The political situation in Kosovo will be increasingly determined by the country’s general elections, which are due to be held in late 2024-early 2025. In this context, it should be expected that Pristina will pursue a tougher policy and we should expect new unilateral decisions from Prime Minister Kurti on the issues related to the process of normalization of relations with Belgrade.
The post-election political situation in Serbia continues to be characterized by elements of instability. At the first session of the newly elected parliament, which was not boycotted by the opposition, it proved impossible to elect a speaker. The new government should be elected by mid-March 2024, but a delay cannot be ruled out. In parallel, in its final report on the elections in Serbia, the ODIHR made 25 recommendations to improve the electoral process and align it with obligations within the framework of the OSCE and other international organizations. The recommendations state that the necessary legislative changes should be initiated early enough before the next elections through an inclusive consultative process built on a broad political consensus. The final report also stated that the frequency of early elections further undermined public confidence in the functioning of democratic institutions, but that fundamental freedoms were generally respected during the campaign. The opposition, for its part, continues to insist on new elections not only in Belgrade, but also new parliamentary elections.
For the moment, according to our assessment, the situation on the ground in Northern Kosovo remains calm, but vulnerable to escalation as a result of possible new unilateral actions by Kosovo or Serbia. At the debate on the situation of the Serbian minority in Kosovo held on February 8, 2024 at the UNSC at the request of Serbia, formally introduced by Russia, and in the presence of Vucic and Kurti, both sides presented their positions with a focus on the decision of the Central Bank of Kosovo /CBK/ according to which the euro is the only currency that is allowed to be used for carrying out cash payment operations. This decision had a negative impact on the Dialogue process between Pristina and Belgrade. The Serbian and other communities in Kosovo receiving financial assistance from Serbia – payment in dinars of salaries, pensions, social benefits and others – are affected by the decision of the Central Bank of Kosovo. Parallel educational and health institutions, which do not have their own bank accounts in Kosovo, turned out to be in the most difficult position. The two leaders this time refrained from personal attacks during the UNSC debate, but that did not make it more constructive. No progress was made during the February 26 meeting in Brussels to resolve this issue and another meeting is expected in the coming days.
According to the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other regional issues for the Western Balkans, Miroslav Lajcak, the highlights of his talks in Belgrade and Pristina on 29-31 January 2024 are that Belgrade and Pristina have confirmed their positions regarding the implementation and formalization of the European Agreement and its Annex. Prime Minister Kurti continues to insist on a formal interstate signing ceremony of the documents as a precondition for their implementation, while President Vučić is inclined to show flexibility regarding the formalization of the two agreements, with the condition that it be done in accordance with the constitution of Serbia. In his conversation with the EUSR, the Serbian president once again laid out the red lines for Belgrade in relation to the European agreement on the normalization of relations, specifically, “rejecting any possibility of de jure recognition of Kosovo or membership in the United Nations”. In this context, the Serbian president has stated that he intends to send a letter to the EU and some European leaders, in which he will explain Belgrade’s red lines in detail. Prime Minister Kurti, for his part, is not willing to commit to supporting negotiations on the draft status of the Association of Municipalities with a Predominant Serbian Population in Kosovo (ASOK), proposed by the EUSR Office, and intends to send the draft for consideration by the Constitutional Court of Kosovo. President Osmani also addressed a number of remarks and questions related to the project.
As for the organization of early local elections in the northern part of Kosovo, there is uncertainty as to how the process will proceed after the Central Election Commission (CEC) confirmed the signatures submitted by the Kosovo Serbs for the resignation of the Kosovo Albanian mayors in the 4 municipalities with a predominantly Serbian population. President Osmani believes that the CEC should schedule elections to recall the mayors once the validity of the signatures is confirmed, while the government’s position is that this responsibility rests with the president. Prime Minister Kurti and Deputy Prime Minister Bislimi have already stated again that the mayors are against the idea to resign and insist on holding elections for their recall. Regarding the ban on Serbian goods entering Kosovo, Deputy Prime Minister Bislimi claimed that this was dictated by security concerns and the ban will remain in place until Milan Radojcic is extradited to Kosovo. He believes that the indictment by the Serbian prosecutor’s office against Radojčić will not be enough to lift the ban on the import of Serbian goods into Kosovo. M. Lajcak, for his part, shared that President Vucic had made a commitment that an indictment would soon be brought against M. Radojcic.
Prime Minister Kurti continues to criticize the EU for its measures against Kosovo, making it clear that Pristina will not take any further action in response to the conditions set by the EU to lift the measures. In a recent letter of First Deputy Prime Minister Bislimi to the EUSR M. Lajcak and the institutions, he referred to the actions taken by Kosovo, which, according to Pristina, justify the cancellation of the measures. It should be noted that Prime Minister Kurti also made sharp critical remarks regarding the linking of the normalization process with the process of Kosovo’s accession to the EU. He calls for the separation of the two processes, without taking into account that in numerous European documents, it is explicitly referenced that the European path of both Serbia and Kosovo passes through the full normalization of their bilateral relations.
President Vučić, for his part, also made critical remarks about the international community for not reacting decisively enough to the unilateral actions taken by Kosovo against the Kosovo Serbs, saying that only general statements are not enough. EUSR M. Lajcak has recently emphasized that the Dialogue is in a critical phase, on the one hand the reason for this is Kurti’s reluctance to commit to the formation of ASOK, and on the other hand the increase in Belgrade’s red lines, including the contestation of the legal validity of the Brussels Agreement/Annex. According to the EUSR’s assessment, the EU has levers to influence both countries, but the question is whether the EU has the political will to use them. In this context, he emphasizes that without the demonstration of political will to implement measures to affect both sides, achieving progress in the negotiation process in the near- and medium-term perspective is unrealistic, and the Dialogue in this case is likely to be reduced to the level of a tool for crisis management.
Such a prospect will of course weaken the authority and trust in the EU. Dissatisfaction is evident within the EU regarding the continued non-implementation by the parties of the European Agreement on the Normalization of Relations and its Annex, with some parties believing that there is an acute lack of political will on the part of Belgrade and Pristina to engage constructively in the normalization process of relations. Some EU member states believe that there is an imbalance in the EU’s approach to the countries and insist on the cancellation of the measures against Kosovo. Berlin, for example, states that it is highly unacceptable for Kosovo to continue to be under restrictive measures, while these have not yet been imposed on Serbia, due to its apparent involvement in the incident near the village of Banska on September 24, 2023. Other member states add also the need to identify and bring to justice those involved in the clashes with KFOR forces in late May 2023 and the attack on the Kosovo Police in September 2024. At the same time, not making a progress on the issue of the establishment of ASOK and without termination of the series of unilateral actions taken by the Kosovo side, which are leading to escalation on the ground and complicate the negotiation process, some member countries believe that Prishtina has not learned a lesson from its imposed measures and they should remain in force.
Comment: However, all member countries are adamant that the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue under the auspices of the EU remains the only way forward for both countries and the normalization of relations between them is a key condition for their European integration. Both parties should commit themselves to full compliance and implementation of the commitments made under the Dialogue without further delay and preconditions. The inclusion of Serbia’s Europe Agreement commitments in negotiating chapter 35 should put an end to speculation about the formal/binding nature of these agreements.
It is extremely important that the EU and the MS, together with Washington, continue to send coordinated messages to both countries for their constructive engagement in support of the full, good faith and parallel implementation of all elements of the Europe Agreement and its Annex. The persistence of the differences in the positions of Kosovo and Serbia on the formalisation of the European Agreement and its Annex does not allow for a convergence of positions, which makes it difficult to agree on the implementation table detailing the sequence of steps by both sides in the implementation of the two agreements.
However, on a positive note, both sides have now agreed on the philosophy of the document (the implementation table), according to which “each side does something to get something else in return”, with the negotiating framework remaining unchanged as agreed in Ohrid. The main problem within the EU remains the presence of divergent signals and opinions from different groups of Member States, which does not allow for the formation of a unified position that would allow for stronger pressure to be exerted on both sides, which leads us to conclude that it is very likely that in 2024 minimal or no progress will be made in the process of normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. What can be expected in the near future is a lifting /we do not exclude it to be gradual/ of the measures against Kosovo, but a summit between Serbia and Kosovo should not be expected soon, as it is believed that at this stage both sides cannot afford significant changes in their positions on the Dialogue due to domestic political reasons.
The political landscape in Kosovo and Serbia is poised for significant shifts as both countries navigate crucial electoral cycles and grapple with the intricacies of bilateral relations. Kosovo’s forthcoming general elections in late 2024 to early 2025 are anticipated to shape the nation’s trajectory, with Prime Minister Kurti likely to adopt a more assertive stance, potentially leading to unilateral actions concerning the normalization of relations with Belgrade.
Meanwhile, Serbia faces internal instability post-election with the opposition asking for new election both for Belgrade and general parliament. The delay in forming a government underscores the challenges ahead, compounded by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ (ODIHR) 25 recommendations aimed at enhancing the electoral process.
Tensions between Pristina and Belgrade persist, exacerbated by recent developments such as the Central Bank of Kosovo’s decision mandating the euro as the sole currency for cash transactions, adversely affecting the dialogue process. The UNSC debate on the status of the Serbian minority in Kosovo further highlighted divergent perspectives, with unresolved issues impeding progress.
The European perspective looms large in bilateral relations, with divergent views within the EU regarding the enforcement of the European Agreement on the Normalization of Relations. While consensus exists on the centrality of the EU-facilitated dialogue, disparities among member states regarding punitive measures against Kosovo underscore the complex dynamics at play.
The EU’s role in fostering constructive engagement between Kosovo and Serbia remains pivotal, yet challenges persist due to discordant signals among member states, hindering the formulation of a unified approach. As 2024 unfolds, prospects for significant progress in normalization appear bleak, with incremental measures against Kosovo likely while a summit between the two nations remains elusive, constrained by entrenched domestic political considerations.
In conclusion, the political terrain in Kosovo and Serbia is fraught with uncertainties, underscored by electoral dynamics, divergent international perspectives, and entrenched bilateral disputes. The path toward normalization remains fraught with challenges, necessitating sustained diplomatic efforts and consensus-building to achieve tangible progress in the foreseeable future.
