Thewesternbalkans
Strong regional excitement in the countries of the Western Balkans is caused by two upcoming events – the decision of the Council of Europe (CoE) to accept Kosovo into the organization and the adoption of a resolution in the UN General Assembly condemning the genocide against the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995. It is hardly to seek a deliberate coincidence between the two initiatives of the international community, perceived by the Serbs in Serbia and Republika Srpska as unjust and hostile actions of the West. The resonance of the consequences of these two events may increase the degree of tension in view of the latent ethnic and religious intolerance in the region.
Of course, all parties concerned understand the dangers to the fragile ethnic peace in the Western Balkans and are taking political and military measures as they deem appropriate at the moment. The European Union dramatically accelerated the integration of BiH, and the international community increased its military presence in Kosovo. The numbers of the KFOR mission in Kosovo and the EUFOR mission in BiH are increasing, Western countries are transferring heavy weapons to Kosovo.
Serbia, for its part, diligently acquires armaments from both the East and the West. The major tactical military exercise “Whirlwind 2024″ which lasted from 8 April to 21 April was one of the largest and most comprehensive exercises that the Serbian Armed Forces have ever conducted in terms of number and diversity of combat forces engaged.
Kosovo will be admitted to the Council of Europe, as it is necessary not only for its own progress in the area of the rule of law, but also as part of the pressure on Serbia from Brussels. Kosovo fully complies with the EU’s restrictive measures in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine, although it has no contractual obligation to support the EU’s foreign policy positions. Admitting Kosovo to the Council would be a significant step towards further international recognition of Kosovo, which Serbia, but also Russia and other countries, oppose.
The ambassadors of the EU member states adopted an updated text of the common position under negotiating chapter 35, which implies that Serbia will fully fulfill its obligations arising from the Agreement on the path to normalization between Kosovo and Serbia of February 2023 and its Annex of March 2023. In other words, Belgrade is obliged to recognize Kosovo for further European integration.
It is not entirely clear how official Belgrade will react when, at its meeting on May 16-17, the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Council of Europe adopts the final decision on the admission of Kosovo into the organization. The Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted on March 27, 2024, a statutory opinion recommending that Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe (from May 22, 2022) be supported and invited The Committee of Ministers to take such a decision.
The reaction of Belgrade will be angry, and the admission of Kosovo to the CoE will not lead to reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo, which is a condition for the admission of both countries to the European Union. Serbia will distance itself even more from some of the provisions contained in the Brussels (February 2023) and Ohrid (March 2023) agreements, will dispute their binding nature and reject the formal signing of the agreements. Belgrade’s ultimate precondition for the establishment of the Association/Community of Municipalities in Kosovo with a predominantly Serbian population within the framework of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and for the implementation of the European Agreement and its Annex will be solidified. Belgrade’s boycott of Kosovo’s institutions will intensify. The key importance of the issue of security in Serbia-Kosovo relations will increase. Belgrade’s final reaction would be to leave the Council of Europe, as president Alexander Vucic has repeatedly threatened.
For most observers, the most intriguing question is whether A. Vucic was bluffing when he said that Serbia would leave the Council of Europe if the former autonomous region of Kosovo, which had broken away from Serbia, joins the organization.
Of course, no one wants Serbia to leave the Council of Europe, except Pristina. The head of the parliamentary group of the ruling Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination) party in Kosovo, Mimoza Kusari-Lila, said that Serbia should be expelled from the Council of Europe, as was Russia two years ago.
In March 2022, after the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Russia was excluded from the CoE. To compensate for the loss of image, Moscow itself withdrew from the Council of Europe – on March 15, 2022, the secretary general of the organization was handed a letter with a corresponding notification by Sergey Lavrov.
Serbia, following the example of its patron Russia, may wish to leave the CoE. Such a move by Belgrade will have a strong mobilizing effect on Vučić’s political support from broad sections of the Serbian population. At the same time, the expectations for a positive evolution in the general foreign policy orientation of Serbia in the foreseeable future will be reduced. The appeal of the West to Belgrade will decrease, and it will increasingly enjoy the support of Russia and China and of friends in the region such as Hungary and Slovakia.
Serbia can follow the example of Greece, which was outside the CoE for 7 years during the military junta.
In the other upcoming event with an anti-Serbian connotation, a draft UN resolution that declares July 11 “The International Day of Reflection and Remembrance of the 1995 Srebrenica Genocide” is to be voted by the 193 member states of the UN General Assembly on May 2. It puts Banja Luka and Belgrade in the same boat. Although, according to the authorities in Belgrade, the text of the resolution does not explicitly name either Serbia or Republika Srpska as the perpetrators of the genocide, the Serbs perceive the resolution as an accusation that they are a “genocidal nation”.
In 2015, Russia vetoed a British draft resolution in the UN Security Council on the Srebrenica genocide. The authors of the proposed resolution now rely on the decisions of the Hague Tribunal (International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) recognizing the extermination in Srebrenica as genocide. Among the defendants brought before the Tribunal, 66% are Serbs, 20% are Croats, and 6% each are Croat Bosniaks and Albanians.
The term “genocide” does not mean the collective responsibility of the Serbian people. But individual criminals have long been punished, which puts the question of why the resolution is being proposed now. There is no clear answer to this question from the initiators (spearheaded by Germany and Rwanda, supported by 15 other countries).
To avoid Russia’s veto in the UNSC, this time the resolution is proposed in the UNGA, where a two-thirds majority is needed for its adoption.
The UN resolution opens old wounds caused by ethnic and religious intolerance in the Balkans in the recent past, although its authors are driven by the quest for historical justice. However, the participation of some countries in the initiative raises suspicions of a double standard. For example, Turkey, supporting the proposed Srebrenica genocide resolution, does not recognize the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire during the period 1915-1922, when over 1 million Armenians were exterminated. Out of a total of 17 countries that initiated the draft resolution, only 3 have recognized the Armenian Genocide (USA, Italy and the Netherlands).
One of the Serbia’s possible responses to the resolution is the proposing of resolutions on genocide against Serbs in the Ustasa concentration camp in Jasenovac during World War II and in Kragujevac in 1941. Furthermore, A. Vucic stated that in response to the actions of the West, Serbia would vying for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, where it will defeat two Eastern European NATO member states.
Likewise the case with CoE, many observers wonder if Milprad Dodik, the President of Republika Srpska, is bluffing when he threatens to start the process of separating Republika Srpska from BiH when the UN General Assembly adopts the resolution on the genocide against the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica. In both cases, the more likely answer is “no” – the Serbian leaders are not bluffing.
Republika Srpska announced much more drastic countermeasures: starting a process to exit BiH. M. Dodik said that in response to the resolution on Srebrenica, he would restore the original Dayton powers: restoration of jurisdiction in the spheres of justice, energy, tax policy, border control, the electoral process, state symbols, as well as the restoration of the army.
The genocide in Srebrenica happened indeed and Milorad Dodik knows it very well, but he prefers the term “war crimes”. However, he will use the UN resolution to wind up the spring of separatism in the region, already greatly intensifying the separatist rhetoric.
The resonance of the consequences of Kosovo’s admission to the Council of Europe and the adoption of the Srebrenica resolution in the UN General Assembly will lead to an escalation of tensions in the Western Balkans region. The Serbian factor in the region will be weakened, as Belgrade and Banja Luka will fall into European isolation. Both events deepen existing regional rifts. Even Serbia’s closest friend in the region until recently, the Republic of North Macedonia, supported Kosovo’s entry into the Council of Europe and the anti-Serbian resolution on Srebrenica. The other regional neighbors – Albania and Montenegro, as well as Croatia – will vote in the same way. For the first time, such a sharp opposition of Skopje to Belgrade has been observed, highlighted by the membership of the RNM in NATO and the increasingly large-scale entry of the Albanian factor into the governance of the country. Objectively, this leads to a reduction of Skopje’s historical dependence on Belgrade and to the emancipation of the junior partner.
The acceptance of Kosovo into the Council of Europe is the biggest blow to Serbia’s foreign policy positions in recent years and personally to President Alexander Vucic. The success of Kosovo would also have domestic political ramifications in Serbia, as it would consolidate opposition to Vucic’s inability to achieve Serbian goals in Kosovo. In the event that Belgrade leaves the Council of Europe, the Serbian opposition will rightly accuse Vucic of ending Serbia’s European path.
