develop a unified EU approach to China and may lead to China wanting to show the EU what it thinks Europe’s position is. While Europe cannot decide whether China is a partner, a competitor, or a systemic rival, Beijing will certainly want to explain that China understands what the EU wants better than the EU itself. This is an opportunity for Beijing to advance its new strategy of imposing its own discursive power, i.e. its own agenda in all areas.
Beijing’s self-confidence is growing to the point of demonstrating the EU’s weakness, knowing that the EU cannot retaliate: some member states and German industrialists will also try to soften the response. For Brussels, the summit is an opportunity to prove that the Union’s call for more realism is backed up by real action. Brussels can reduce its dependence on China, but it cannot eliminate it entirely. The summit can only be successful if both sides manage to separate politics from economics and adopt a pragmatic approach.
