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According to some Albanian media, recently the European Commission said it has suspended the reimbursement of all the funds and paused all measures under its Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance for Rural Development (IPARD) to Albania since July 2023, amid an investigation of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) for spending irregularities.
The Commission has initiated a procedure with the Albanian authorities to ensure that appropriate remedial actions are put in place as soon as possible, Olof Gill, Commission spokesperson for trade and agriculture, said in an emailed statement to SeeNews.
“As we are dealing with the EU tax payers’ money, we expect the Albanian authorities to take this issue very seriously,” he added. “The European Union is ready to continue supporting the Albanian farmers, agri-food sector and rural areas in the future, provided that the financial interests of the European Union are duly protected.”
“Irregularities found included applicants paying part of their grant to a pre-picked local consultancy, contracts awarded through rigged processes, inflated prices, and breaches of contractual rules”, OLAF’s annual report, published recently, shows.
This is a blow to the credibility of Albania’s EU path. This ongoing suspension follows a massive misuse scandal involving IPARD II funds, where the EU’s own anti-fraud office, OLAF, uncovered more than €33 million in misappropriated grants and deep structural irregularities in the management of rural development funds. Two years later, no one in Albania has been held criminally accountable. On the contrary, senior figures implicated in the scandal—including the former director of the agency overseeing the funds—were promoted to cabinet-level posts, a move that has further entrenched perceptions of political impunity.
At the heart of the problem lies not just corruption, but a deliberate state-sanctioned mechanism designed to siphon off aid funds. Consultancy firms, many with political ties, were empowered to charge poor and small-scale farmers fees of up to 30% of the total grant—often upfront—for application “assistance.” The rules were structured to ensure that most small producers, who make up nearly 90% of Albanian agriculture, were systematically excluded due to complex eligibility requirements like trade-related tax numbers. As a result, the aid intended for development and empowerment became a tool of exploitation, further marginalising rural communities and deepening their dependency. The farmers, for whom these funds were ostensibly intended, were instead driven into debt, with no guarantees of accessing the grants themselves.
This is not an isolated case of inefficiency, but a striking example of capture. It underscores a broader reality where Albanian institutions do not suffer from weakness but function with precision to serve a political-economic elite. That elite has turned foreign assistance into a means of enrichment, not development. And despite OLAF’s detailed reports, and despite multiple EU warnings, the Albanian prosecution system—especially the SPAK anti-corruption structure—has failed to initiate any proceedings. Not a single conviction has resulted from the extensive documentation of fraud provided by European investigators.
What makes this situation more troubling is the context in which it unfolds. Albania is in formal accession negotiations with the EU, promoting a vision of readiness, reform, and integration. The promise of closing all chapters by 2027 is ambitious, but without action on systemic corruption, it risks being little more than a rhetorical mirage. The EU itself has been forced to confront the contradictions of its aid architecture: grants flow through politically controlled intermediaries; audits rely on self-declared compliance; oversight is sporadic and reactive; and the institutions meant to implement reform are too often themselves compromised.
They point to a broader problem of how foreign aid is administered and how easily it becomes a front for elite capture. While successful aid projects do exist—including some that have directly empowered farmers through in-kind support and rigorous third-party oversight—they remain the exception rather than the rule. The IPARD scandal laid bare a sophisticated ecosystem of shell companies, fake bids, fictitious receipts, and front NGOs, some of which were created precisely to exploit EU programs. Half of the companies that applied for IPARD grants were reportedly established just as the program began, many of them having no agricultural experience and having previously benefited from construction grants after the 2019 earthquake.
The consequence is a paradox. As Albania negotiates its EU future, with Brussels still officially supporting its candidacy, one of the most tangible links between Europe and Albanian society—EU agricultural support—has been severed. Negotiations describe a future Albania of transparency, growth, and rule of law. But the reality is an Albania where corruption reaches even the EU’s most developmental programs. The risk now is that aid will continue to serve as a façade, disguising dysfunction behind a language of progress, and eroding rather than advancing the very values it seeks to promote.
Unless both the EU and Albania confront this gap—between the narrative and the lived reality—then the promise of accession will remain hollow, and future funds will only perpetuate the same failures. What is needed now is not more money, but a fundamental rethinking of how aid is structured, monitored, and conditioned. Without accountability, transparency, and a genuine commitment to break the cycle of capture, Albania’s EU dream will continue to be undermined by its own internal contradictions.
Comments: While Albania’s government continues to project an image of rapid progress toward European Union membership— pledging to have negotiated all accession chapters by 2027—the reality on the ground tells a very different story.
As the analysis of the IPARD II scandal shows, these failures are not only institutional, they are moral and strategic, and the cost of this embezzlement is not just monetary – it is deeply political. It undermines trust in institutions, erodes the legitimacy of aid, and feeds citizen disillusionment at a time when public support for EU integration is already fragile. It also exposes a fundamental asymmetry between what the EU assumes and what actually occurs in candidate countries.
