Thewesternbalkans.
What Happened?
There is still no more specific information after the initial official announcement by the Chinese Ministry of Defense accusing Chinese military leaders Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli of “serious violations of discipline and law.”
Zhang (75) is the second person after Xi Jinping in the Central Military Commission (CMC), which controls the armed forces of the PRC, as well as a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC). He was considered a loyal ally of leader Xi. Their fathers were also comrades in arms.
General Liu Zhenli (61) served as the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission of China.
However, rumors abound. Searchers for a “general conspiracy” have begun speculating about a prepared coup against Xi Jinping, troop movements, confrontation between Xi’s security guards and the military, etc. American experts focused on the thesis of disagreements regarding the readiness for a military campaign in Taiwan.
The Wall Street Journal reported that at an official internal briefing for the Chinese leadership, Zhang Yuxia was accused of passing secrets about Chinese nuclear weapons to the United States. More serious experts are skeptical that this official internal version corresponds to the facts. Indeed, what can the United States give Zhang in exchange for his hypothetical betrayal? Top Chinese leaders practically live in communism and have all possible benefits at their disposal. Moreover, it is highly doubtful that American journalists will have an internal source who, under the current circumstances, would not be afraid to share such sensitive information. But an accusation that is stronger than corruption (working for the main enemy) may be useful for internal propaganda.
Consequences
After Xi Jinping’s powerful and sudden move, silence fell in Beijing. As Leonardo da Vinci noted, nothing strengthens power like silence.
With Zhang Yuxia’s removal, the seven-member Central Military Commission, which leads the PLA, is now empty, consisting only of Chairman Xi Jinping and his deputy Zhang Shenming. In addition, for the first time, there will be no military representative on the Politburo of the CPC. The role of the CMC is changing, it will no longer be the same, and may even disappear as a structure.
The vacuum in the military leadership is also great, as Xi has delayed appointments to a number of senior military posts. Some observers jokingly debunk that the only military person Xi trusts now is Major General Peng Liyuan, the leader’s wife and a folk singer of the army staff.
Despite the unprecedented exposure of the military-political leadership, there are no external signs of the Chinese army weakening in operational and technical terms. In the long run, strengthening the unity of command and party control can enhance the PLA’s combat capability in the face of external challenges or incidents. In its commentary on the case, the PLA Daily, the military organ, argued that the PLA’s combat power is being strengthened through rebirth as a result of the armed forces’ cleansing and the raising of its ideological awareness.
In any case, the effectiveness of the Chinese military must increase as it prepares for war in Taiwan – not as an invasion, but as a consequence of a provocation.
Why now?
Rumors that Zhang Yuxia was being investigated were already circulating in 2023. Information about his son – Zhang Honglin, born in Beijing in 1968, is also widely circulated. He is a well-known businessman with connections in the West, and his name has repeatedly appeared in business deals, military orders, and tenders for projects related to the selection, maintenance, and logistics of military equipment. Zhang Honglin is suspected of abusing his father’s position to receive large bribes and illegal profits in the aforementioned areas.
A number of experts, mostly from Taiwan, believe that Xi Jinping is the biggest dove in the CPC, the primary advocate for peaceful reunification, and the main force suppressing the military’s push for forcible unification. On the other hand, Zhang Yuxia is not known to have been a hawk on Taiwan, and according to some American experts, he was not inclined to a hostile course towards the United States. Both Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhengli are well received in the West. The latter is said to have played an effective role in contacts to mitigate risks and clarify misunderstandings.
With the upcoming goal-setting, Xi is pressed for time – the 21st CPC National Congress (at the end of 2027) and the PLA’s 100th anniversary in 2027 are approaching. In connection with the army’s anniversary, the CPC is pursuing certain goals, likely to shift the PLA’s development of certain capabilities within the categories of the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization. If realized, this achievement could give the PLA capabilities to be a more credible military tool for the CPC to wield as it pursues Taiwan unification.
The question of Xi’s legacy
The military organ PLA Daily’s commentary on the case of the senior officers underscores the political nature of the accusations against Zhang and Liu. The emphasis is on undermining Xi Jinping’s leadership, although Zhang cannot be publicly accused of political rivalry, as this would infringe on the leader’s integrity.
The leadership ability and natural aura of Zhang Yuxia, one of the few Chinese generals with combat experience, may be key to his political downfall. Close comrades can become deadly enemies in China’s relentless power struggle.
An insider with knowledge of Chinese party politics describes this struggle as follows: “The competition in the CPC’s ‘black box’ is ruthless and is based on one basic principle: ‘I survive – you die; You survive – I die!’”
The source also describes the consensus decision-making on personnel matters in the CPC Politburo: Each of the 24 members of the supreme party body stands at the head of his own pyramid of power – a clientelistic-patronage network, built up of cadres in the vertical, whose loyalty is due to protections in career development or countrymen, relatives or other connections. Xi Jinping, who controls the special services, can present at a meeting of the Politburo the file of a high-ranking official who has deviated from the party line. Since this comrade is certainly someone’s protégé, Xi’s question to the patron, in the presence of the other members of the Politburo, is: do you take responsibility for this official or should we punish him for his crimes? Since the patron always chooses the latter, this way unanimity is achieved among the Politburo members, each of whom is the leader of his own clique, with his own interests.
Regarding Zhang Yuxia, who can be considered Xi’s protégé, the decision was clearly made by Xi himself, but again based on the old established principle – “… You die, I live!”
Perhaps here lies the answer to the question – why are loyalists punished?
In this sense, Zhang’s punishment may be a preventive move to remove the last remaining high-ranking officials with a status equal to the leader. Eliminating any semblance of rivalry or factionalism would be a prerequisite for a smoother succession process in the leadership of the party and state after the 21st CPC Congress. And if this process does not go smoothly, then power will lie with whoever controls the army. In Chinese terminology, the army is a gun in the hands of the party, and it is good to have it on your side.
Reactions in the Western Balkans
There are currently no official or widely reported national reactions from the Western Balkan countries to the news of the removal of Chinese generals Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli.
The news is mainly treated as part of China’s domestic political dynamics, without attributing any specific effect on bilateral relations with the Western Balkans. Most governments in the region are reluctant to politicize internal personnel changes in Beijing unless they directly affect bilateral relations.
Media reactions in the region are superficial and generally reproduce foreign (mainly Western) information flows, without offering a national assessment or linking the events to local foreign policy positions.
However, the projection of power resulting from Xi Jinping’s powerful and shocking actions cannot but have an impact on authoritarian leaders in the Balkans, such as Aleksandar Vučić, for example. He may feel encouraged to step up military cooperation with China, such as negotiating new purchases of Chinese weapons or military transport aircraft.
