Thewesternbalkans
Ethnic division in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), state dysfunctionality and the attachment of the Republika Srpska (RS) leadership to Russia place BiH in the zone of instability in Europe. The US has recently stepped up warnings to its European allies about a looming crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Washington emphasizes its commitment to providing security as needed and encourages strengthening the capabilities of the EU’s Operation “Althea”. EUFOR units are mobilizing. Bosnian media sound the alarm: “The Balkans indeed might face a new big war.”
US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James O’Brien told Tanjug on Monday (8 July) that the risk in the Balkans is that “some local battles will turn into a political conflagration that will hold back the states of the region… The primary risks are in northern Kosovo and with the threats of secession in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.
The increased instability in BiH has the potential to escalate into a severe crisis in the coming months, according to US assessments. It is unclear whether these concerns stem from RS President Milorad Dodik’s desire to “peacefully separate” RS from BiH, or whether Washington has any specific information about Russian intentions to destabilize the region through its influence on Republika Srpska. The two options are interconnected considering Dodik’s close alliance with Putin. After the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Dodik met four times with Putin, and plans for a peaceful secession took concrete shape with the drafting in early July of the Agreement on Regulating Relations Between the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Accordance with the Dayton Agreement and International Acts, as well as Information on the Necessity of Separation.
In May, BiH’s Defense Minister Zukan Helez requested the establishment of a NATO military base in BiH, hinting that the details are already being negotiated. There are NATO bases in Albania, another is planned in Montenegro, and there is a US military base in Kosovo. Russia has agreed to the continuation of the EUFOR “Althea” mission (logistically supported by NATO outside BiH) until June 2025, to prevent its complete replacement by NATO. Moscow will certainly continue to look for ways to prevent the strengthening of NATO’s presence in BiH.
The United Nations High Representative for Bosnia, Christian Schmidt, told in May that EU leaders must be aware that the country could be at great risk if the accession process is further delayed. It is obvious that the process of European integration of the WB has been stagnant for a long time, which gives Russia the opportunity to strengthen its influence in the region to the detriment of the interests of the EU and the USA. The countries of the region do not undertake difficult reforms due to the lack of prospects for progress. As long as there are obstacles in the way of EU integration, these countries will be susceptible to Russian influence.
Russian influence
Russia uses economic ties to exert political influence in the Western Balkans. However, its economic influence in BiH is relatively limited. Although RS is almost entirely dependent on Russian gas imports, its share in the country’s energy mix is minimal. In 2007, the partly state-owned Russian company NeftGazInkor bought the main oil refineries in RS, but they have operated at a loss.
Sarajevo accepts the imposition of sanctions against Russia, but is unable to actually implement them, mainly because of resistance from RS leader Milorad Dodik, who seeks to intensify economic relations with Russia following its invasion of Ukraine.
In the military and security spheres, Russia’s opportunities for influence have greatly diminished since the invasion of Ukraine. Russia assists in the militarization of the RS police and develops forms of cooperation in the field of counterintelligence, counterterrorism and police training. BiH’s purchase of arms is limited due to fears by the RS, which has no army of its own, that the weapons could be used by Sarajevo in a possible civil war against the Serbs. In 2019, the RS purchased three Mi-8 police helicopters from Russia and is also trying to acquire anti-aircraft missiles. Russia is trying to create an emergency center in the RS, similar to the one in the Serbian city of Nis. Backed by Moscow, Banja Luka blocked BiH’s partnership with NATO, which went as far as proposing a Reform Program in the security sphere.
Without using significant resources, Russia manages to maintain its influence in BiH mainly through the instruments of “soft power”. Dodik managed to build strong personal ties with Putin and maintains his reputation as Putin’s most loyal ally in the Balkans. The main destabilizing element of Russian influence in the region is the support of the concept of “Serbian World” propagated by Belgrade and Banja Luka, similar to the “Russian World” created by Moscow.
Currently, Russia is making efforts to consolidate its political and ideological influence in Serbia and Republika Srpska, with the methods of the so-called soft power and its main direction – public diplomacy.
Russia began to implement in relation to the Republika Srpska and to the Serbian world as a whole a new approach that focused on building institutional relations, introducing pragmatism in the relations between Russia and the RS, activating public diplomacy. The aim is to create an Eastern Orthodox geopolitical enclave in the Balkans with Serbia and RS as its core.
Through the tools of public diplomacy, such as the “Gorchakov” Fund at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow has successfully spread in BiH the narratives about the Slavic community, Orthodox brotherhood and the fight against Western values, which were initially adopted by the scientific circles in the RS. These narratives are fully embraced by state institutions in Banja Luka and resonate with broad sections of the society due to conservative values, disillusionment with the progress of European integration and the lack of long democratic traditions. Russia is demonstrating more and more categorically its possibilities of influence in the sphere of culture, science and education. This provides a number of entry points for Russian influence, despite weakly institutionalized and fragmented relations at the governmental level. In an attempt to intensify ties at the official level and build institutional relations, on June 11 the Russian Federation opened an office of its embassy in Sarajevo in Banja Luka. A visit of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov to the RS to open a Russian-Serbian religious temple is also planned. Leading Russian experts are already announcing that it is time for Russia to return to the Balkans and declare them a zone of its national interests.
In addition, Russia supports proxy groups in the nationalist sector, Orthodox brotherhoods, Russian oligarchs, Serbian Cossack groups, veteran organizations and Orthodox figures, which form a loosely connected network across the Balkans. They are locally organized and keep a low profile, but they are highly motivated and, in case of need, Russia is able to urgently mobilize them. This potential, along with the positions of Russian special services in the region, allow for malicious Russian intervention to polarize and destabilize individual countries, or to interfere in its political affairs, as was the case in Montenegro in 2016.
The permanent constitutional crisis and political instability in BiH are profitable for Moscow and can always serve as an occasion for intervention. BiH is now part of Moscow’s information war. Russia’s main goal is to preserve the status quo and uncertainty in BiH by supporting Banja Luka in the politics of obstruction and delaying the European integration process and keeping BiH outside the NATO-centric system. Russian ambassador to BiH Igor Kalbukhov threatened that Russia would be forced to take action if BiH takes steps towards NATO integration.
At this stage, Russia does not publicly support the separation of the RS from BiH and declares itself in favor of preserving the Dayton Agreement. Bosnian media, however, suggest Russian involvement in the preparation of the so-called “Agreement” for secession. According to Dodik, the war in Ukraine makes it difficult to separate the RS from BiH, and the thesis is now maintained that the outcome of the war will decide the future of BiH.
But Russia can reverse the situation in BiH at any time, the question is if and when it will ask for it.
