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The ideological closeness between VMRO-DPMNE and Fidesz was the basis for the organic cooperation between North Macedonia and Hungary after 2024 and for Hungarian financial support for Skopje. After Tisza’s victory in the Hungarian parliamentary elections on April 12, the strategic alliance between the two countries will be put to the test. The Hungarian channel of support may dry up or transform, weakening domestic political stability in North Macedonia.
In terms of foreign policy for North Macedonia, the effect of the change of government in Hungary is rather positive: fewer internal blockages in the EU and a greater chance of progress in the negotiations, which is especially important after the long disputes with Bulgaria. But at the same time, greater EU unity means stricter conditions and greater demands – there will be no political umbrellas like Orbán’s. This will increase the pressure for real reforms (judicial system, corruption) and implementation of the agreements with Bulgaria.
After the change in Hungary, the pro-European arguments in North Macedonia are strengthened and external support for “anti-EU” rhetoric is reduced. External influence (Russia/China) will decrease and stronger EU coordination will leave less space for alternative geopolitical players.
The former Prime Minister of North Macedonia, Nikola Gruevski, is still in Hungarian exile, under the personal tutelage of Viktor Orbán, and now his situation will change. Although Gruevski’s former party VMRO-DPMNE is in power, there are still pending corruption investigations against him. It is unlikely that the Macedonians will demand extradition, which would put their judicial system to the test. But the Hungarians may simply invite Gruevski to leave the country.
The change in Hungary has an indirect but sensitive effect — through the EU — on relations between Bulgaria and North Macedonia
As Viktor Orbán’s influence weakens, the pressure from the EU to resolve the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia is increasing. The EU is becoming more united and internal blockages and “political games” are decreasing. This means more coordinated pressure on both Sofia and Skopje and narrowing the space for delay.
Bulgaria was often perceived as an “obstacle” and other EU countries did not always actively push for a solution. From now on, the EU will want concrete progress, not just positional declarations. The balance is shifting and Bulgaria is losing some of its tactical advantage. Although Hungary is not a direct participant in the bilateral dispute, under Orbán’s rule there was more tolerance for national vetoes and weaker coordination against such blockages. Now the pressure against unilateral blockages is increasing and it will be more difficult for Bulgaria to maintain a firm line without compromises. Brussels will expect constructiveness, not just conditions.
For North Macedonia, the situation is two-way: it gets a chance, but also clear conditions. On the positive side are a clearer European perspective and stronger support from the EU. But Skopje will not have the opportunity to “bypass” the conditions, as the most important thing – the inclusion of Bulgarians in the constitution and the implementation of bilateral agreements – remains. The EU will now insist that this happens in reality, not formally.
Orban was a symbol of national sovereignty against the EU and a hard line towards external pressure. After his loss, this type of rhetoric is losing weight. In this regard, the legitimacy of anti-Bulgarian rhetoric is expected to decrease in North Macedonia, and in Bulgaria, the incentive for a tough domestic political position will decrease.
The combination of factors leads to a greater likelihood of resuming active dialogue and gradual compromises. This cannot happen automatically, since the main obstacles remain: domestic politics in both countries, public opinion, and historical and identity disputes.
In addition, there are risks – the pressure may have the opposite effect. External pressure may strengthen nationalism, and politicians may use the topic for internal mobilization.
After Orban’s defeat, there is a clearer European framework for Bulgaria-North Macedonia relations: more pressure for compromise and less tolerance for blockage.
Decisions will still be made in Sofia and Skopje, so the risk of domestic political reactions remains. The most likely scenario is slow but more structured progress, with periodic tensions, but under stronger EU supervision.
