Thewesternbalkans
The development of the domestic political situation in Kosovo in the coming months will be increasingly determined by the positioning of the main political forces in relation to the upcoming elections on 9 February 2025. Kosovo has extended an invitation to the EU to observe the elections and a fact-finding mission is expected to visit Kosovo in the middle of September this year in connection with the preparations for monitoring the election process by the EU.
The ruling party – Prime Minister Kurti’s – Self-Determination Movement maintains its position as the leading political force, with polls suggesting the party could win around 45 percent of the vote. The main question remains whether the party will be able to secure an absolute majority or will be forced to form a coalition with other political forces.
The question of whether the Kosovo Serbs will participate in the elections in February next year remains open for now. According to some estimates, there is already some understanding in the Serbian community that boycotting the elections is not in the interest of the Kosovo Serbs.
The operations undertaken by Pristina at the beginning of August this year closing the offices of the Serbian-led parallel structures/services led to a sharp escalation of tensions in the four predominantly Serbian municipalities in the north of the country and to an escalation of tensions between Belgrade and Pristina.
On August 2, 2024, Prime Minister Kurti announced at a meeting with ambassadors from the Quinta and the EU Office about Pristina’s intention to open the Ibar Bridge in Mitrovica, which was met with disapproval by those who participated in the meeting.
On August 5, 2024, as a result of a police action, nine branches of “Serbian Post” were closed on the territory of the four municipalities in the northern part of the country. On August 30 the Kosovo Police conducted a new operation during which a number of parallel communal services and social offices, run by Serbian institution, were closed. These ostentatious actions with the participation of heavily armed special police forces greatly provoked the discontent of the local Serbian population and Belgrade.
There were reactions of public disapproval from the EU, USA, NATO/KFOR, which repeatedly called on Pristina not to take unilateral and uncoordinated actions outside the framework of the Dialogue, leading to an escalation of the situation on the ground. A clear message was sent to Pristina to refrain from new unilateral steps such as the opening of the Ibar bridge and to give priority to solving this and other open issues exclusively within the framework of the Dialogue and in accordance with the agreements reached in the negotiation process.
The focus is currently on the preparation of a meeting between the parties at the level of chief negotiators, with the orientation being that it will be held in Brussels by the end of September this year.
The issue has already been discussed between the EU Special Envoy Miroslav Lajcak and the Serbian President Vučić at their meeting in Prague at the end of August 2024, on the sidelines of the international forum “GLOBSEC 2024”. Talks were also held in Pristina on September 6 between M. Lajcak and the first deputy prime minister and chief negotiator from the side of Kosovo, Beslik Bislimi, at which the specific parameters of the upcoming meeting were discussed.
The EU believes that the agenda should include the topics related to postal services and other issues in the field of telecommunications agreements between the countries of 2013 and 2015, and the question of opening the Ibar Bridge, whose status is also part of the agreements reached within the Dialogue. The EU’s position has always been in favour of opening the bridge to motor vehicles, but this should be based on an agreement between the parties.
More generally, with regard to the functioning of the so-called parallel structures, the position of the EU continues is that this issue should find a permanent solution within the negotiation process for the establishment of the Association/Community of the municipalities with a predominantly Serbian population in Kosovo. M. Lajcak considers it more important within the framework of the upcoming meeting to continue the discussion of the tenth version of the implementation table proposed by the EU, listing the sequence of actions of each of the parties in the process of implementing the European Agreement and its Annex.
For the time being, the EU’s assessment is that Prime Minister Kurti’s government remains consistently committed to the reform process related to the country’s European perspective. Guaranteeing the rule of law and the independence of the judicial system, the formation of a professional and independent public administration and the fight against corruption and organized crime remain the main challenges in the country’s European integration process.
The EU supports at a working level the efforts of the authorities in the above-mentioned areas, but the problem is that in a number of cases legislative decisions are adopted without taking into account the previously made recommendations and some draft laws enter the parliamentary hall without prior expert consultation with The Venice Commission.
Intensive high-level consultations have been held over the past two to three months on issues related to the preparation of the Reform Program. The consultations took place in a markedly constructive atmosphere on the part of the authorities in Kosovo. In general, Pristina has taken into account the EU’s recommendations, for example, on enhanced measures to harmonize Kosovo’s visa policy with that of the EU. However, the escalation on the ground in North Kosovo in August of this year, after Pristina’s actions, uncoordinated with the EU and the international community, to assert the rule of law in the four municipalities with a predominantly Serbian population, continues to cause serious concern.
The EU underlines that at this time it is important for both parties to refrain from further unilateral actions and mutual accusations, engaging more constructively within the Dialogue on the implementation of the agreements reached, with a focus on the Europe Agreement and its Annex. Regardless of the mentioned above, most member states support Borel’s June 2023 proposal to lift sanctions against Kosovo from June 2023, but some of the major countries like France, Italy and Spain express reservations based on the series of unilateral actions of Pristina during the summer period and offer only a partial lifting of the sanctions.
COMMENT: It is difficult to imagine that A. Kurti will change his policy towards the Kosovo Serbs before the election next year when tension in the north is increasing the support for him personally and his party. In the same time, we can’t exclude some provocations from Belgrade and the Kosovo Serbs, which might end up in real clashes with Kosovo police.
In regard of the sanction our assessment is that they will be lifted before the elections in 2025, having in mind that A. Kurti will hold the leadership of the county for at least one more mandate.
