Thewesternbalkans
In January 2024, Skopje adopted the Program for Economic Reforms 2024-2026, including all EU-related reform measures, which the North Macedonian government will focus on in the next period. Together with Brussels, Skopje defined five priority areas: public finance management, digital and energy/green transition, human capital, business environment and rule of law. After the finalization of the key elements of the reform agenda, Skopje should focus on the specific activities to implement the reforms and the accompanying investments. The implementation of the Reform agenda 2024-2027 is expected to lead to the preservation of macroeconomic stability, achieve sustainable and inclusive growth and contribute to strengthening the country’s capacities to be shock-responsive.
The efforts of North Macedonia to bridge the gap in reaching the EU standards faster and to speed its Euro-integration path are significantly supported by The Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, adopted by the European Commission on 8 November 2023.
During her first visit to Skopje (22.01.2024) the new Director for the Western Balkans in the Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) Valentina Superti encouraged the dialogue between the North Macedonian political formations to adopt the changes to the constitution of the country. Skopje has received a recommendation to strengthen its administrative capacity for the effective utilization of the financial resources granted by the EU (the unused amounts will be cut from the approved budget for a specific year – the so-called decommitment).
At the same time, the European Commission found that the reforms in the Republic of North Macedonia are generally stagnating. The political forces are unable to accept the constitutional changes before the parliamentary elections on May 8 this year, along with the second round of the presidential elections (the first round will be held on April 24). The changes in the Constitution, with inclusion in the basic law of the Bulgarians in the country, are included in the Negotiation Framework of the RNM with the EU as a condition for the automatic holding of the Second Intergovernmental Conference on accession negotiations (IGC) and the start of real negotiations with the EU, by opening negotiation chapters.
The Action Plan on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities and Communities, which is part of the RNM’s commitments related to the EU negotiations, has not yet been finalized, with the North Macedonian government intending the Action plan to be part of the public debate on changes in the constitution. Only after the European Commission receives the final Action Plan on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities and Communities and the two roadmaps, it will present the Opening Benchmark Assessment Report (OBAR) on Cluster 1 – Fundamentals.
There is no progress in the country in the fight against corruption and organized crime. The recommendations of EU experts on improving the work of the judicial system are not implemented. The RNM significantly delays the replacement of passports and other personal documents with ones containing the new name of the country. This makes hundreds of thousands of old-style passports invalid after 12.02.2024. After that date, each EU member state decides whether to recognize old-style passports as valid travel documents.
Complications in the negotiation process of the RNM with the EU may also occur in the event of a victory of the right-wing political formation VMRO-DPMNE in the upcoming parliamentary elections – the most common option at the moment. This opposition party opposes the constitutional changes (characterized by it as a “Bulgarian dictate”) that will trigger the accession of the RNM to the EU. If VMRO-DPMNE wins just under half the seats in the country’s 120-seat parliament, it will have to form a coalition with one of the ethnic Albanian parties, which are strongly pro-European. If it wins less than 50 parliamentary seats, VMRO-DPMNE will probably be forced to negotiate with more than one Albanian party. This means that the need for a compromise could delay the formation of a new government and the negotiations with the EU.
In order to agree to the constitutional changes, VMRO-DPMNE has requested a revision of the Negotiating Framework. The party can accept a compromise, but without loss of prestige, in the form of, for example, a “French proposal+” or a resolution of the European Parliament.
A key factor in the Albanian political spectrum is currently the center-right Alliance for Albanians (AA), which, however, split into two in February: the faction of its founder, AA Central Assembly President Ziyadin Sela favors remaining in the governing coalition SDSM – Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and is for the independent appearance in the parliamentary elections; the faction of AA chairman Arben Taravari decided to join the AA to the Albanian opposition European Alliance for Change (ECJ), which includes the BESA, Alternative and Democratic Movement parties for the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. The party leadership dispute, which is likely to be settled in court, makes the situation more dynamic and unpredictable. Taravari has taken a position to join the AA to the electoral list of the Albanian opposition, as well to run for the president of the RNM, after consultations with the prime minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti. Within the AA party itself, the majority of party members are in favor of independent appearance in the parliamentary elections, while other smaller parts prefer a coalition with the ruling DUI or with the ECJ.
The growing bloc of Albanian opposition parties in RNM is a challenge to DUI’s dominance over the Albanian vote and to SDSM’s hopes for the supremacy of the coalition with DUI over VMRO-DPMNE.
Comment:The insistence of the director of the EC, Valentina Superti, on the changes in the country’s constitution, which are also included in the decision of the European Council of December 15, 2023, deserves attention. These changes could be decisive for the continuation of the EU accession negotiation process. A change in the Negotiation Framework and withdrawal of the “French proposal” seem impossible at the moment and are most likely only a negotiating position of the VMRO-DPMNE.
Before the elections, every political formation in the RNM takes a visibly unyielding position. However, the next rulers are expected to be more inclined to compromise in the name of the Euro-Atlantic majority. RNM presents itself as a loyal member of NATO and its contribution to aid for Ukraine is among the most significant, considering its population of less than two million.
