Thewesternbalkans
Turkiye pursues Neo-Ottomanism, a Realpolitik, pragmatic and interests-based foreign policy in the region. Through active diplomacy and economic statecraft, it seeks to establish itself as an economic and political leader in the region before these countries become EU members. As long as Turkiye’s accession to the EU remains deadlocked and the Turkish political elites feel alienated from the West, Turkiye is tempted to split with the EU to pursue an increasingly independent foreign policy or play a spoiler role in the Western Balkans. Turkiye has stepped up its economic, cultural, political, and diplomatic relations with the countries in the region and demanded that priority to be given to regional ownership initiatives and regional economic zones. Turkish foreign policy in the region moves from boundary testing to boundary challenging, as Turkiye increasingly competes against the EU for regional influence.
Turkiye has re-emerged as a player in the Balkans in the past decade, and its economic and political influence has grown since the end of the 1990s Balkans wars. Ankara does view the Balkans as part of its geographical and emotional hinterland: many citizens of Turkiye have ancestors that came to Anatolia during the Balkans wars of the early twentieth century.
Turkish leaders like the myth of Turkish power for internal propaganda reasons. Whatever dreams of Ottoman glory Turkish leaders may have in their private moments, these do not form the basis of Ankara’s Western Balkans policy. In reality, Turkiye is neither an alternative or even the biggest economic actor in the region. Turkiye is indeed taking steps to strengthen its relationship with Western Balkans countries; it would like to be taken seriously in the region, and it retains its interest in the protection of Muslims there. But none of this is on a par with the EU’s economic and political influence in the region or a threat to it – at least for the moment.
Ankara-centric view of the region has the aim of identifying areas of cooperation and potential points of divergence between Turkiye and the EU. There are three distinct phases of Western Balkans policy under Turkiye’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, charting its shift from: ongoing Atlanticism in the party’s early years of government; to an extended period under foreign minister and prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who accentuated the Ottoman inheritance; to a pragmatic shift back under a newly empowered Erdogan, retaining some emphasis on the imperial past, but also focusing on trade.
In his scientific bestseller “Strategic Depth”, Davutoglu argued that Ankara should base its Balkans policy on Bosniaks and Albanians – the two significant Muslim populations in the region. He saw closer relations with these communities as the key to expanding Turkiye’s influence in the region. Once he became a foreign minister, Davutoglu focused not only on Bosnia and Albania but developed close ties with Macedonia and Serbia as well.
In fact, as soon as Davutoglu became foreign minister, Turkiye embarked on a dizzying diplomatic outreach campaign throughout the Western Balkans.
Davutoglu was a keen believer in Turkye’s soft power potential. In terms of cultural influence, the AKP government during this period put great emphasis on the expansion of the activities of the Turkish aid agency (TIKA) and the establishment of Yunus Emre cultural centres across the region. Fashioned after the Goethe Institute and the British Council, these local cultural institutions were supported by the Turkish government with the intention of spreading Turkish language and culture. From 2007 onwards, Turkiye opened two Yunus Emre centres in Albania, three in Bosnia, one in Serbia, three in Kosovo, and three in Macedonia.
In a speech in Sarajevo in 2009, Davutoglu claimed that: “Our history is the same, our fate is the same, and our future is the same. As the Ottoman Balkans has risen to the centre of world politics in the sixteenth century, we will make the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East, together with Turkiye, the centre of world politics. This is the aim of Turkish foreign policy and we will achieve this. To provide regional and global peace, we will reintegrate with the Balkans region, the Middle East, and Caucasus, not only for ourselves but for the whole of humanity.”
Erdogan himself repeated the salute to the Balkans at key events and other post-election victory speeches over the years, presenting Turkiye as the saviour of Muslims in neighbouring countries.
However, most of the political elites in the Western Balkans unanimously display devotion to the Turkish political establishment and nurture good relations. But, ciitisens with more liberal views dread the possibility of Turkiye becoming more influential in the region, especially in light of the more assertive autocratic nature of President Erdogan’s regime.
The one exception to this is Bosnia, where Turkiye has remained popular for Muslims and life under Turkish rule is generally seen in positive terms.
Underpinning all these shifts are Turkiye’s ongoing commitment to: transatlanticism; trade links; and Muslim communities in the region. And, as with much else in contemporary Turkiye, Erdogan towers over all this: his pragmatic approach to the region and, more recently, his rivalry with influential religious leader Fethullah Gulen, have also left their imprint on Turkiye’s Western Balkans policy.
In terms of its desired outcomes for the Western Balkans, the current Turkish government – like its predecessors – does not see the integration of the region into the European framework as something that runs counter to Turkish interests. In interviews in Ankara, senior Turkish officials emphasise that Turkiye is supportive of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans, and they express frustration that Europeans fail to see this. From Turkiye’s point of view, the EU framework brings stability and prosperity to a troubled region with which Turkiye has friendly relations and growing economic ties. The Balkans is Turkiye’s gateway to Europe – literally, as it is the route that Turkish trucks use to export to the EU, the country’s main trading partner. Turkiye has a further interest in the region in that, in terms of EU membership for Western Balkans countries, it sees friendly governments inside the EU as an indirect way into the heart of Europe. Especially at a time when Turkiye’s relations with Europe are suffering, it makes sense for the country to want Western Balkans states in the European club.
However, it is trough that the Balkans hold a particular emotional significance for Turks, regardless of who is governing Turkiye at any given time. The Ottoman Empire was in large part a Balkans empire – not only in terms of territorial space but also in terms of its ruling cadres and bureaucracy, many of whose members came from families with roots in the Balkans. Waves of Muslim immigration to Anatolia started in the late nineteenth century and continued until the early decades of the Turkish republic. It is impossible to know the exact number of Turkish citizens who have a family background in the Balkans. Turkiye’s founding leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and many of the leading cadres in the late Ottoman and early republican periods, had Balkans forebears. Today, entire neighbourhoods of Istanbul, such as Bayrampasa, Pendik, and Arnavutkoy (Albanian village), have populations that claim to be descendants of Balkans emigrants.
Yet the Balkans does not feature among the top issues in Turkish public opinion. Turkish newspapers do not run stories about political developments in the region and pollsters do not find the Balkans significant enough to even inquire about Turkish perceptions of the region. There appears to be overall support for good relations, as shown by one recent debate in the Turkish parliament on the Balkans, in which both the government and the opposition expressed their support for close ties.
Alongside economic and security relations, Turkiye also harbours a desire to be the patron saint of the Muslim populations of the Western Balkans. In this respect, Erdogan finds in the region the prestige that he does not have elsewhere in Europe.
Comments:
Turkish foreign policy towards the Western Balkans continues to be based on the Neo-Ottoman ideology traced by former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in his book “Strategic Depth”, regardless of the new situation around him, the idea of the Ottoman past of the region and its organic connection with Turkiye is leading and defining. This predetermines the protection of the Muslim minorities in the region, the rehabilitation of Turkish culture and monuments, the imposition of economic and commercial hegemony wherever possible, the division of the societies of the Balkan states on ethnic-religious lines, including through the prosecution and financing of political parties, incessant attempts to interference in the internal affairs of the countries in the region.
However, it should be noted that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, there has been a realignment of the Turkish attitude towards the Balkans, which is most likely due to the increased global ambitions of Erdogan and his subordinates, but also to the understanding in Ankara that the Balkans are not where to escape. The war in Ukraine gave Erdogan the opportunity to conduct an independent foreign policy dictated by Turkish interests, which made him one of the world leaders whose opinions and positions are important on many issues of a political and economic nature. Erdogan skillfully balances the country’s role as a loyal member of NATO and maintaining good relations with Moscow. On the other hand, the presence of a strong Muslim community in the Balkan region, including the Western Balkans, but also EU member states, gives Ankara peace of mind that their interests are protected.
Forecast:
This policy will actually remain in effect regardless of who rules in Ankara, as it is based on the real power (political, economic, military, cultural, etc.) of the Turkish state. Naturally, the EU, Russia, the USA and other major players continue to seek and impose their place in imposing influence in the Balkans.
Both the historical facts (which are not always in favor of Ankara) and the new geopolitical realities related to the expansion of the two most influential organizations – NATO and the EU – should be taken into account.
