Thewesternbalkans
The “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), in addition to the visible, commercial component, associated with purely economic advantages for China, has by design a second, less visible security component.
Security issues in the BRI are related to Beijing’s imposition of security cooperation with the countries participating in the initiative to protect overseas Chinese interests (facilities, citizens, investments, etc.). The comprehensiveness and two-layered dimension of the offensive Chinese initiative is also hinted in the very term “one belt, one road”, which in the Chinese language has shades of “connection between generations” that follow the “only natural path” – set in modern conditions naturally by the Chinese Communist Party. The number “one” in the Chinese language is largely a symbol of unity, and the “road” symbolizes progress and development, i.e. some “universal destiny”. The BRI originated from the idea of restoring continental links between Europe and China (New Silk Road). On the basis of the geographical and historical approach, the projects are built initially in Central Asia and then in the Balkans, as a gateway to Europe.
China’s project-by-project strategy in Europe and the Western Balkans (WB) resembles the gradual imposition of China’s military presence in the South China Sea, thereby increasingly affecting the security and sovereignty interests of BRI member states.
The People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) is tasked with identifying and studying operational areas it deems strategically important. Undoubtedly, such an area is the Eastern Mediterranean, whose ports provide access to South-Eastern Europe.
The invisible part of the iceberg
China’s state leadership has continuously increased its attention to security issues and is rolling out the implementation of the second hidden part of the BRI strategic initiative, related to security and military power projection. Under the pretext of protecting Chinese investments and Chinese citizens, Beijing is increasing external security capacity, expanding ties and security cooperation, and internationalizing its military forces, with the aim of pursuing purely military Chinese interests in the future.
China’s economic advance under the auspices of the BRI in Europe and the WB should be evaluated as a calculated approach by Beijing to support its geopolitical intentions – establishing an economic presence that is transformed into political influence, after which security issues are also raised. Beijing’s attention to the coastal infrastructure of the WB is a clear signal of intentions to create a bridgehead as part of this global strategy. The accession of a number of Western Balkan countries to NATO delays, but does not block Beijing’s plans in this direction.
Beijing implements a unified coordinated strategy under the leadership of the party vertical of power, at the core of which is the enhancement of cooperation with foreign partners in the field of security and protection activities. The leading role has the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), in which a special “Directorate for Ensuring the Protection of China’s Interests under the BRI” was established in 2018.
In all meetings with foreign delegations at the level of Ministers and Deputy Ministers, the MSS brings up for discussion the issues of cooperation in ensuring the security of joint projects from the BRI and the platform “14 + 1” (formerly “17 + 1”), as well as the Chinese economic interests (investments, concession sites, joint ventures, etc.). The goal is to solve tasks related to joint or independently organized security activities regarding infrastructural, energy and other objects, which are under construction or already completed, as well as the informational provision of the protection of Chinese investments and economic interests.
At the same time, China imposes on the partners its new understanding of the development of security cooperation: the core of the partnership remains counter-terrorism in its traditional interpretation, but expanded to combat territorial threats to Chinese interests abroad (terrorist attacks against Chinese state-owned and private companies, organizations and institutions and Chinese citizens and other Chinese representations), as well as any anti-government activities. The priority for the Chinese special services remains Uighur extremism, Tibetan separatism, social movements threatening the foundations of the Chinese Communist Party. Both in diplomatic dialogue and in the field of security, at all levels, Beijing is increasingly prioritizing anti-Americanism.
Geopolitically, the BRI increases China’s regional influence, particularly in the area of security. The initiative is used to justify the increased presence of diplomatic representatives in participating countries, to reveal trade-economic and other foreign representations, as well as representations of private companies. They also serve as a cover for employees of China’s MSS.
BRI provides an opportunity to tactically improve Beijing’s relations with a number of Western Balkan countries, but in the field of security, its attention is focused on its own interests, ie. this cooperation is primarily understood as a one-way street.
So far, China has failed to enforce the deployment of security personnel in foreign countries along the BRI route, but joint Serbian-Chinese police patrols in Belgrade are a step in that direction. In Chinese military academies, specialized courses are organized to train Chinese military personnel for overseas activity. These include training in strategic communications, military public diplomacy, intercultural diplomacy, foreign studies of the BRI countries (150 in total), including nature, society, culture, languages and laws of the countries.
From security cooperation to military-technical cooperation
In the competition of who is China’s best friend in the WB, the first place goes to Serbia without a doubt. It is the first country in Europe to receive and operate Chinese FK-3 anti-aircraft missiles (an export version of the HQ-22 – equivalent to the Russian S-300 and the American Patriot). They were transported by 6 Chinese Y-20 military transport aircrafts in April 2022, which is considered the largest overseas operation of the PLA with these home-built aerial giants. It is a demonstration of China’s strategic transport capacity and global power, an impressive novelty in Europe, against the background of the war in Ukraine.
The intensification of China-Serbia security and military cooperation began in 2017. After 2020, Chinese arms imports to Serbia are increasing. China is the 4th largest arms supplier to Serbia, which is the first European country to receive Chinese military drones. Serbia receives weapons from China at prices 20-30% lower than sales to other countries. The Serbian Armed Forces receive significant donations and assistance with weapons and military equipment from Beijing.
The visit of Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe to Serbia and three NATO member states (Hungary, Greece and the Republic of North Macedonia) in March 2021 became a demonstration of the high potential for military cooperation with the possibility of joint military exercises and military exchanges delegations. It was China’s response to past and future visits by Western warships in the South China Sea and an attempt to create a mini-pool of China-friendly states and to play with NATO differences.
In 2023, Serbian air defense is already heavily based on Chinese missiles, due to the sanctions against Russia. Chinese influence on Serbia’s economy and defense is so great that it reflects on its foreign policy decision-making process.
The Republic of North Macedonia will not develop military and military-technical cooperation with China, but the country is important for Chinese activities along the Piraeus-Athens-Skopje-Belgrade-Budapest transport corridor.
Challenges
The security challenges of the WB countries arising from the BRI are related to the increasing importance of digital and cybersecurity issues, and how these are shaping the BRI through the Digital Silk Road (DSR). The topic of DSR is significant because it touches on information security, the possibility of cyber attacks and China’s attempts to enforce technology standards. Concerns exist about China’s 5G networks because national security is closely linked to technical and communications systems. The possibility that they are owned by a totalitarian state or that it has unregulated access to them is a risk. In some countries, Huawei is a leading company, which makes them a battleground between China and the US. Western pressure on WB countries to shun Chinese technology will grow, affecting the development of 5G networks in Albania, Montenegro and even Serbia.
In the memorandums of understanding with the countries participating in the BRI, Beijing always insists on the inclusion of projects for the construction of smart cities, which are related to ensuring Chinese access to the security sphere of the respective country.
Environmental issues related to Chinese companies operating mines or building coal-fired thermal power plants (for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina) are among the security challenges of countries in the WB, as they are related to civil society protests, disruption of relations between local citizens and governments, weakness of management.
Debt traps also lead to macroeconomic destabilization and uncertainty for local governments, as exemplified in Montenegro. Other challenges are rooted in China’s lack of sufficient sensitivity to the cultural-historical, ethnic and civilizational peculiarities, the traditions in the labor market, the corruption environment, the mentality of the peoples of South East Europe.
Perspectives
In the future, the importance of the implicit component of the BRI, related to security issues and the projection of Chinese military-political influence, will grow. China will continue to apply a combination of diplomatic and military measures to the important strategic projects. In parallel with the BRI international cooperation forums, the Chinese side will insist on meetings on security issues.
Based on the understanding that the success of the BRI depends on the stability of the territories through which the corridors pass, Beijing is changing its long-standing policy of non-intervention and is now directing efforts towards conflict management and stabilization in BRI countries as well. At this stage, Beijing participates in multinational efforts, with more publicity and media attention, the motives being related to building an image of a responsible global power and the possibility of direct access and influence on local governments.
Security challenges are increasing because the central government in Beijing has weak coordination of BRI projects and has problems with control. There is a mismatch and clash of group interests in China and outside the country.
