Thewesternbalkans
Until recently, Serbia relied on Russia as its main ally for diplomatic and political support on the Kosovo issue in the international arena.
China is increasingly playing a significant role in Serbia’s stance on the Kosovo issue, effectively starting to displace Russia as a primary consultant and ally. This shift is driven by several factors:
- Strategic Alliance and Economic Ties: In the last 10 years Serbia has been deepening its ties with China through substantial economic cooperation, including infrastructure projects and direct investments. These economic ties are complemented by strong political support, where China backs Serbia’s territorial integrity concerning Kosovo. This aligns with China’s own principles regarding territorial sovereignty, especially in relation to Taiwan. The overall cooperation between Serbia and China is strengthening, both through bilateral channels and within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Central and Eastern European Countries Cooperation Mechanism, which Serbia has actively supported since their launch.
- Diplomatic isolation of Russia: Due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has more limited resources and is cautiously beginning to withdraw from the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro). Serbia can no longer rely on Russia’s support in organizations such as the Council of Europe, IMF, OSCE, Interpol, UNESCO. In these organizations, the influence of Russia, as a tightly isolated country, will be minor and therefore of little help for Serbia. The Serbian-Russian Humanitarian Center in Niš lost its meaning as a hub for action in case of natural disasters in the region, when Russia was physical cut-off from the rest of Europe, by the abolition of air traffic.
- UN Support: China’s potential use of its veto power in the UN Security Council to support Serbia on the Kosovo issue indicates a growing strategic alliance. This is reminiscent of Russia’s previous support but now includes China as a steadfast partner. When it comes to extremely important decisions, decision-making in the Security Council can be overcome by delegating decisions to the UN General Assembly, as was the case with the condemnation of Russian aggression, which Serbia also joined.
- China’s opposition to any separatist aspirations that may threaten the “One China” policy on Taiwan. For China, the Kosovo issue is very similar to the Taiwan issue. Serbia is against separatism in the occupied territories of Ukraine (Donbass), a position that China sympathizes with, but which is at odds with Russia’s interests. Belgrade is also very careful about considered options for possible trade of Russia – Crimea against Kosovo.
- EU and US pressure on Serbia to accept Western positions regarding Russia. China’s involvement is seen by Belgrade as a balancing act against Western influence in the region.
- China is inclined to engage with issues that cannot be resolved by the US alone – Serbia’s sovereignty, status of Republika Srpska. China has greater potential to influence countries inclined to refuse to recognize Kosovo (from Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, the Pacific and the Caribbean). China’s intervention in the Kosovo issue outlines another standoff between the US and China.
- 7. Political Implications: Serbia’s closer relationship with China has raised concerns among EU and US policymakers. There is a fear that China’s growing influence in the Western Balkans could extend to EU institutions if Serbia joins the bloc. This relationship could jeopardize Serbia’s EU accession prospects if tensions between China and the West continue to escalate.
Both Russia and China regard Serbia as their primary political and economic partner in the Western Balkans. Their interests align on the Kosovo issue; however, while Moscow states it will support any resolution on Kosovo that Serbia finds acceptable, Beijing has not made a similar commitment. We can expect however, that China will support everything that Belgrade and Pristina agree upon within the framework of the dialogue, and will respect Belgrade’s position in case Kosovo attempts to gain admission to the United Nations. Due to the principle of “One China” (Taiwan issue), Beijing is not expected to recognize the independence of Kosovo, regardless of Belgrade’s position. Serbia, for its part, adheres to clearly defined red lines, that pertain to the fact that Serbia will never recognize the independence of Kosovo and will not allow Kosovo to enter the UN.
China looks at the position of Taiwan the same way that Serbia looks at Kosovo, as an inalienable part of its territory, and it views any disputes between the two sides as internal issues. Because it is in China’s interest to maintain this position on the issue of territorial disputes, it is likely that Chinese officials will support the Serbian narrative that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia rather than an independent country.
In a highly opaque manner, China is increasing its influence in the Western Balkans through economic and military deals with Serbia and Republika Srpska. Russia remains a major destructive player in the Balkans, while China is a subversive but flexible player that uses more words than deeds to build positions to suit its interests.
Belgrade attempts to balance Moscow’s political sway by engaging with Beijing, but Russia remains a significant influence due to a strong pro-Russian lobby within the Serbian government, the increasing impact of pro-Russian nationalist groups, and Russia’s role in the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.
In terms of cooperation between China and Russia, Beijing is trying to keep room for maneuver without restrictions, depending on the course of events in Ukraine. Russia does not have this luxury and is entirely dependent on China for the future survival of the regime in Moscow. Russia remains in an awkward position vis-à-vis China.
Ahead of the Beijing Winter Olympics in February 2022, Russia and China issued a joint statement in which Beijing joined Russia’s calls for NATO to halt its eastward expansion. This is an unprecedented attempt by China to deny the sovereign right of countries to make their own decisions, in complete contrast to China’s long-standing policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
At present, China is expanding its mediation toolkit in various conflicts around the world, including in the Balkans, without officially announcing a change in its policy of non-intervention. Without active involvement in conflicts, China cannot claim the role of a great power setting the world agenda. After the crisis in Kosovo escalated in May 2023, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement in support of Serbia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, advocating for a solution between the two parties in line with their agreement. On July 31, 2023, Vice Foreign Minister Deng Li met in Beijing with Member of the Presidium of the Serbian Progressive Party and Director of the Serbian Government’s Office for Kosovo and Metohija Petar Petkovic. Deng Li said that China firmly supports Serbia’s efforts in safeguarding its national sovereignty and territorial integrity while firmly opposing Pristina’s unilateral actions. He emphasized China’s support for finding a peaceful solution to the Kosovo issue based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and specifically highlighted Beijing’s support and insistence on the prompt establishment of the Community of Serb Municipalities in accordance with the 2013 Brussels Agreement.
In summary, China’s increasing role in Serbia’s Kosovo strategy highlights a strategic shift, with China providing both economic support and political backing, thereby gradually displacing Russia’s traditional role. This evolution reflects broader geopolitical changes and China’s expanding influence in the Balkans.
Already in the near future and after the possible formalization of Belgrade-Pristina relations, Serbia-China relations will be of utmost importance for the democratization of Serbia and its membership in the EU and NATO.
