Thewesternbalkans
Beijing claims that since the establishment of the “Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries” (CCCEEC) platform in 2012 until now, China has been trying to support the economic development of some weaker countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), as it was the original idea for this initiative. In recent years, during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, a number of platforms for cooperation within the CCCEEC, known outside China as “16+1”, have not been developed. Today, the participating countries generally consider it an ineffective format, which is also evident from its shrinking to “14+1”, passing through “17”1″.
Mutual Interest: Years of advance, Years of decline
The countries of the Western Balkans (Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo) do not form an independent group of special importance for China within the CCCEEC platform. However, they are of particular importance for the development of economic ties with Western Europe and for ensuring the economic development of China: the “Balkan Silk Road” provides the link between Piraeus and the rest of the EU and allows the ability of Chinese companies to be tested on the European market.
The growing dependence of the Balkan countries on Chinese finances allows China to gain political support on sovereignty issues (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang and the South China Sea).
For the countries of the Western Balkans (WB), the CCCEEC is of key importance above all as a platform for bilateral contacts between these countries and China. The annual forums at the level of prime ministers during the period 2012-2019 were an indispensable opportunity for personal meetings and conversations (shaking hands) of the Western Balkan leaders with the second most important Chinese leader during this period, Li Keqiang. It was at these forums that some of the most important Chinese projects in the region were negotiated. Without this platform, the prime ministers of countries like BiH, the Republic of North Macedonia or Montenegro would very rarely (if never) meet with a Chinese prime minister.
In this aspect, “14+1” largely fulfilled its purpose. From Beijing’s point of view, a number of set tasks and undeclared goals were also achieved: on the basis of the socialist past of the Western Balkan countries, the channels of communication were kept warm; a split occurred in the EU: Western European countries developed a justified mistrust and an understandable jealousy towards this format; Germany and France saw justification in developing their own “2+1” format with China.
The situation of the six countries of the WB in the CCCEEC is highly differentiated. While Kosovo (unrecognized from China) is not a member of the “14+1”, Serbia has the lion’s share of Chinese projects and other bilateral initiatives. The Chinese narratives are fully followed only by Serbia, while satisfaction with the achievements and positive expectations were expressed by BiH (Milorad Dodik) and Montenegro (Milo Djukanovic). The most openly critical is Albania (Edi Rama).
In the list of projects, published in January 2022 after the last CCCEEC summit (09.02.2021), Serbia participated with 22 intergovernmental non-commercial and commercial projects with the Chinese side, far ahead for Hungary (the Republic of North Macedonia has 4 projects, Albania – 4, BiH – 3, Montenegro – 2). Serbia continues to organize high-level state visits, and China, for its part, supports Belgrade in the military sphere and promotes Serbian products in online commerce.
The disappointment of the Balkans, the disappointment of Beijing
Among China’s European partners, however, over the years, dissatisfaction accumulated over the unfulfilled Chinese investment promises, the large trade deficit, and the lack of reciprocity in relations. The WB countries were grateful for China’s assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic, but insist on increasing the export of agricultural goods to China, speeding up the procedures for signing import protocols with China (the so-called fast track), on establishing a level-playing field, focusing only on certain spheres of cooperation, in accordance with the priorities and interests of the participating countries. For Albania, for example, it was important to sign protocols for the import of milk and honey in China, and the Republic of North Macedonia emphasized the export of foodstuffs and wine for China.
Despite the growing presence of Chinese companies in Serbia, Beijing’s interest in the WB remains limited. Due to a lack of administrative capacity and weak state structures, these countries fail to develop projects attractive to China in a timely manner. In addition, the Balkan countries are heavily indebted and have limited capacity to take on new loans. Another factor with a negative influence on China’s interest in the WB is the negativity of the USA and Germany towards Chinese initiatives.
The Chinese side made significant concessions to European partners in the CCCEEC. At the 2021 summit, the idea was launched that future cooperation between China and CEE countries should follow a more pragmatic and practical approach. In the new official documents, the European participating countries, strongly supported by the EU and the US, rejected China’s political messages.
The Chinese leadership was aware of the CCCEEC ‘s failure to improve China’s perception in CEE, and the disappointment was not hidden in the MFA’s internal discussions. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the political part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the CCCEEC, while the National Development and Reform Commission considers which project should be included under the BRI. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, control over the CCCEEC was for a long time exercised by Le Yucheng, First Deputy Minister and candidate member of the Central Committee of the CCP. He was considered to be China’s next foreign minister, but in 2022 he began his gradual decline in office and in 2023 he retired, only 60 years old.
What should we expect?
The Chinese side will not allow the dissolution of the CCCEEC platform under any circumstances, as it is the only such permanent international format (China + group of countries) and, moreover, it is under the auspices of Xi Jinping. Due to the peculiarities of the Chinese system, the MFA is unable to offer the prime minister self-restraint of the format, instead Beijing sought ways to revitalize the platform. As long as it continues to bring diplomatic benefits to China, reduce EU pressure on human rights and values, and cause division and competition among European countries, Beijing will continue to make efforts to maintain it.
The importance of China’s CCCEEC initiative, whose face is the Chinese premier, is diminishing at the expense of the BRI, which is a project of President Xi Jinping. Overall, the CCCEEC is evolving from a leading to a supporting platform of the BRI strategic initiative. The CCCEEC is a regional project, and, although more institutionalized than the BRI, is now on the periphery of the global BRI and will continue to support it.
China will continue cooperation within the platform CCCEEC mainly on the basis of bilateral relations with selected partners, will concentrate on the “14+1” countries that are not members of the EU, especially Serbia and the Republic of North Macedonia. With other countries, China will maintain bilateral relations in less controversial areas such as science, culture, tourism, sports. It will reorient more and more from political areas to economic, commercial, customs areas, through more active participation of the Chinese provinces, such as Zhejiang, Hebei and others. Attempts by the Chinese side to build sub-regional formats with voluntary participation, in search of real changes and concrete results, are not excluded (the so-called “regional approach” – implementation of projects for which countries from the same region are interested). Within the framework of the CCCEEC, Beijing will endeavor to deploy a multi-pronged approach with a stronger focus on non-state and civil organizations and interaction with sub-national administrative institutions and local levels of government in the WB countries.
Activities within the framework of the CCCEEC will be developed almost exclusively through the Chinese embassies in the CCCEEC countries. The embassies of the countries of the region in Beijing, which are already severely understaffed and with poorly prepared diplomatic staff, will continue to be bypassed. The work of the CCCEEC Secretariat in Beijing with these embassies has a purely formal-bureaucratic nature.
The “14+1” regional format will not cease to exist, as it is a logical step for China to develop projects along the Pan-European Corridor X. However, Beijing will be forced to comply more strongly with EU norms and regulations and will focus on the development of activities based on the EU-China dialogue mechanism.
In the conditions of dissatisfaction and extremely low interest of the member states, Chinese diplomacy is currently trying to “buy time” by organizing facade and non-essential initiatives within the framework of the CCCEEC to prolong as much as possible the beginning of the end of this tired format. Without changes in functioning and without achieving concrete results (understand Chinese investments and financing of various projects), the member countries consider the future of this platform to be unclear and unknown.
