Thewesternbalkans
The new enthusiasm with which the European Union, in the last two and a half years, turned to its strategy for the enlargement of the union, has also spread to the candidate countries for accession – more so in the countries of the Western Balkans (Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Kosovo and Serbia) and less in the countries of the Eastern Partnership (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia). Turkey has remained uninterested in calls from Brussels to fulfill its membership conditions, focusing instead on strengthening its own geopolitical role.
Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, a strategic reassessment of the EU’s security and defense partnerships began, reflected in the development of the EU’s Strategic Compass 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine only added to the urgency and scope of the transformation that was already underway. The need to adapt the nature of EU partnerships has intensified. The pursuit of more targeted and deeper cooperation with partner countries has accelerated and the need to improve coordination with like-minded countries has increased. Definitions of threats and challenges were calibrated and the EU began to more firmly perceive its role as a “geopolitical actor”.
Russian aggression in Ukraine two and a half years ago caused a change in the EU’s thinking regarding enlargement. The leading understanding became that Europe can only get greater security when it is united, and the accession talks acquired more of a political character and less of a technical character. Enlargement is back on the main stage and the Western Balkans is once again in focus. The EU continued to generate strategies and agreements, which is an expression of the desire to systematize and institutionalize the expanding scope of partnerships. The EU’s security partnership priorities are reflected in the new Security and Defense Partnership agreement with Moldova in May 2024, and there are plans to extend this new framework further with Albania and North Macedonia. These are non-binding agreements serving as overarching frameworks based on political commitments allowing for deepening security and defense cooperation.
With these agreements, the EU signals that the approach to partners is individual, not legally binding and mutually beneficial. They outline mechanisms for information exchange, control and coordination and contain a broad list of areas of cooperation such as long-term support for Ukraine, crisis management, maritime security, space security and defense, cyber issues, countering hybrid threats, countering foreign interference, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, partner capacity building, training and education, mediation missions, economic security, cooperation in multilateral fora.
These new developments reflect the dualistic nature of the enlargement process. It is like a two-way street: on the one hand, candidate countries must meet the criteria, make significant progress in terms of democratic reforms, the rule of law and economic standards; on the other hand, the EU must also reform to prepare and adapt to the integration of new member states. A scenario where candidate countries are ready to join and the EU is not prepared to accept them, due to ongoing debate on internal reforms, should not be allowed. Internal EU reforms to create absorption capacity mainly cover four areas: reforming institutions and decision-making procedures; changes in general policies: cohesion, agrarian and others; the EU enlargement budget; improving the rule of law.
The EU must be institutionally reformed in order to be able to integrate the new members without jeopardizing its effectiveness and stability. One of the key questions is whether the EU should move to more frequent Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) instead of unanimity in some policy areas, especially foreign policy and tax matters. Especially in the European Council, unanimity is important when taking some key decisions. With the increased number of members, the transition to a qualified majority would allow faster decision-making and reduce the risk of blocking by one country or a small group of countries. Some member states have already expressed concerns that enlargement would complicate the governance of the Union and could lead to a split in priorities.
With enlargement comes the need for more funds to support new members. The EU needs to consider how to reform its budget and financial mechanisms so that it is sustainable and able to meet the needs of a larger number of member states. In connection with this, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027 was revised in December 2022 and then again more substantially in February 2024, and new own sources of financing the budget are being sought. At the same time, the EU needs to adapt common policies, such as cohesion and agricultural policy, so as not to create tension between old and new members.
In order to ensure compliance with the principles of the rule of law and democracy, especially in the newly admitted member states, the EU is discussing the introduction of additional monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. This includes ideas for annual inspections and financial support linked to compliance with the rule of law.
The big innovation that the EU is introducing for the upcoming enlargement compared to previous waves of enlargement is the Western Balkans Growth Plan, which means combining the rule of law with economic and humanitarian development. One cannot wait for the final confirmation of the rule of law and then move on to economic development, i.e. the two fields must develop in parallel and influence each other. This shows that the EU has learned its lesson from previous waves of enlargement.
The introduction by the EU of the “Interim Benchmark Assessment Report” – IBAR is also a novelty. This interim report on the rule of law serves as a benchmark for an EU accession candidate’s progress in this area. The positive IBAR is a confirmation of the successful steps taken under negotiating chapters 23 (Justice and fundamental rights) and 24 (Justice, freedom and security) of the accession procedure and points the way for further reforms. For the first time in history, this new necessary condition in the enlargement methodology was applied to Montenegro in June this year, which thus became a role model for the other candidate countries. The receipt of a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report for Montenegro has become a milestone for the EU as well, as it is an example for the EC on how to work with candidate countries and help them reach this important milestone.
It must be emphasized that the EU is making extraordinary efforts to increase the intensity of communications with the candidate countries and their inclusion in all the activities of the union, which is a great advance compared to the commitments of the countries of the previous enlargement waves. The aspiration is for the citizens of the candidate countries to feel the benefits of membership on a daily basis even before formal accession.
Among the challenges facing the EU is finding an adequate balance between the regional and the individual approach to the individual countries of the Western Balkans, each of which has its own characteristics and differences. The separation of Albania from Macedonia in the negotiation process is indicative in this regard.
The Union will have to make significant reforms in order to successfully integrate the countries of the Western Balkans. This means that both sides must be committed and ready to compromise in order for the enlargement process to be successful and contribute to the stability and prosperity of the entire region.
It is a long-standing practice of the EU to usually postpone solving the difficult issues until later and postpone the hard choices. The discussion on the necessary institutional reforms in the EU started more than a year ago, but so far there has been no significant progress.
But if, because of its own reforms and creation of absorption capacity, the EU slows down or postpones the accession process, this would mean its final suspension. This will be the worst scenario for the EU as well, because if the Western Balkans are left outside the EU for a long time, other players will enter the region and Europe will lose its influence in the Western Balkans, i.e. on its own continent.
