Thewesternbalkans
The European Union’s disappointment with both Kosovo and Serbia is palpable as neither country is making substantial progress towards normalizing their relations. After six meetings in Brussels aimed at finding a mutually acceptable solution regarding the Kosovo Central Bank’s decision on the use of the dinar, the EU’s special envoy, Miroslav Lajčák, expressed his frustration, essentially stating, “whenever you are ready for compromise, we will continue.” On May 17, Germany, France and Italy postponed the vote on Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe, despite a positive recommendation from the Committee of Ministers on April 24 and a favourable opinion from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). This delay was due to Pristina’s failure to create the Association of Serbian Municipalities. The reason – Albin Kurti have sent to the Kosovo Constitutional Court his own project for the Association of Serbian Municipalities, and not the one prepared by EU.
The EU and the Council of Europe (CoE) still have several demands for Kosovo, including:
- Lifting the blockade on Serbian goods imports;
- Ceasing government pressure on the judiciary;
- Halting pressure on individual journalists and media outlets;
- Improving legal rights for women and the LGBTQ+ community;
- Enforcing the Law on Languages, which remains largely unimplemented.
The EU’s frustration is further evidenced by the divergent opinions among member states regarding the lifting of European sanctions on Kosovo. Some countries advocate for immediate removal of all measures, while others, including France, support a “step-by-step” approach.
Simultaneously, the configuration of the new Serbian government is seen as a “slap in the face” to the EU and the US, as noted in a previous analysis. Democratic reforms in Serbia are stagnating while relations with Russia and China are strengthening. Serbia is actively working through diplomatic channels to at least delay Kosovo’s membership in the CoE, although they acknowledge it will eventually happen.
In early May 2024, the Council of Europe approved the establishment of a Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, aimed at supporting EU-related reforms and economic growth in the region from 2024 to 2027. This facility is expected to provide up to €2 billion in grants and €4 billion in loans to the EU’s six Western Balkan partners. According to the Commission’s proposal, which was amended by the European Parliament, support under this facility requires beneficiaries to improve and uphold democratic mechanisms, ensure a functioning multi-party parliamentary system, protect free and pluralistic media, combat disinformation, and adhere to the rule of law. For Serbia and Kosovo, an additional precondition is making real progress in normalizing relations.
Comment:
The current developments indicate that the primary winners of the stalled normalization process between Kosovo and Serbia are Russia and China. Both countries are gaining increased support from the Serbian populace and are expanding their political and economic influence in the region.
Conversely, the biggest losers are Serbia and Kosovo, whose leaders seem unwilling to make necessary concessions for fear of destabilizing their power. In a rapidly changing global landscape, the significance of both countries is diminishing. While the Western Balkans are not of strategic interest to Russia or China, the region remains a focus for the EU, which sees the integration of the Western Balkans into the Union as inevitable. The recent setbacks in Serbia and Kosovo represent a partial defeat for the EU’s “soft power” in the region.
EU member states remain steadfast in their belief that the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, under EU auspices, is the only path forward. Normalization of relations is a key condition for European integration for both countries. However, there is a clear lack of political will in Belgrade and Pristina for compromise. Both ruling parties ascended to power with nationalistic rhetoric and are now waiting for the outcomes of the European Parliament and US presidential elections, making immediate normalization of the relations between Belgrade and Pristina unlikely. This stalemate renders Brussels another significant loser in this scenario.
The US has also publicly admitted its limited control over Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti. Nevertheless, the US remains committed to supporting Kosovo’s international recognition and EU integration, despite its calm but cold response to Serbia’s new government.
In conclusion, while minor steps toward de-escalation may occur due to upcoming elections and the summer holidays, the political landscape in Kosovo and Serbia remains fraught with uncertainties. This situation, underscored by future electoral dynamics, divergent international perspectives, and entrenched bilateral disputes, demands sustained diplomatic efforts and consensus-building to achieve tangible progress.
Ultimately, the greatest losers of this stalemate are the peoples of Serbia and Kosovo.
