Thewesternbalkans
For Montenegro’s Deputy Prime Minister Filip Ivanović, his country’s way out of the EU waiting room is clear: in 2028, Montenegro will become the 28th EU member state. At a regional forum in Bucharest on 25 October 2024, however, he also issued a strong warning that after all the efforts made so far, if the accession process is delayed or postponed again, it will be completely abandoned. The Montenegrin Deputy Prime Minister called for an understanding at all levels in the EU that if the accession plan fails and the Western Balkans are left outside the EU for a long time, other players will enter the region and Europe will lose its influence in the Western Balkans, i.e. in the heart of Europe itself. In his opinion, the integration process must develop quickly and confidently so as not to leave room for foreign influence.
The EU’s dilemmas
Some EU enlargement experts believe that the Union can easily afford the rapid accession of a country with a population of 600,000, such as Montenegro, before the Union has completed its fundamental reforms to increase its absorption capacity. They believe that the EU should not keep the Western Balkans in the waiting room for the sake of its own reforms and the creation of absorption capacity, which would be the worst-case scenario. The Western Balkans are not an experimental laboratory where officials from Brussels can study the effect of increasing or decreasing the Union’s institutional pressure, they argue.
However, another part of the experts focuses on the dualistic nature of enlargement – not only do the candidate countries have to meet the criteria, but the EU also has to reform itself in order to be prepared for enlargement: changes in decision-making procedures, adjustment of common policies (cohesion, agricultural and others), preparation of the EU budget for enlargement, etc.
The main dilemma for Brussels is how, on the one hand, to move the enlargement process forward, while maintaining close cooperation, commitment and the perspective of the candidate countries, and on the other hand, to link it to the assessment of the countries on their own merits.
Brussels has managed to create competition between the countries in the region. This raises another dilemma – whether to expand as a group or individually, by country, depending solely on their own merits. Among the challenges facing the EU is finding an adequate balance between the regional and individual approach to the individual countries of the Western Balkans, each of which has its own peculiarities and differences. The separation of Albania from North Macedonia in the negotiation process at the end of 2024 is indicative in this regard.
The waiting room policy
North Macedonia has been in the EU’s waiting room for 20 years, Montenegro – for 16, Albania and Serbia – for 15, Bosnia and Herzegovina – for 8; only Kosovo submitted an application recently – in 2022. Candidate countries are tasked with implementing reforms on their way to joining the Union, but they are no longer sure whether the Union’s member states really want them to join the club.
The waiting room policy is the result of two competing concerns:
The first concern is that the accession of the unstable and economically backward Western Balkan countries will weaken the Union. Unity and trust in the EU are already being tested in the face of geopolitical turmoil and internal problems in the old member states.
The other concern is that postponing accession indefinitely will harm the security of the EU and will push the Western Balkans back towards unrest and crises.
The tension between these two concerns orients decision-makers in Brussels towards buying time: by keeping promises of eventual membership, the candidate countries are moved from stage to stage in the waiting room as slowly as possible. This minimizes the risk of introducing problems into the EU from the accession of the least developed countries in Europe to the Union, while the EU still has enough problems with the eurozone, the coordination of a common foreign and security policy, weakened economies, and geopolitical positioning.
The candidate countries of the Western Balkans had no choice between a fast or a slow track to join the EU. The fast track was closed after the enlargements in 2004 and 2007. An exception was made only for the excellent Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013, “only” 10 years after the application date and eight years after the start of accession negotiations.
The strategy of slow progress of the candidate countries through the waiting room stages, as well as the constant change of the accession conditions, has strengthened distrust towards the EU and increased Euroscepticism in the Western Balkan countries. Waiting room fatigue is cracking the prospect of European integration, which has been the political glue that united the region.
At the same time, the EU’s influence in the Western Balkans has been seriously challenged by the powerful inflow of Chinese capital into the region within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative over the past 10 years. The ground has been prepared for China’s “soft power”, which, in synergy with Russian information operations, has shaped a powerful extra-European trajectory of influence. Russia has also largely maintained its economic presence in the region. The effects of Russian aggression in Ukraine are clearly visible in the candidate countries of the Western Balkans, and are expressed in disinformation, interference in elections and intra-regional tensions.
The EU’s efforts
The EU has worked long and hard to create relations and institutions that are the foundation for long-term stability in the Western Balkans region: from financial assistance and investment, through visa liberalization and screening, to The Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. The EU has generally succeeded in motivating the countries to undertake reforms that are not only a technological process, but also a political imperative. The possibilities of local elites to shift the blame for their own failures and lack of progress onto Brussels are decreasing.
It must be acknowledged that the EU is making extraordinary efforts to increase the intensity of communications with the candidate countries from the Western Balkans. The aim is for the citizens of these countries to experience the benefits of membership on a daily basis even before the countries formally join.
Both in the candidate countries and in Brussels, some weaknesses are acknowledged: even in the excellent countries Montenegro and Albania, sufficient administrative capacity has not been created, although the EC regularly sends its specialists to the capitals of the candidate countries to provide methodological assistance. Frequent changes of government and fierce confrontations between government and opposition have prevented countries with populations between 600,000 and six million from forming a sufficient number of experts in key policy areas for reforms.
The politicization of the enlargement process
In a geopolitical context, the Russian aggression in Ukraine has intensified the politicization of the EU enlargement process and has had an impact on the balance of power in the European Council. Almost all member states accept geopolitical arguments in addition to the importance of the rule of law and merits, and view enlargement through a geopolitical prism. Some member states explicitly insist on accelerating the enlargement process. Others, however, do not want to commit to specific deadlines.
Veto points and bilateral disputes
EU member states must reach unanimity on the approval of countries’ applications, on granting candidate status, on starting negotiations, on opening and closing each of the 35 negotiation chapters, on the accession treaty and on the date of accession to the EU. These are at least 75 veto points in total that candidate countries must overcome.
The enlargement process is often delayed by bilateral disputes between candidate countries and member states. These disputes are usually ethno-territorial, historical or border-related and date back to before the accession process, but they can become the last obstacle before a country’s admission as a result of a veto by a member state. In such cases, the accession process is always delayed and trust in the merit-based process is undermined. The EU has failed to learn the bitter lessons of the Cyprus case and the border disputes between Slovenia and Croatia, and is currently experiencing tensions over North Macedonia’s disputes with Greece and Bulgaria and Montenegro’s disputes with Croatia. If these disputes fail to be resolved bilaterally within the framework of the accession process, the EC will have to resort to binding arbitration mechanisms.
The realistic perspective
The governments of the EU member states recognise the European perspective of the candidate countries. The realistic perspective of membership is an important motivation for candidate countries to reform. Governments in candidate countries must give priority to implementing and maintaining the necessary reforms. Over the past year, some countries in the Western Balkans, such as Albania and Montenegro, have made progress in reforms related to the so-called Fundamentals (democracy, rule of law, human rights, public administration, migration, a functioning market economy). Demonstrating a critical-constructive approach, the European Commission (EC) at the end of 2024 supported the opening of Cluster 6 for Albania and proposed the closure of three chapters for Montenegro (instead of the closure of four chapters expected by Podgorica).
The Commission’s conclusion on Serbia is that it has met the technical benchmarks for opening Cluster 3, but it has not been opened due to concerns about the rule of law and progress in the dialogue with Kosovo. In addition, Serbia is expected to further align with the EU’s CFSP.
The Commission does not currently envisage any further steps for North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.
While there are no shortcuts in the accession process, the transition from the EU waiting room to the club for Montenegro and Albania is more or less predictable in the coming years – they are NATO members and Montenegro has unilaterally adopted the euro as its national currency. The third NATO member from the Western Balkans, North Macedonia, has a more uncertain outlook due to disputes with Greece and Bulgaria, while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo need to resolve sovereignty issues before moving from the waiting room to the club.
