Thewesternbalkans.
According to Sasa Djordjevic – a senior analyst at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, violent extremism in the region is not only powered by ethnic tensions but by complex financial networks – which authorities are doing little to disrupt.
First important point of the study of Sasa Djordjevic is that over the past 30 years, attention in the Balkans has often centred on tensions that have the potential to provoke and threaten regional stability, sparked by ethnonationalism.
“Some view different events as acts of patriotism; others see a resurgence of ethnic nationalism. But what these incidents all highlight is that ethnic tensions deeply rooted in history still exist and can drive extremism in the region” said Sasa Djordjevic.
Second important point of Sasa Djordjevic is that ethnonationalism is not just rhetoric. It is also used to generate profit and is often accompanied by a transactional trail, which makes following the money increasingly important.
He pointed out that: “Funding for extremists has become increasingly diverse. Ethno-nationalism often fuels religious and far-right extremism by crafting a unifying narrative centred on identity, grievances and perceived victimhood. However, violent extremism in the Western Balkans – whether religious or far-right – is not only about ethnicity and ideology. It is also about complex financial networks that combine external patronage, legitimate businesses, illicit profits, contributions from the diaspora, state contracts and cash flows that are difficult to track.”
According to a recent study by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, GI-TOC, it highlights how funding for violent extremism in the Western Balkans has become increasingly diverse and adaptable – and underscores that little has been done to disrupt these funding channels.
“Religiously motivated violent extremism in the region has decreased since 2018. During the height of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, from 2011 to 2018, the Balkan region was a significant recruiting hub for fighters. More than a thousand people joined Islamic State operations in Syria and Iraq. Funds were raised and moved through external sponsorship, charity fronts, diaspora donations and intermediaries using money-transfer services” the study said.
The main conclusion of the study is that “despite the decline in this threat, challenges still linger. Some returnees, radicalized preachers and ideological influencers remain active in the region, increasingly turning to self-financing and crowdfunding”.
Decline doesn’t necessarily mean less vigilance is required. Circumstances can quickly change due to external factors. Current issues such as the Gaza war or growing tensions between Iran and Israel can reactivate dormant networks or foster new supporters.
On the other hand, violent far-right extremism is increasing in the region, aided by greater funding opportunities, and, in some cases, bolstered by the participation of individuals from the Western Balkans in the war in Ukraine on both sides.
Such violent far-right groups operate openly under the guise of patriotic associations, football fan associations, or humanitarian organisations, while building financial companies in construction, hospitality, sports and IT services.
An important conclusion is also that: “While involvement in organised crime is rare among violent religious groups, far-right groups show a greater tendency to engage in criminal enterprises. While these collaborations can bring advantages to both parties, they also heighten exposure to risks, such as intensified scrutiny from law enforcement. Some benefit from public procurements and access to state-owned enterprise budgets”.
Financial support enhances the resilience of violent extremist groups, making them harder to detect and more capable of exerting long-term influence. The line between legal and illegal funding, as well as between mainstream and extremist entities, becomes increasingly blurred, giving rise to a grey zone where extremist financing can flourish.
Unexamined, these groups threaten the integrity of the rule of law when they operate with impunity, especially when backed by influential political and religious figures.
Europe is seeing a surge in far-right mobilization, frequently backed by foreign ideological supporters. Although direct evidence of external funding is hard to establish, their narratives resonate across numerous extremist platforms in the region.
Therefore, the Balkans risk again becoming a hotspot for proxy conflicts, with funding channels already established.
So far, governments in the Western Balkans have mostly targeted preventing acts of violence and dismantling groups, physically. However, the financial aspect remains a weak point.
In this situation, governments need to face uncomfortable truths. In some cases, extremist actors appear to benefit from state inaction, access to public contracts, or political protection, raising difficult questions about accountability. Addressing this money flow demands both political commitment and technical expertise.
A few concrete steps can go a long way. Enforce transparency in public procurement, particularly in high-risk sectors such as construction and hospitality. Subject all religious and non-profit organisations to financial reporting requirements. Strengthen oversight of sports institutions, particularly football clubs and fan associations, which serve as financing and recruitment hubs for far-right groups. Monitor cryptocurrency flows before they become a significant threat.
The Balkan region has the potential to lead this effort, rather than follow. But to achieve this, a shift in focus is necessary: from ideology to infrastructure, from rhetoric to networks and from responding to threats to disrupting finances.
Comments: Sasa Djordjevic made an enormous work and his conclusions are really very frightening and yet very important. In the same time we can see that the political corruption and organised crime go together hands by hands. Not only in the candidate countries from the WB.
