Thewesternbalkans.
Political Crisis and Public Protests
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is facing the most serious crisis since his party came to power in 2012. A student movement, initially sparked by demands for justice following an incident in Novi Sad, has evolved into a large-scale mobilization, supported by a significant number of citizens. The latest demonstration in Belgrade on March 15, reportedly the largest in 20 years, gathered an estimated 300,000 participants.
Widespread public anger and distrust in the government have intensified tensions. Negotiating a resolution appears challenging, as student leaders continue to distance themselves from opposition parties and NGOs while rejecting Vučić’s offers for talks.
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Serbia’s Foreign Policy Maneuvering
In an effort to secure his political survival, Vučić has shifted his rhetoric towards the European Union while simultaneously deepening ties with Russia. This “flirtation” with Moscow is evidenced by Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin’s visit to Russia and Vučić’s meeting with Maxim Oreshkin, Deputy Chief of Staff of Vladimir Putin’s administration. Vulin explicitly sought Russian support in countering so-called “color revolutions.”
Vučić maintains a narrative of external interference, accusing the EU and some of its member states of backing these protests. Brussels has repeatedly dismissed such allegations. Meanwhile, there are indications of Serbia strengthening relations with China. Aligning with U.S. positions on the war in Ukraine, Vučić sees the new U.S. administration as an opportunity to safeguard his interests.
Serbia’s Relations with the EU
Serbia’s low alignment—only 55%—with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) raises concerns about its geostrategic orientation. The EU increasingly demands that Belgrade abandon its balancing act between Brussels and Moscow.
Economic repercussions of the political instability are already visible. Investments have declined, and several economic forums have been canceled in recent months. The Serbian government has also withdrawn key legislative proposals related to the EXPO 2027 preparations.
Despite these challenges, Serbia submitted its first reform program implementation report to Brussels and successfully ratified an agreement with the EU on loans under the Reform and Growth Instrument. The European Commission is currently evaluating these measures. However, an investigation by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office into potential misuse of EU funds in constructing Novi Sad’s railway station has been dismissed by the Commission, stating no EU funds were involved.
EU’s Strategic Engagement
On March 18, EU Enlargement Commissioner Martha Kos met with Vučić, emphasizing that adherence to reforms is the best path out of the crisis. She highlighted the importance of civil society participation in reforms. In response, Vučić reaffirmed his commitment to the EU but expressed disappointment over the lack of EU support and hope for opening new negotiating clusters.
Marta Kos had previously sent an open letter to Serbian NGOs, and discussions on Serbia have taken place in the European Parliament.
On March 19, Vučić met with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to discuss Serbia-NATO cooperation, including KFOR’s role, as well as the situations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. On March 25, Special Envoy for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, Peter Sørensen, visited Belgrade, while Vučić traveled to Brussels for a dinner with European Council President Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The EU continues to insist that Serbia remain committed to its accession path, including aligning with EU foreign policy positions.
A discussion on the Western Balkans is planned in the EU Foreign Affairs Council in April. The EU underscores the necessity of maintaining strategic communication with Belgrade, but its stance towards Serbia can no longer follow a “business as usual” approach. Protesters in Serbia have echoed this sentiment, arguing that the situation in the country should not be treated as normal. Their demands align with those of the EU, raising doubts within the European Commission about Serbia’s commitment to the Reform and Growth Instrument.
Uncertain Future for Serbia’s EU Integration
Some EU member states doubt whether Serbia will meet interim benchmarks under Chapters 23 and 24 by year-end. There is growing concern that the EU’s window of influence in Serbia is narrowing, which could lead to missed opportunities. Protesters and opposition figures criticize the EU’s perceived lack of support for their demands, further eroding public approval for EU accession, which has been steadily declining. This may be due to disillusionment among reform advocates who once saw the EU as a beacon of change. There were no EU flags during the protests, indicative of the decline in support for the EU among ordinary Serbs, who interpret Brussels’ actions as aiding the Vucic regime in an attempt to distance Belgrade from Moscow.
EU member states recognize the importance of keeping Serbia within the EU’s orbit and agree that the door to accession should not be closed. However, some capitals believe it may be time to rethink the EU’s approach towards Serbia, potentially outlining red lines in a unified stance.
Conclusion
A stable resolution to Serbia’s crisis does not seem imminent, as the protests have yet to consolidate into a unified political representation. This uncertainty poses potential risks for regional destabilization. For now, the EU’s main leverage remains financial support through the Reform and Growth Instrument. While disbursement of pre-financing under this instrument has been delayed due to incomplete documentation from Serbia, it is expected to proceed soon.
Serbia stands at a crossroads and must decide on its geostrategic direction. The European Commission sees only one viable path—Serbia’s commitment to EU membership and the implementation of necessary reforms in response to the protesters’ demands. The coming months will reveal the course Serbian leadership chooses to take.
