Thewesternbalkans.
When discussing the European Union’s enlargement towards the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Türkiye, an old Bulgarian—and not only Bulgarian—saying seems particularly appropriate: “Appetite comes with eating.”
There is little doubt that EU enlargement is a multi-dimensional strategic undertaking, combining geopolitical and political objectives, economic interests and considerations of cultural compatibility. Ultimately, the process is intended to strengthen the Union and maximize the political, economic and strategic benefits of further integration.
The enlargement of the EU prior to 2004, when the Union still had 15 members, can broadly be viewed as a process of consolidation in Western Europe. The subsequent waves of enlargement represented a decisive eastward expansion, made possible by the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the emergence of a new geopolitical environment.
Importantly, this geopolitical opening was not created exclusively by the West. It also developed with the acquiescence, and at times the active cooperation, of the Russian Federation during the first post-Cold War decade.
It was against this background that the Copenhagen Criteria were established. They defined the principal political and economic requirements that candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe had to meet, while also making clear that the EU itself had to be capable of absorbing new members.
These principles remain valid today. Enlargement cannot be sustainable unless both sides—the candidate countries and the Union itself—are prepared for the institutional, political and economic consequences of membership.
A New Geopolitical Window
The current situation has once again created what could be described as an open geopolitical window, this time as a consequence of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
However, the circumstances are fundamentally different from those of the early 1990s.
The EU enlargement process towards the Western Balkans is proceeding within the established institutional framework, albeit at varying speeds. Ukraine’s accession process, by contrast, is unfolding under wartime conditions and is therefore subject to an entirely different set of strategic considerations.
The economic implications also vary considerably among the candidates.
The accession of Montenegro and Albania would not be expected to fundamentally alter the economic balance of the European Union. Serbia would have a greater impact because of the size of its economy and population. Ukraine, however, represents a completely different proposition.
Ukraine: Geopolitics versus Economic Reality
The geopolitical argument for accelerating Ukraine’s European integration is particularly strong among several northern and eastern EU member states, including Poland, the Baltic states, Sweden and Finland. For these countries, Ukraine’s integration is not simply an enlargement issue; it is directly linked to the future European security architecture.
The economic implications, however, are considerably more complicated.
Ukraine will require enormous financial resources for reconstruction, potentially reaching hundreds of billions of euros over the coming years. At the same time, the availability of affordable financing remains uncertain. The possible use of frozen Russian assets could provide an important source of funding, but its scale, legal basis and political sustainability remain contested.
Another sensitive issue is agriculture. Ukraine possesses a highly competitive agricultural sector, and its integration into the EU single market would create significant competitive pressure on existing producers. This is particularly relevant for neighbouring member states such as Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
The consequences would also depend heavily on the territorial and economic configuration of Ukraine at the time of accession. The future status of the Donbas, access to the Black Sea and the reconstruction of Ukraine’s energy system would all have major implications for the European economy.
For these reasons, Ukrainian membership would almost certainly require adjustments to major EU policies, including the Common Agricultural Policy, cohesion policy and the distribution of structural and investment funds.
It could also have significant consequences for the next Multiannual Financial Framework, covering the period 2028–2034. Negotiations over this framework are already shaping up to be difficult, with several member states advocating tighter budgetary discipline.
The central question, therefore, is straightforward:
What will ultimately prevail—the geopolitical imperative of integrating Ukraine or the economic and institutional constraints facing the European Union?
Türkiye: A Different Enlargement Equatio
The situation regarding Türkiye is fundamentally different.
Türkiye is a large country with a substantial market economy, a strategically important geographical position and a unique role as a bridge between Europe, the Middle East and Asia.
After years of negotiations, political disputes and diplomatic manoeuvring, however, the accession process appears to have reached a prolonged stalemate.
On the one hand, the EU has demonstrated limited political willingness to address the consequences of Turkish membership. The economic, demographic, institutional and political implications would be considerably greater than those associated with most other candidates.
On the other hand, Ankara’s own political priorities have changed. Statements by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan indicating that EU membership is no longer Ankara’s overriding strategic priority have further reduced expectations of a rapid revival of the accession process
In practical terms, both sides appear to have reached the limits of what they are currently prepared to offer.
Serbia and the Logic of Multi-Vector Foreign Policy
Serbia represents a different case
It is a considerably smaller country than Ukraine or Türkiye, but its geopolitical significance is greater than its economic size alone would suggest.
For more than a century, Serbian foreign policy has demonstrated a strong preference for multi-vector diplomacy—maintaining relations with competing centres of power and exploiting opportunities for national development regardless of their geopolitical origin.
This approach remains visible today.
President Aleksandar Vučić has repeatedly emphasized Serbia’s distinctive international position and, on several occasions, referred favourably to the country’s tradition of non-alignment.
The symbolic importance of this orientation was demonstrated by Belgrade’s hosting of events marking the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement. On 1 September, delegations from more than 30 member states reportedly gathered in Belgrade for a plenary session at the Palace of Serbia commemorating the First Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Belgrade in 1961.
For Brussels, Serbia therefore presents a more complex strategic challenge than the purely technical question of accession negotiations might suggest
Can the EU Reform Itself Before Enlarging?
One conclusion appears increasingly difficult to avoid: major EU enlargement will require some degree of internal reform within the Union itself.
The most difficult issue concerns decision-making in foreign and security policy, where unanimity gives individual member states the ability to block common decisions.
The introduction of qualified majority voting in some areas has therefore become an increasingly important subject of discussion.
Yet meaningful reform would require changes to the EU treaties. At the present stage, such a process does not appear politically realistic, since treaty amendments ultimately require the agreement and ratification of all member states.
Hungary’s repeated use of its veto has drawn particular attention in recent years. However, history provides other examples.
Greece, for instance, has at various stages used its position to obstruct or complicate Türkiye’s European integration. In practice, however, member states rarely act completely alone: countries opposing a particular policy can often find tacit or informal support from others.
The same logic may apply to the current disputes surrounding Hungary.
European integration has experienced both major successes and major failures in attempts to reform its institutional architecture. The Lisbon Treaty demonstrated that difficult compromises remain possible, while the failure of the proposed European Constitution demonstrated how quickly such ambitions can encounter political resistance.
Has Enlargement Made the EU Wealthier?
There is another issue that deserves greater attention.
Over the past quarter-century, the EU has primarily expanded towards countries whose levels of economic development were below the Union average.
At the same time, several highly developed European countries have rejected membership. Switzerland and Norway have remained outside the Union, while Iceland has repeatedly demonstrated limited enthusiasm for accession.
The most dramatic example remains Brexit, when the United Kingdom—one of the EU’s largest and most economically developed members—chose to leave following a referendum.
The political euphoria following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc helped create strong momentum for enlargement. Yet enlargement did not automatically make the EU wealthier in per-capita terms.
The political compensation, however, was considerable. The Union expanded its strategic influence, consolidated democratic institutions across Central and Eastern Europe and fundamentally changed the political geography of the continent.
The question today is whether a similar political dividend can be expected from Ukrainian membership.
Would Ukrainian accession, for example, fundamentally alter the geopolitical balance in Europe or contribute to a major transformation of Russia?
That remains highly uncertain.
What is much more certain is that Ukrainian accession would entail very substantial financial costs for the Union.
The political question is therefore not simply whether Ukraine can meet the Copenhagen Criteria. It is also whether European citizens and governments will be willing to bear the economic consequences of membership.
Domestic Politics Will Also Matter
EU enlargement will not be determined exclusively by developments in the candidate countries.
Domestic political developments inside the EU will be equally important.
The political environment ahead of the 2027 French presidential election, developments in Germany and the changing balance between liberal, conservative and populist forces could significantly influence public attitudes towards further enlargement.
The stronger the political pressure for more restrictive migration, tighter public spending and protection of domestic agriculture becomes, the more difficult it may be to construct a political consensus for enlargement.
Back to the Enlargement Agenda
Against this broader strategic background, the EU enlargement agenda for the remainder of 2026 contains several important milestones.
In September, the European Commission is expected to address the redistribution of funding under the Western Balkans Growth Plan, with proposals potentially increasing support for Montenegro and Albania at the expense of Kosovo and Serbia.
On 15 October, the European Council is expected to hold a strategic discussion on enlargement. In preparation for that debate, Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos is expected to present proposals concerning the future direction of the enlargement process.
In November, the European Commission is expected to publish its annual Enlargement Package, covering the Western Balkans as well as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Türkiye. The precise scope of the Türkiye assessment remains subject to discussion.
On 15–16 November, the Enlargement Forum is expected to take place in Brussels, organized by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations. The participation of senior EU leaders and representatives of candidate countries is expected.
At the same time, negotiations on the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework for 2028–2034 will become increasingly important. The financial framework will ultimately determine how much political ambition can be translated into actual enlargement funding.
There is also an emerging debate about the future institutional relationship between the European External Action Service and the European Commission, which could have implications for the EU’s external policy and enlargement architecture.
The Strategic Outlook
The EU’s enlargement objectives are becoming increasingly ambitious.
One of the stated political objectives is to complete accession negotiations with Montenegro by the end of 2026, while Albania could aim to complete its technical negotiations by the end of 2027.
2028 could then become an important year for assessing the readiness of Ukraine and Moldova, which have already advanced into the substantive phase of their accession negotiations.
This would create a potentially unprecedented situation: the EU could simultaneously be preparing for the accession of relatively small Western Balkan states while addressing the fundamentally different strategic implications of Ukrainian membership.
The central challenge will therefore not simply be whether the candidate countries are ready to join.
The more consequential question may be whether the European Union itself is ready to enlarge.
The history of European integration suggests that enlargement has always been driven by a combination of political opportunity and strategic necessity. The current geopolitical environment provides that opportunity once again.
But unlike in the 1990s, the EU now faces a much more difficult equation: a major war on its borders, intense competition with Russia and China, pressure on public finances, demographic challenges, agricultural concerns and increasingly fragmented domestic politics.
The Western Balkans remain the most manageable part of this equation. Ukraine represents the strategic test. Türkiye remains the unresolved long-term question.
The outcome will depend on which consideration ultimately proves decisive: geopolitical ambition, economic capacity—or the EU’s ability to reform itself before taking the next step in its own enlargement.
