Thewesternbalkans
China’s approach to the Western Balkans (WB) is marked by strategic flexibility and a tailored approach to each country. Beijing’s nuanced strategy involves engaging not only with central governments but also with local administrative and management structures. This multi-layered engagement leverages both bilateral and multilateral formats, particularly through the “14+1” initiative. Within this framework, China has developed various regional influence mechanisms such as the China-CEEC Political Parties’ Dialogue and the China-CEEC Young Political Leaders’ Forum. Political parties from WB countries also participate in the World Political Parties’ Dialogue, with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić joining its latest virtual edition hosted by Beijing in July 2021.
Understanding the unique territorial and administrative setups of WB countries, Beijing actively collaborates with municipal and regional authorities to execute joint projects, especially in regions with decentralized governance and strong local authority, such as Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The connections at the level of twin cities are particularly intensive. For instance, Tirana and Beijing, along with five other cities from both countries, are twin cities. Similarly, Sarajevo and Shanghai maintain close ties, supported by donations of Chinese medical masks during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. An understated yet significant role in Serbian-Chinese relations is played by the ties between China’s Shandong province and Serbia.
China’s strategy of complementing high-level ties with smaller-scale social, cultural, and media interactions creates a comprehensive influence network. This strategy is also marked by meticulous attention to detail. For example, the National Film Archive in Tirana received Chinese temperature and humidity control equipment as a donation; following a fire at the Macedonian state news agency MIA, it received Chinese financial aid for recovery; and the children’s choir in Wuxi donated 42,000 medical masks to the city of Sarajevo.
Chinese embassies in the region are intensifying their engagement with local civic associations, NGOs, media groups, business associations, and expert communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and North Macedonia. This grassroots engagement, traditionally associated with Western democratic models, is now effectively utilized by Beijing. China promotes horizontal partnerships, including direct and horizontal links materializing in collaborations between Chinese and local universities, applied research institutes, think tanks, media, business structures, and NGOs to advance a pro-China agenda, particularly the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China’s cultural diplomacy is expanding, with Chinese cultural centers complementing the Confucius Institutes in the WB. In 202o, one of Europe’s largest Chinese cultural centers was established in Belgrade, with another planned for Tirana. China’s media presence in the WB is expanding, particularly in Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. The information disseminated is factual, neutral in tone, with minimal analytical content, focusing on economic issues, and generally devoid of critical assessments of China. China’s direct involvement in generating informational content is increasing through cooperation agreements with state and private media.
Key players in producing and spreading pro-China content include Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International (CRI), China Global Television Network (CGTN), and BRI centers. The tradition of Russian language knowledge in the former Yugoslav countries, especially Serbia, is giving way to the increasing prevalence of Chinese language learning, actively supported in the Republic of Srpska by Milorad Dodik.
Chinese funding has established various “research” centers in Serbia, primarily serving as instruments of influence: the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD), Conflux Center and Silk Road Connectivity Research Center. The founder of CIRSD is Vuk Jeremić, former Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, former President of the 67th UN General Assembly, and Chairman of the People’s Party. Through the China Energy Fund Committee (CEFC), Jeremić has received millions of dollars for consultancy services, aiding Chinese diplomatic and political contacts with influential foreign figures.
China increasingly utilizes the Chinese Southeast European Business Association, creating opaque relationships with institutions in the WB. BRI centers in the region serve as hubs for research, academic cooperation, and media influence. The number of Chinese personal and institutional entry points into WB societies and economic entities is growing, with visibly organized communities advocating for active and friendly relations with China without significant Chinese intervention in their creation. This dynamic has political consequences and strengthens Chinese influence in the region.
Beijing demonstrates flexibility in exploiting naturally arising opportunities to generate influence, such as providing free financial aid for the repair and acquisition of new equipment for the fire-damaged Macedonian Information Agency. China pays disproportionate attention to Serbia compared to the rest of the WB and Europe, due to several factors: Serbia’s status as an EU membership candidate without adhering to EU rules, political stability, potential for transport corridors, the largest economy and population in the WB, non-recognition of Kosovo by China, and Serbia’s support for China’s territorial claims regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea. China is also interested in monitoring the negotiation process between Belgrade and Pristina and views Serbia as an attractive model for neighboring countries.
China’s influence in Serbia is sufficient to secure Belgrade’s support for Chinese positions on Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Taiwan. Serbia has effectively adopted a policy of refraining from criticizing China in international initiatives. China’s presence in Serbia highlights Beijing’s ability to focus on specific countries where it has strategic interests or opportunities to exert influence. If Serbia fails to meet expectations as a foothold, China will seek another alternative country.
Serbia has a low level of resilience against China’s “soft” power and has the highest proportion of pro-China residents in Central and Eastern Europe. A significant factor is Serbia’s strategic interest in China’s influence as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, preventing Kosovo’s UN membership. Other factors include attracting Chinese investments as a balance to Russia and as an alternative to EU investments. This reduces Belgrade’s perception of risk and dependency.
Belgrade’s partnership with China supports the interests of Serbia’s increasingly illiberal regime, strengthening its political legitimacy through Chinese attention and assistance. By playing the “China card,” Belgrade positions itself as a bridge between China and Central and Western Europe, enhancing Vučić’s international standing. Serbia is crucial for China in promoting the Chinese model and agenda.
Serbia still has room to develop closer relations with China and maneuver under increasing EU and US pressure. However, most young Serbs prefer the Western model, and for them, China remains culturally unattractive. It will be increasingly challenging for China to apply “soft power” and cultural penetration in Serbia. Overall, China’s desired influence in the WB is hampered by cultural and value system differences, with better results achieved in countries with more Chinese investments.
China is on the verge of establishing real levers of influence in the WB, particularly in Serbia and Montenegro. If the current pace of deepening Chinese involvement in the WB continues, Beijing may achieve its goal of creating an area where China significantly shapes the economic and political environment, serving as both a buffer and a foothold for penetrating the heart of Europe.
