Thewesternbalkans
- Strategies and goals of China and Russia in the Western Balkans region
China’s strategy for influence in the Western Balkans is built almost entirely on economic penetration and differs radically from Russia’s approach, which is primarily oriented toward political, cultural-historical, and religious influence. China exerts influence through economic superiority, which in recent years has increasingly transformed into political influence.
For now, Moscow and Beijing avoid direct competition between their projects in the Western Balkans region, and each pursues its own economic interests, which practically do not intersect. Given the strong traditional influence of the Russian Federation in the Western Balkans region and the great importance that China attaches to its relations with Russia, Beijing, for its part, undoubtedly takes into account Russia’s interests in the regional balance.
Moscow does not oppose China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the “14+1” platform, which are China’s main channels for economic and political influence in the Western Balkans and give China an advantage over Russia in Central and Eastern Europe. “14+1” is a platform under the auspices of the BRI and has been developed as its institutional form of cooperation, which is increasingly used by China as a tool to develop relations on a bilateral basis.
China enters the Balkans from more limited starting positions, but its goals are long-term. Although the countries of the Western Balkans do not represent a particularly distinct group in China’s foreign policy strategy, Beijing’s concrete actions in the region suggest elements of planning and a long-term economic development strategy, the core of which is to make the Balkans a hub for penetration into the rich heart of Europe. Moscow lacks such a long-term strategy, with the main constant in Russia’s approach being to delay and stop the integration of the Balkan countries into NATO and preserve soft power in the region consisting of a mixture of culture, history and opposition to the West.
China is not trying to delay the membership of the Western Balkan countries in the EU and NATO, and it is not linking economic cooperation to political conditions, as Moscow seeks. Beijing more precisely meets the expectations of the Balkan elites to receive money without considering foreign conditions.
On the other hand, in recent years, Russia has practically suspended its investments in the Western Balkans and cannot compete with China either in terms of scale or variety of investments. At the same time, Russia’s pull in considerations about brotherhood, religion and history is gradually weakening. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, contact with Russia even became toxic.
- Mechanisms and tools of influence
In recent years, China has been steadily and consistently pushing Russia out of the role of the main alternative to the West for the Balkan states. Taking advantage of Russia’s involvement in the war in Ukraine, China’s activities in the WB are predominantly at the intergovernmental level and are aimed at the highest representatives of the state. This is a manifestation of the unfolding concept of “discursive power” in Chinese foreign policy, which no longer relies solely on public diplomacy and soft power, which have proven insufficient to impose Chinese influence. Beijing seeks to enforce China’s agenda primarily through elites and decision-making structures, not just through the general public.
For example, the Chinese presence in Serbia is helping Aleksandar Vucic and the Serbian Progressive Party consolidate their power. Due to the centralization of power in Serbia, President A. Vucic has a major role in promoting Chinese interests in the country and is accepted by the Chinese side as a reliable partner.
The most vehement defenders of the priority importance of cooperation with China are the Speaker of the Serbian Parliament Ana Brnabic, the Chairman of the National Council for Coordination and Cooperation with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China Tomislav Nikolic, the chairman of the Serbian Socialist Party Ivica Dacic, the Vice President of the Serbian Socialist Party and former Minister of Energy and Mining Aleksandar Antic, the leader of the Bosniak ethnic group Rasim Ljaic. Former Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic remains the main promoter of Serbian-Chinese rapprochement. China interacts with both the rulers and the opposition.
In Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic is considered a great friend of China, and in Republika Srpska – Milorad Dodik.
A strong, albeit opaque, role in Serbia’s relations with China is played by the Serbian National Council for Coordination and Cooperation with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, headed by former President Tomislav Nikolic (created in 2017). In some cases, this body acts as a parallel to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Based on the sizeable staff and impressive budget, it can be concluded that its influence will grow. T. Nikolic is also the honorary chairman of the Chinese-Serbian Economic Association.
In the new Serbian government (May 2, 2024), five ministers have a definite pro-Russian orientation, but for them the dilemma is not Russia or China, but West or East. The orientation of this government is definitely to the East, but not so much towards Russia as towards China. This trend is primarily economic, but this is typical for China, which comes with an economic agenda and then deploys all-out penetration. The accumulated economic presence gradually transforms into the political influence.
The West’s pressure on Belgrade to recognize Kosovo, to impose sanctions against Russia, and to recognize the genocide against the Muslims in Srebrenica also contributed to the trend towards the East. Vucic publicly complained in May of this year that the West had massively funded the Serbian opposition to carry out a coup to overthrow the government.
The jump starter of the new Serbian government was Xi Jinping’s visit to Belgrade (May 7-8, 2024), when not only the “ironclad friendship” was confirmed, but also the “building of a community between Serbia and China based on a shared future in the new era” was announced.
Significantly, China has displaced Russia even on Belgrade’s anti-NATO agenda with the commemoration of the anniversary of the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 1999. The Chinese president said in May in Belgrade that “China will never forget” this event. Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe also stated the same during his visit to Serbia in March 2021. With the assistance of Belgrade, he then also visited the Republic of North Macedonia, which received Chinese vaccines within the framework of an intergovernmental agreement. The meetings of the Minister of Defense of the People’s Republic of China in Serbia and in the Republic of North Macedonia were at the highest level (presidents and prime ministers), which can be considered equivalent to a visit by Xi Jinping.
Chinese top-level visits are a major tool for promoting China’s image and have a strong public impact in Western Balkan countries (but less so in EU countries).
China is also ahead of Russia in the development of inter-party relations with Belgrade. Chinese President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping’s visit in Belgrade in May was immediately followed by an all-party CCP delegation led by Politburo member and Beijing Party Organization Secretary Jin Li.
Immediately after that, there was an intensification of the relations between the parliaments of the two countries, as a delegation of the Serbian Parliament, led by Deputy Speaker Marina Raguš, arrived in Beijing on 06.06.2024.
Russia cannot boast of such an intensive development of relations at the highest state level, as Putin’s last visit to Belgrade was in 2019, and Vucic did not dare to go to the parade in Moscow on May 9 this year.
Particularly impressive is the displacement of Russia by China in modernization the Serbian army. Serbia became the first country in Europe to purchase combat drones and the FK-3 anti-aircraft missile system, an analogue of the Russian S-300, from China. However, the importance of abandoning Russian armaments should not be exaggerated, as they are more expensive than Chinese ones and are difficult to obtain today.
During the covid epidemic, Serbia purchased both Russian Sputnik-V vaccines and Chinese vaccines, but A. Vucic was vaccinated with a Sinopharm product. The emotional effect of Chinese aid in this period greatly increased the positive perception of China by Serbs.
- Symbioticity displaces competition
The presence and interests of Russia and China in the WB differ, which is why concrete cooperation between them has not been initiated, despite the announcement of a strategic partnership.
Anti-Americanism is the main driver for combining the efforts of Russia and China, who are working together in the UN to block Western initiatives and to limit the influence of the USA in the Western Balkans and SEE.
For both Russia and China, Serbia is the main political and economic partner in the WB. Their interests coincide on the issue of Kosovo, but while Moscow declares that it will accept any decision on Kosovo that is acceptable to Serbia, the same cannot be said for Beijing. Although Belgrade is clearly trying to balance Moscow’s political influence by toying with Beijing, Russia remains a powerful factor, thanks to a strong pro-Russian lobby in the Serbian government, the growing influence of pro-Russian nationalist formations and the role Russia plays in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.
Serbia is not giving up and has no plans to give up on Russia. Serbia’s multi-vector policy is based on pragmatism and balance, which has recently been evident in Belgrade’s increasingly strong interest in BRICS. This would help Serbia move closer to the desired foreign policy position of “always independent, never isolated”. The RS also expressed interest in improving relations with the BRICS.
In terms of influence in the WB, a strategic cooperation is developing between Russia and China, which began to become visible during the pandemic. Chinese propaganda in Europe and the Balkans is spread through pro-Russian and anti-European electronic sites. Similar symbiotic elements are the exchange of content between media and propaganda institutions in both countries. Russia and China work in tandem with alternative media and appeal to the same public – disenchanted with the West and sympathetic to Eastern autocracies. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese media fully accepted Russian narratives about the causes and consequences of the war.
Economically, Chinese investments in coal-fired thermal power plants in Serbia and Republika Srpska can be seen as an alternative to Russian natural gas and illustrate China’s strategic political motivation. At the current stage, China is turning to renewable energy sources, while Russia remains focused on the oil and gas sphere and the nuclear industry, which is why in the Balkans the two countries are not rivals.
China’s main rival in the Balkans is the EU, which is becoming increasingly suspicious of the Balkan countries’ partnership with China, which is reflected in the warning to Serbia to terminate the Free Trade Agreement with China and some recent legal steps in relation to Chinese projects on the Balkans. By displacing Russia in the Balkans, China risks taking on its role as a scarecrow for the West, traditionally played by Russia.
