Thewesternbalkans
Serbia has made significant progress in the process of joining the European Union, but it is not yet fully ready for membership. It needs to continue reforms in key areas such as the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organized crime, and improving its legal and institutional framework. According to the European Commission and other observers, the fulfillment of these conditions will determine the speed and success of Serbia’s accession process to the EU.
“I am convinced that Serbia could meet all the formal criteria in the negotiation chapters within a few months,” said new Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Đurić in an interview with the Austrian state agency APA.
Progress and Challenges
Serbia applied for EU membership in 2009 and obtained candidate status in March 2012. Accession negotiations between the EU and Serbia began in January 2014. So far, 22 out of 35 negotiation chapters have been opened. Currently, Belgrade assesses alignment between Serbia’s foreign policy and the EU at 53%, while Brussels estimates Serbia’s alignment with the union at around 50%.
The accession process is structured around six clusters, each covering different areas of negotiation chapters. Currently, Cluster 1 (Fundamentals: Rule of Law, Fundamental Rights, Public Administration) and Cluster 4 (Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity: Environment, Transport, Energy) are open. According to European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi, the goal now is to open the next clusters in negotiations with Serbia and support the rapid finalization of the country’s reform agenda.
Future Prospects
The Hungarian presidency aims to open Cluster 3 (Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth: Economic and Financial Affairs, Labor Policy), and Belgrade has stated it has been fully ready for this since 2021. Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi stated in 2022 that Serbia had met the initial conditions for Cluster 3 and that it is technically ready to be opened, but the decision lies with the member states and must be made unanimously. Moderate optimism is advised, given the increasing number of EU member states opposing such a step due to a lack of change in Serbia’s behavior and progress in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue.
Parallel efforts are also being made to open Cluster 2 (Internal Market: Free Movement of Goods, Services, Capital, and People) and Cluster 5 (Resources, Agriculture, and Cohesion: Agriculture, Fisheries, Regional Policy).
The new Serbian government aims to be fully ready for accession by 2027, in terms of both the economy and the rule of law, democracy, and other aspects important for full membership. This reform agenda has been declared a top priority of the government, which, however, has to convince its own population, only 38% of which see their country in the EU. One of the things in which President Vučić was successful in recent years was to establish a position where the West needs him more than the he needs the West.
Key Issues
A crucial aspect of Serbia’s EU accession is its alignment with the EU’s positions and decisions on foreign and security policy, particularly regarding the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the implementation of sanctions. A major issue here is Serbia’s persistent refusal to support sanctions against Russia. The controversy over Serbian ammunition and weapons reaching Ukraine is seen by the Serbian government as an attempt by the West to disrupt Belgrade’s warm relations with Moscow.
On one hand, Belgrade insists on its right to sell the products of its highly developed military-industrial complex to third countries. On the other hand, Serbia has longstanding trade and economic relations with Russia, primarily in the fields of energy, military, and agriculture. Serbia emphasizes its desire not to be a burden to the EU one day but to be an economically strong country. Belgrade rightly points out that in the past, the EU has accepted countries with weaker political and economic capabilities than Serbia.
However, Serbia will not join the sanctions against Russia not only for economic reasons or because 95% of the Serbian population is against the introduction of anti-Russian sanctions. The leading reasons are principled considerations – Belgrade does not want to deprive itself of its main protector on the Kosovo issue in the UN Security Council and other international forums.
The question of Kosovo is decisive in Serbia’s accession process to the EU. Everything else is much easier to resolve. At this stage, Serbia is not ready to concede on recognizing Kosovo as a condition for EU membership. There are no signs of progress on this issue in the near to medium term, especially in light of the upcoming Hungarian EU presidency.
Regional Security and Cooperation
The ongoing Russian military aggression against Ukraine has posed serious security challenges for the Western Balkans, including increased risks of cyber and hybrid threats, intensified Russian propaganda, and disinformation activities aimed at undermining the region’s Euro-Atlantic integration. The EU is focusing on policies and projects aimed at enhancing the resilience and capacity of the six Western Balkan countries to counter cyber and hybrid threats, foreign information manipulation, and other malicious activities.
Serbia is seen as crucial for the EU’s efforts to address common security threats and challenges, such as illegal migration, organized crime, terrorism, and human trafficking. The regional economic prospects for the Western Balkans have deteriorated due to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, prompting the EU to launch initiatives aimed at associating the Western Balkans with measures to mitigate the negative impact of the Russian war in Ukraine on the region.
Neighborly Relations
Resolving bilateral issues, participating in inclusive regional cooperation, and achieving lasting reconciliation are crucial for good neighborliness and stability in the Western Balkans region and its European perspective. In this context, developing good neighborly relations, including with neighboring EU member states, is essential for Serbia as a principle in enlargement policy. The situation of the Hungarian and Bulgarian minorities in Serbia is generally deteriorating due to objective demographic trends, but Sofia periodically raises economic or educational problems of the Bulgarian minority, which are practically not being resolved. Bulgarian President Rumen Radev has already indicated that the situation of Bulgarians in Serbia will be a key criterion for supporting the country’s European integration. In Belgrade it smelled like a veto.
Conclusion
Serbia remains committed to its EU path and acknowledges the importance of the new Growth Plan and the Reform and Growth Facility. These initiatives are crucial for Serbia’s accelerated economic integration with the EU, regional economic growth, and implementation of necessary socio-economic and fundamental reforms.
